Beauty, Life, and Death through a Macro Lens: Is there an Intelligent Designer?

Staying true to form, as predicted. In a pitiful and desperate bid to shift the burden of proof on me, he now wants to make it appear that the default view on Hilbert's Paradox—such is its power it defeats 8 of Pecier's questions—is the one that he happens to hold:

"An actual infinity is a logical impossibility."

As it happens, I could count not only mathematicians and logicians, scratching their heads at this new—and newly default—state-of-affairs, but even William Lane Craig himself. Maybe all of them owe Miguel a new formulation of a disproof, too, as do I?

I don't think he realises people's comments here are actually 'dated' or are arranged in order of the time they have been written; he must think readers of this site will fall for his latest ploy; that because I've mentioned that we have physically possible infinities, it shall be on me whom the burden of proof rests. (Miguel, 4 days ago: "Even d_gently must admit, and maybe has admitted to XIII to some extent, that, at least intuitively, it does seem to be the case that an actual infinity cannot be physically instantiated." DG, 2 weeks ago: "Maybe Miguel meant See William Lane Craig's use [or misuse] of Hilbert's Paradox, and maybe mistook 'logical' for 'intuitional'.")

Perhaps this is to be expected seeing he didn't —and, from all indications, still doesn't—understand what logical impossibilities are (and as opposed to physical impossibilities). Else, he would've bothered to check for an example of infinity in physics. You'd wonder though how much an example of a physically possible infinity would achieve at this point, when, until it was imparted to him, he:

didn't know what an actual infinity was ("an actual infinity is different from the concept of infinity"); wrong to say Hilbert showed it using his famous math parable ("the grand hotel was another way of saying that […] the infinite cannot physically exist"); wrong to claim and insist it was a logical impossibility ("An actual infinity is a logical impossibility, as Hilbert's hotel shows") ; and wrong about where the alleged logical contradiction lie ("Even if an infinite number of guests checked out (odd numbered guests), an infinite number of guests still remain (even numbered guests")).

And this from the guy who told us, 'See Hilbert's Paradox.'…

Well, since we no longer seem to be discussing the main issue (which may be my fault), I guess it's time to wrap this up.

For what its worth, thanks for this discussion d_gently.

M: "Craig uses it, as far as I know, in the same way I have. So, I seriously don't know what you're talking about here."

Seriously, Miguel, you cannot be this obtuse. When one says actual infinite in mathematics or philosophy—and, yes, that includes Craig—they mean a complete or completed infinite set of objects; you on the other hand have been using the term actual infinite to mean a physically existing infinity. To further drive the point, here is Craig clarifying that an actual infinite 'is a collection in which the number of members really is infinite. […] it is 'complete''. And, elsewhere: 'If an actually infinite number of things could exist, a Hilbert's Hotel would be possible.'

If we were to insist your definition was correct and consistent, this is what happens to that last Craig quote when replaced with your own definition of actual infinite:

If a physically existing infinite number of things could exist, a Hilbert's Hotel would be possible.

The statement becomes self-referential or circular and cumbersome to the point it becomes meaningless.

(I've made the same corrections on actual infinites (and v. potential infinites) to XIII in the past. It took forever, but we got there in the end and he relented and modified his definitions. I didn't get thanked nor acknowledged then, though I wasn't expecting nor in need of any. But I'm wondering now why he hasn't stepped in yet to make the same corrections to you and your definitions.)

M: "Of course. Any mathematical object can be used abstractly. Math is an abstraction."

Abstract to same extent as Hilbert's Grand Hotel is. To the same extent as Craig's metpahysical realm is. But we don't see you bring into question their validity and their limits, do we?

M: "Hilbert's hotel shows that an infinity cannot be instantiated in physical reality."

That's not what Hilbert's Paradox shows because Hilbert's Paradox is not physics. Maybe you meant Craig shows—using Hilbert's Paradox—that an infinity cannot exist in reality—by showing first that is is a metaphysical impossibility. Or maybe you meant Hilbert's hotel shows that an infinity cannot be instantiated in metaphysical reality. What is utterly strange with this and should be quickly apparent to anyone is that the very first thing you are asked to do in the thought experiment is to: imagine there exists an infinite hotel. I don't know how much more 'instantiated in metaphysical reality' you could get!

M: "Hilbert was a rigorous defender of Cantor's theorems, and the grand hotel was another way of saying that, although set theory can use the infinite (in some abstract sense), the infinite cannot physically exist."

Maybe you know something Hilbert didn't about the force of his thought experiment? Because—very much unlike you—in his opposition to and search for an infinity in reality he actually also checked with the physics of his time. If what you say is true, then Hilbert himself is so lacking in insight he failed to realise the potency of his own thought experiment. He's so stupid for bothering with his examples from physics and for failing to mention his Grand Hotel when he made his 'the infinite is nowhere to be found in reality, it neither exists in nature nor provides a legitimate basis for rational thought' speech to the Westphalian Mathematical Society? He even tried to solve the continuum problem, the poor man!—when all he needed to do was tell them his Hotel story!

M: "Anyone can imagine a set that contained all the natural numbers, say."

Anyone? Okay, if you say so. But then that should not be just for numbers, mind you. The same goes for hotels, books, universes, or angels dancing on the head of a pin.

M: "But all natural numbers cannot have a one-to-one correspondence with anything in physical reality because if you lined them up, that line would have no end, and will thus make the collection forever incomplete; forever finite."

Again, meaningless waffle that's an attempt or made to look like it understands the concepts involved in infinity. A one-to-one correspondence with anything in physical (metaphysical—but I'm going to drop this contention for now) reality? What would that anything be, pray tell? Forget first about lining up, what do we line up with the set of all natural numbers? Describe what this set—if it is that—of anything is.

[The line … I think you mean the numbering of that (any)thing—but this is your example so… which we take to be infinite would have no end… You're right: it doesn't have an end. But what you do not realise is that it doesn't have a beginning either.)

Seriously, d_gently, you can't possibly be this pedantic. You could at least be more competent about it.

Craig's says:

"Can anyone sincerely believe that such a hotel could exist in reality? These sorts of absurdities illustrate the impossibility of the existence of an actually infinite number of things."

and

"2.11 An actual infinite cannot exist.
2.12 An infinite temporal regress of events is an actual infinite."

You can go read the whole "scholarly article" he's written about the KCA and notice how he uses the term. The point is, I used it to refer to a "physically existing infinity" –you're right. Its official usage in "mathematics or philosophy" is completely irrelevant to the point I made about how the 2 (concept of infinity [in an abstract sense] and actual infinity [as defined by me]) are profoundly different. I've already admitted to not knowing the precise definition, and was only using it in the way Craig did. So, nobody's "insist[ing" their definition is correct but you.

d_gently "That's not what Hilbert's Paradox shows because Hilbert's Paradox is not physics "

If Craig uses Hilbert's paradox to show "that an infinity cannot exist in reality—by showing first that is is a metaphysical impossibility", then that's "what Hilbert's paradox shows" –at least to him and those who are persuaded by his argument. What I find "utterly strange", however, is how you can whirl and twirl about with so many words yet wind up in the same place.

d_gently: "Maybe you know something Hilbert didn't about the force of his thought experiment? Because—very much unlike you—in his opposition to and search for an infinity in reality he actually also checked with the physics of his time. If what you say is true, then Hilbert himself is so lacking in insight he failed to realise the potency of his own thought experiment. He's so stupid for bothering with his examples from physics and for failing to mention his Grand Hotel when he made his 'the infinite is nowhere to be found in reality, it neither exists in nature nor provides a legitimate basis for rational thought' speech to the Westphalian Mathematical Society? He even tried to solve the continuum problem, the poor man!—when all he needed to do was tell them his Hotel story! "

David Hilbert: "The infinite is nowhere to be found in reality. It neither exists in nature nor provides a legitimate basis for rational thought. The role that remains for the infinite…is solely that of an idea…"

LOL.

d_gently: "Again, meaningless waffle that's an attempt or made to look like it understands the concepts involved in infinity. A one-to-one correspondence with anything in physical (metaphysical—but I'm going to drop this contention for now) reality? What would that anything be, pray tell? Forget first about lining up, what do we line up with the set of all natural numbers? Describe what this set—if it is that—of anything is."

Set of any physical objects or series of events. The point is that they cannot form an actual infinite. How many times must we repeat this?

d_gently: "[The line … I think you mean the numbering of that (any)thing—but this is your example so… which we take to be infinite would have no end… You're right: it doesn't have an end. But what you do not realise is that it doesn't have a beginning either.)"

Actually, I didn't mean anything of that sort. But thank you for that fascinating and irrelevant bit of trivia.

Objection 1: Hilbert's Paradox as a Veridical Paradox

Again, I said that Hilbert's Paradox is a veridical paradox only insofar as it occurs within the realm of Mathematics, not when actuated in reality. Fact is: you've never denied the point. You've tried to bury this under a host of jargons and definitions (perhaps hoping somebody would get confused) but the fact is that no-one has ever denied that Hilbert's Paradox is a veridical one.

What's been pointed out (repeatedly) is that that is true only within the confines of Set Theory but that when you attempt to conceptualize actual infinites as physical possibilities, you start getting these logical contradictions.

Objection 2: False Impressions

You say that I am giving the impression that Set Theory only flourishes outside of logic. No, I am not. I am merely pointing out that what may be true in Set Theory may not also be true when in reality.

That said, my contention has always been that Hilbert's Paradox is an example of the logical contradictions that would occur were actual infinites to be actuated in reality. I have always, always, maintained the qualifier, "in reality". This, however, does nothing to show that Miguel's original contention is wrong. Showing that actual infinites result in logical contradictions (when actuated) does, in fact, furnish you with logical reasons for rejecting an infinite regress of causes.

Objection 3: Inconsistencies with Dr. Craig

You say that my position is inconsistent with Dr. Craig's and you even pulled a citation (link please). What needs to be understood here is that Metaphysical Modality refers to modal properties (and any entailments therein) as they pertain to metaphysics. A logical possibility, on the other hand, is simply a statement has no contradictions located therein.

For example (to use Kripke's famous one): Water is H20.

While it is strictly logically possible that Water is not H20 (it violates no first-order rules of logic), it is nevertheless metaphysically impossible that water is not H20 because we know that water is always H20. Basically, logical possibilities refer only to possibilities as they relate to the first-order rules of logic while metaphysical possibilities examine possibilities as they relate to a broader metaphysical worldview.

Now, I didn't use the term as I felt that using the term 'physical' possibilities would be easier to understand (thinking perhaps that metaphysics would be too technical). That and the word meta- (especially in conjunction with the word 'physics') stirs up negative connotations.

Objection 4: Empirical Verifiability

You ask, have I tested these conclusions? Isn't Hilbert's Paradox merely an appeal to intuition?

Well, as an argument, this is just weak. To say that an argument is wrong simply because it has not and ,interestingly, cannot be empirically verified smacks of positivism (a worldview long since shown to be incoherent).

In order to show some proposition x to be false, it is not necessary to test it empirically. It is sufficient to show that proposition x results in a logical contradiction.

In fact, we have a word for this in logic: Reducto ad absurdum, which is 'a form of argument in which a proposition is disproven by following its implications logically to an absurd consequence'.

Interestingly, that is what the argument from Hilbert's Paradox is.

Objection 5: Law of Non-Contradiction

You say that quantum indeterminacy furnishes us with a counter-example to the Law of Non-Contradictions (LNC).

First point, I did not, in fact, respond to this because this was a Red Herring in that the truth or falsity of the LNC does not, in fact, disprove the original argument. Any objection that I rejected this as being something too 'verbose' is purely imaginary.

More importantly, the fact is that quantum indeterminacy and the contradictions that arise from it (as exhibited in Schrodinger's Cat) occur only on indeterministic interpretations of Quantum Mechanics (like the Copenhagen interpretation). There are interpretations of QM that are fully deterministic and these have yet to be ruled out (majority preferences notwithstanding).

QM thus hardly furnishes us with a proven counter-example to the LNC.

If this doesn't suffice, Aristotle himself foresaw this LNC and a harmonized interpretation of the LNC is readily available that is fully compatible with even indeterministic models of QM.

Objection 6: Renormalization

Lastly, you say that Renormalization equations are not merely equations but computational and predictive tools in physics. This is irrelevant. So long as the equations fall under the aegis of Set Theory (and it's attendant prohibitions), renormalization fails to serve as a proven counter-example to the original argument.

Cheers. 😀

To be fair, I do remember Dawkins saying that biology can seem to look designed. That's why people are so convinced of creationist narratives (even the Catholic version of guided evolution). But, obviously, Mr. Boncan here misrepresented Dawkins.

"The argument from improbability states that complex things could not have come about by chance. But many people define 'come about by chance' as a synonym for 'come about in the absence of deliberate design'. Not surprisingly, therefore, they think improbability is evidence of design. Darwinian natural selection shows how wrong this is with respect to biological improbability. And although Darwinism may not be directly relevant to the inanimate world – cosmology, for example – it raises our consciousness in areas outside its original territory of biology.

A deep understanding of Darwinism teaches us to be wary of the easy assumption that design is the only alternative to chance, and teaches us to seek out graded ramps of slowly increasing complexity. Before Darwin, philosophers such as Hume understood that the improbability of life did not mean it had to be designed, but they couldn't imagine the alternative. After Darwin, we all should feel, deep in our bones, suspicious of the very idea of design. The illusion of design is a trap that has caught us before, and Darwin should have immunized us by raising our consciousness. Would that he had succeeded with all of us." — The God Delusion, Chapter 4 — "Why there almost certainly is no God"

Correction:

it is a quote mine from The Blind Watchman.
Evident in Thomas F. Heinze's article: http://www.creationism.org/heinze/PresentDayEx.ht…

he uses both quotes to point out even Dawkins, of all people, seems to agree that we are intelligently designed.

The apparent design is because of Natural Selection. A good starting point would be the book by Dennet, Darwin's Dangerous Idea.

Either dboncan didnt read Dawkins or didn't understand his writings.

Or maybe it is because that Dawkins is a hack. Anyway, how on earth does Natural Selection lead to an appearance of design?

//Anyway, how on earth does Natural Selection lead to an appearance of design?// ask some backward thinking creationist

the two quotes used by dboncan are explicitly used in this article. http://www.creationism.org/heinze/AppearanceOfDes…

If you read the above points: it's about the watchmaker analogy/fallacy

for those interested in the book http://www.terebess.com/keletkult/The_Blind_Watch…

1. I don't care about dboncan.
2. My point is that Natural Selection in no way explains the appearance of design, most clearly evident in the cosmic fine-tuning of the universe for intelligent life.

Natural Selection is about biology, not about cosmic fine tuning. Now it shows who is the hack here. Seems you are in the same boat as dboncan. Make sure you understand first what you are trying to discredit.

now now, just because someone does not subscribe to dawkins does not mean he is a fundy. irreligion is viewed through many angles.

you got the likes of
Harris vs. Dawkins (on morality)
Berlinski vs. Hitchens (on philosophy NOT Intelligent Design)

Not me who said somebody is a fundie, dude. I am saying NS is about biological evolution and does not have in its scope

"design, most clearly evident in the cosmic fine-tuning of the universe for intelligent life"

which is religion talk, not science.

//I don't care about dboncan. //
neither do i, as far as i care he's a source of entertainment.

// My point is that Natural Selection in no way explains the appearance of design, most clearly evident in the cosmic fine-tuning of the universe for intelligent life.//

thats the point of the book. creationists see what they want to see and rely on their imagination to come to a conclusion.

seeming desing = designed.

Neil Degrasse Tyson explains the human body, the world etc. could not be designed intelligently. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4238NN8HMgQ

That's why I did not appeal to the appearance of design of the human body.

For the record: I believe in evolution.

Now, what I'm trying to say here is that there is no comparably good explanation for the appearance of design as regards to the cosmic fine-tuning (cosmology) as exists in evolution (biology). Dawkins admits as much in his book, 'the God Delusion'. To wit:

"6. We should not give up hope of a better crane arising in physics, something as powerful as Darwinism is for biology."
– Dawkins, The God Delusion,158.

Now, you do point out that there is a jump from something's seeming designed to it actually being designed. For example, there might be other, more plausible explanations other than design that could count for that appearance. For example, chance.

That is true (that there are other explanations) and the task of the critical thinker is to weigh competing arguments from both sides in order to discern the truth. Is the fine-tuning due to chance, nature or design? You decide.

still working on the Cambridge paper. differing views is the spice of life!

//That is true (that there are other explanations) and the task of the critical thinker is to weigh competing arguments from both sides in order to discern the truth. Is the fine-tuning due to chance, nature or design? You decide.//

Oh i agree wholeheartedly. Read, learn and understand before making an informed decision. i would not be making my jump to agnosticism without it.

i just keep an open mind until technology and discoveries finally reveal more than what we currently have.

just for the record i am no Dawkins-fanboy. i find fun in trashing creationist quote-miners. and i dont see design, i see the beauty of adaptation, mutation then finally evolution.

_XIII_, what's your take on both weak and strong anthropic principles, then? Or, more to the point, on the Copernican principle as applied to cosmology and meta-cosmology? Note that I don't even have to invoke the hidden dimensions landscape hypothesis.

And isn't claiming that the fundamental constants of the universe are fine-tuned to support life a claim too strong to be thrown out in such a cavalier way? Have we observed other universes and compared them to ours for us to be able to conclude that our set of fundamental constants are for the maximization of life? Do we know enough about the effects of changing the values of these constants to so confidently declare that all other sets are inferior in supporting life or even hostile to life? Remember, optimization is only well defined when it is in the context of a comparison of values. If the universe is optimized to support life, what is our source of comparison, thought experiments and hypothetical tweaking of fundamental constants?

1. I'm not familiar how the strong anthropic principle relates to the Teleological Argument so I can't comment. That said, I don't find the weak anthropic principle convincing as an argument at all. To wit:

"As Leslie points out, if 50 sharpshooters all miss me, the response “if they had not missed me I would not be here to consider the fact” is inadequate. Instead, I would naturally conclude that there was some reason why they all missed, such as that they never really intended to kill me."
(Collins 2009)

Why?

"Because, conditioned on background information . . . that does not include my continued existence – such as the background information of a third-party observer watching the execution – my continued existence would be very improbable under the hypothesis that they intended to kill me, but not improbable under the hypothesis that they did not intend to kill me."
(ibid)

What Collins does here is formalize Leslie' intuitions as regards to his counter-example to the Weak Anthropic Principle (WAP).

Collins proposes that in response to the WAP, we simply need to reformulate the argument as follows: that our existence as 'embodied moral agents' is extremely unlikely under Naturalism but not under theism (which goes on to disconfirm naturalism vis-a-vis theism).

I can't explain it very well due to space constraints but Leslie's counter-example should be plenty clear enough to at least get the point across.

2. We don't need to compare our universe with other universes in order to discern whether our universe is fine-tuned for life. For example, gravity. Very simply, if gravity were stronger, we wouldn't exist as even a planet only 40ft in diameter would exert a gravitational pull 1000 times that of Earth (if gravity were to, say, be 1 billion times stronger).

Now, we don't need to compare that with other universes in order to discern that gravity so defined is not life-permitting. We know that the Laws of Physics in our universe would entail that.

So Dawkins is a hack. What are you then? Do you have a thesis you could publish to refute it? Don't worry, we know who the real hack is. 🙂

I'd take a hack of a deranged loon anytime (heinze writes for jack chick).

In fairness to XIII i did fall asleep reading the god delusion. too much science can make any read tedious.

though select chapters are definitely worth reading.
like: NOMA, the great prayer experiment and primitive man's overactive imagination

If you want an actually credible work, might I suggest the Cambridge Companion to Atheism? At least there, you don't get such glaring fallacies like a non-sequitur, of all things.

nice, philosophy side to non-religion, mostly quotes Dennette
anyone interested here's the book. http://ase.tufts.edu/cogstud/papers/atheism.pdf

I prefer Tyson's view of the world. and he has a meme. http://knowyourmeme.com/memes/neil-degrasse-tyson…

Oh, come off it.

Just because Dawkins writes books doesn't mean that his ideas are sacrosanct or that he's never wrong. The reason I dismiss Dawkins as a hack is because his arguments (that touch on philosophy) are *dubious*. You don't have to take my word for it. Other (much more credible) atheists have also expressed the same sentiments.

The problem with that version of creation ex nihilo is that it shows Krauss's complete ignorance of philosophy. Krauss's "nothing" is a sea of quantum energy still governed by physical laws. That's hardly a "nothing" in a strict metaphysical sense. Krauss even admitted this much during his debate with Craig.

And to object with a "who made God?" is to seriously miss the point because it assumes the premiss the argument rests on is 'everything has a cause'.

Not quite.

The premiss the whole argument actually rests on is the one for which we have at least prima facie evidence for, which is: everything that *begins to exist* has a cause, or, everything that's contingent has a cause.

God isn't arbitrarily defined as an uncaused entity, actually. The aim of the whole argument, in it's complete form, and not the form it takes on infidel websites, is to show that there must be a cause of everything which could not in principle be caused because it's not the sort of thing that in principle can be said to have had a cause.

Ofcourse, the reasons for the above, in all their complexity, won't be easy to show here –if I even attempted to do so, I'd be doing an injustice to philosophers like al-Ghazali, Aquinas, Leibniz, or Craig– but It nevertheless shows why an objection like the one made above is not a serious objection to the cosmological argument.

Just sayin.

Yes, that is true because, according to quantum physics, even empty space has stuff due to the uncertainty principle. Actually, to suppose a “beginning” for the universe misunderstands what time is and how it “began” itself at the big bang. All notions of causality fly out the window. Asking what came before the big bang is like asking what’s north of north or what is outside space. It is effectively meaningless. Krauss’ “nothing” is simply a something that is not the universe we have today—an environment from which a universe such as ours, with its dimensions, particle energies, and entropies, can spring forth. So, on that we can agree.

A god is an arbitrary starting point because it is a failure of the imagination. It asserts that the universe could not bring itself to being, or could not have existed forever. Huge assumptions that are not even argued for with any evidence whatsoever. It assumes that there must be nothing rather than something. Why shouldn’t we ask, rather, why there could even be nothing? Why is nothingness the default? It prioritizes our own cognitive biases over the actual fact of the matter: that the universe is much stranger than we can ever intuitively understand. And why would we be able to intuitively understand the nature of cosmos? Our brains never had the evolutionary pressure to understand how light can be both a particle and a wave, how electrons are everywhere in an area but only as a function of a probability equation, how light takes every possible path from point A to point B.

It is outside our realm of experience to know just what kinds of things “start” something like the universe, which is not like just anything else that we know, because it itself is everything that there could be. We have never seen anything like a universe, where time is inextricable from space, begin. So, to suggest that since everything we know has a cause, then the universe itself must have a cause rests on a simple failure of the imagination. It’s an argument from incredulity.

At the very very least, the position must remain that we do not know how or why the universe began. And definitely, to add a sentient intelligent being as the solution to the causality chain is no answer at all. (It itself rests on even more assumptions, such as that things such as intelligence and sentience can exist without material such neurons or electrical charges.)

To summarize, the god argument rests on several tenuous assumptions:

– That there is something that is “before” time. (That is, there was a time, t = –1s.)
– That the universe or the laws of nature did not always exist.
– That the universe could not bring itself into being from the pre-existing laws of nature.
– That there must always be nothing instead of something.
– That a god is free from all the existential responsibilities of causality that are unfairly lumped on the universe.
– That the beginning of the universe operated on our intuitions of cause and effect.
– That the universe must have a cause.
– That sentient intelligent gods with thoughts, wills, and desires can exist without material such as neurons or electrical impulses.

And these are just off the top of my head.

And, again, this is just the deist argument. Theists have all their work ahead of them even if we allow them all these assumptions.

The "what's north of the north pole' objection has become an increasingly popular objection to the cosmological argument. But, ironically, it has already been dispensed with centuries ago.

Aristotle wasn't even interested in proving God's existence when he made his argument from change where a potential can only be actualized by something that's already been actualized until a first cause that's pure actuality would be inescapable as a starting point.

Aquinas and the old scholastics even assumed that the universe was eternal.

Ofcourse, these versions were made centuries before Einstein developed his theory that gave us an idea of the reality of time.

But, so what? the objection will only hold if the argument claims God created the universe *before* time. Indeed, the word 'before' shows a temporal relation, so it really wouldn't make sense to say "before time". But God need not be chronologically prior to the act of creating. Intention and action can happen simultaneously; you can be preforming the act of hanging from a tree branch while simultaneously having the intention of not falling. So, the idea that God created the universe while not being chronologically prior to it isn't at all incoherent. And it sure is more coherent than an infinite regress.

Krauss unruefully tried to circumvent this by saying that mathematicians do in fact deal with infinities, yet this only succeeds in further demonstrating the illogic of his position because an actual infinity is different from the concept of infinity.

God isn't an "arbitrary starting point" because the cosmological argument is a strict metaphysical demonstration that precludes any scientific considerations. They start with a priori generalizations that science itself must assume to be true for it to work –like, for instance, that there's an empirical world at all, or that our senses can be trusted. Like I said previously, without getting into the details of the argument, it's aim is to show that there must be a cause of everything which could not in principle be caused because it’s not the sort of thing that in principle can be said to have had a cause.

Nothing is arbitrarily posited. Everything proceeds from premises that science can scarcely deny without denying its own evidential presuppositions.

And, if everything proves sound, then, yes, theists will still have alot of work ahead of them in demonstrating the truth of their views. But then it would be a debate between different strands of theism, and not whether theism or atheism were true.

" So, the idea that God created the universe while not being chronologically prior to it isn't at all incoherent. " And you can't replace "God" here with the "laws of physics" why?

"Krauss unruefully tried to circumvent this by saying that mathematicians do in fact deal with infinities, yet this only succeeds in further demonstrating the illogic of his position because an actual infinity is different from the concept of infinity."

Completely beside the point.

"They start with a priori generalizations that science itself must assume to be true for it to work –like, for instance, that there's an empirical world at all, or that our senses can be trusted."

The difference being science actually admits to its limits. If, say, that empiricism were to fail to produce an understandable and coherent picture of our nature, then science must revise itself. That the world is not empirically comprehensible would have implications on science. Suppose that evidence of the supernatural actually rears its fabled head, then science must incorporate this into itself. If it is unable to study the supernatural, then, at the very least, study the how the supernatural interacts with the natural.

But, this is all to fall prey to your attempts to sidetrack the conversation.

"God isn't an "arbitrary starting point" because the cosmological argument is a strict metaphysical demonstration that precludes any scientific considerations."

Then it is consigned to meaninglessness. You could very well say the same thing about invisible snow faeries with orange capris.

"Like I said previously, without getting into the details of the argument, it's aim is to show that there must be a cause of everything which could not in principle be caused because it’s not the sort of thing that in principle can be said to have had a cause. Nothing is arbitrarily posited. "

Yes, "God" is the arbitrary assertion. Why can't the universe or the laws of physics not be the uncaused cause?

I issue the challenge again, why should there be nothing instead of something?

The advantage of starting with the universe or the laws of physics is you cut off an unnecessary element that explains nothing. We know for a fact that the universe exists (to the extent that the word "fact" retains any meaning). Nobody knows for a fact whether God, a god, or gods exist. Until proven otherwise, I would choose the more parsimonious theory. Especially in the face of the assumption you conveniently ignored: that sentience can exist without matter.

For the sake of convenience, I will post again the list of assumptions that the god hypothesis makes.

– That there is something that is "before" time. (That is, there was a time, t = –1s.) [To be charitable, I'll let you off the hook for this one, but I do not think you understand the implications of this. No "before" time would mean that the laws of nature have always existed in some form without needing gods.]

All the rest, you did not back up at all.
– That the universe or the laws of nature did not always exist.
– That the universe could not bring itself into being from the pre-existing laws of nature.
– That there must always be nothing instead of something.
– That a god is free from all the existential responsibilities of causality that are unfairly lumped on the universe.
– That the beginning of the universe operated on our intuitions of cause and effect.
– That the universe must have a cause.
– That sentient intelligent gods with thoughts, wills, and desires can exist without material such as neurons or electrical impulses.

You draw your conclusions from begging the question that naturalism is true. You're beholden to the idea that propositions for which we cannot have empirical evidence for are meaningless, but that's a snake that bites itself in the tail because you cannot prove, through empirical evidence, that only propositions we can have empirical evidence for are meaningful. Much of modern philosophy has already ruled out verificationism as a philosophical dead-end precisely because it is self-refuting.

The reason why "the universe or the laws of physics" cannot be it's own prime-mover is because that's the very thing that is ruled out by the cosmological argument –which, again, proceeds from premises that even science cannot dismiss without undermining itself. If you think we should do so, then at least some argument as to why we must distrust our modal intuitions is in order.

Let's take one of its variations; aristotle's 'act and potency (although Craig's Kalam is the most honed in my opinion): 'Only what is actualized can have the potential to actualize, therefore, an agent that's pure actuality must have been the starting point'. (this is, ofcourse a very rough summation). Saying the universe is it's own prime-mover is essentially saying that the universe actualized itself, which violates the whole concept of act and potency, which claims, not through arbitrary armchair-meandering, but through rigorous philosophical and metaphysical demonstration that that which has potency cannot actualize itself. It must be actualized by something else.

That's why you cannot just assert that the universe can be its own prime-mover without a philosophical argument that's sound. Without the ability to infer that conclusion from demonstrably sound premises, you might as well assert anything you wish in its place.

So, I'm not "undercutting" anything that's already necessarily ruled out by the argument. You can, however, refute the argument, or one of its premises. I would be glad to hear some such.

And on the "noth of north pole" thing, what I was saying is that it's not incoherent for God to create the universe and do so outside of time (not before time). To create would entail an *intention* to do so. And it doesn't put God
chronologically prior to the act of creating –which would mean he was *before time*– because he could have intended to create while simultaneously doing so, as my previous example shows. I am not suggesting that God existed before time. I'm suggesting God exists outside of time. I'm familiar with that contention, and the only seeming contradiction is the intent and the act, because both are seen to have temporal relations, which isn't necessarily the case.

On your notion that only complex systems can be sentient, this isn't as obvious as you seem to think. The mind-body problem, and mental states like intentionality suggest otherwise. But this is a completely different subject. And it's a digression that isn't worth having as it will lead us away from the heart of our discussion. However, we can get to this, if you like.As for your "list of assumptions", I'm afraid I'm going to have to overlook it for now. But I think I've been able to answer the more substantive part of your case.

I simply subscribe to naturalism because there are no good reasons to believe that the supernatural exists. I also believe that an objective reality exists (that is, I do not think that we are in a computer simulation). The world would be very different if the supernatural were to be a real thing. (Fields such as medicine would cease to be a coherent field of knowledge if prayers, for example, were to disrupt the lawful succession of events of disease progression.) I admit that science has values of empiricism built into it, and ultimately, the only reason why we use such values is because they work. (A reason why I do not think that there is a true distinction between facts and values, but that’s a different thing altogether.) I acknowledge the limits of reason, in that you cannot use logic to prove logic and no amount of evidence can be used to support the idea that using evidence is a good idea. But here’s the thing, the same limits apply to you. Unless you simply want to assert narratives about this god of yours and how you simply take this assumption without making a case for it using evidence because you do not value evidence, reason, or logic, then our conversation is at an impasse. I cannot reason with you at all. Though, I am skeptical that you would be as dismissive of empiricism if someone were to say to you that your car is being towed.

So, if you continue to assert simply that the cosmological argument says that the universe cannot bring itself into being because that’s what the cosmological argument means (“The reason why “the universe or the laws of physics” cannot be it’s own prime-mover is because that’s the very thing that is ruled out by the cosmological argument –which, again, proceeds from premises that even science cannot dismiss without undermining itself.”) then I simply cannot convince you of anything and that’s alright, because this thread has been exceedingly interesting.

“Saying the universe is it’s own prime-mover is essentially saying that the universe actualized itself, which violates the whole concept of act and potency, which claims, not through arbitrary armchair-meandering, but through rigorous philosophical and metaphysical demonstration that that which has potency cannot actualize itself.”

I can see now that it takes a lot of learning, such as what you clearly have, to be so very wrong. Such babbling as this is exactly what physicists like as Hawking complain about regarding philosophy. It has failed to keep up with science and it is drowning in its own ejaculate. “Rigorous philosophical and metaphysical demonstration” indeed. I am almost tempted to believe that this is a Sokal-esque hoax.

“That’s why you cannot just assert that the universe can be its own prime-mover without a philosophical argument that’s sound.”

“Without the ability to infer that conclusion from demonstrably sound premises, you might as well assert anything you wish in its place. ”

I completely agree, which is why I’m baffled that you seem to have impressed even yourself. I would hope that it is not sufficient that a system of knowledge be self-consistent to be believable for you. It would need to reflect objective reality. I’m afraid that this might be too much to hope for.

“I’m suggesting God exists outside of time. ”

I know, which is why I stopped pressing the point. The fiction of intention and tree branches remains unimpressive, however.

“But I think I’ve been able to answer the more substantive part of your case.”

I think you have, in that I think you have refuted my assumption that people are generally reasonable and amenable to change their mind using evidence.

You may very well be completely right, Miguel, on every single one of your claims. But I could also be right when I say that blue and yellow polkadot-speckled narwhals the size of battleships emerged from the tails of rhinoceroses during lunar eclipses in the Devonian era. This is because narwhals achieve their potential quantum systematics as a result of temporal displacement topologies. Neither of these claims make testable predictions and neither will ever be disproved. Without a single drop of evidence for your case, (all the while abstracting Aristotelian concepts) you would only be right coincidentally. I’d sooner choose to admit that I do not know how the universe came to be than bask in glibness masquerading as a plausible refutation of a thoroughly scientific claim: that the universe brought itself into being.

You talk as if empiricism owns logic so that denying the former entails denying the latter. That's not true. Logic is precisely what I'm using –and what others have used– to show that empiricism, or verificationism, is false. You then assume that when one denies empiricism one is committed to the belief that emprirical evidence doesn't matter. Again, that's not true. Empirical evidence does matter, but It's not all that matters, and that's where the "logic" points to.

The problem with all of this isn’t that it’s an absolutely bizarre response, though of course it is, but rather that it seems to be a very obvious attempt at creating a strawman just to be able to attack something.

Notice that I never "continue[d] to assert simply that the cosmological argument says that the universe cannot bring itself into being because that's what the cosmological argument means" without having expended a good effort to show why that is precisely the case. You accuse me as if I merely asserted it. I did not. But I understand that it will be easier for you to pretend that I did.

And to say that all that is just "babbling" seems to me a very thin excuse to avoid having to educate oneself in the subject –as indeed one should if he's to be taken seriously.

The you bandy about the implication that I'm inconsiderate of your "evidence", which you say should suffice to convince a reasonable mind. But where, pray tell, is it?

As for your puerile analogy of "blue and yellow polkadot-speckled narwhals the size of battleships", I'll take it seriously once you show how it can have the same explanatory power a God hypothesis can have while still having some semblance of being non adhoc. Your equation of this babyish mockery to the ideas of Aristotle, and the old scholastics is telling of your ignorance of philosophy, and it manifests a deep flaw in the way you think. You think philosophy is all "babble". The problem is, the God question is a philosophical one.

"You then assume that when one denies empiricism one is committed to the belief that emprirical evidence doesn't matter. Again, that's not true. Empirical evidence does matter, but It's not all that matters, and that's where the "logic" points to."

I don't see anywhere where I claimed this. In fact, I even conceded to the limitations of empiricism.

"Notice that I never "continue[d] to assert simply that the cosmological argument says that the universe cannot bring itself into being because that's what the cosmological argument means" without having expended a good effort to show why that is precisely the case. "

Here is exactly where you did this: "The reason why "the universe or the laws of physics" cannot be it's own prime-mover is because that's the very thing that is ruled out by the cosmological argument –which, again, proceeds from premises that even science cannot dismiss without undermining itself." Premises, I might add, that you never presented.

"And to say that all that is just "babbling" seems to me a very thin excuse to avoid having to educate oneself in the subject –as indeed one should if he's to be taken seriously. "

I'm sorry if all this talk of potency and whatnot strikes me as nonsense. "Saying the universe is it's own prime-mover is essentially saying that the universe actualized itself, which violates the whole concept of act and potency, which claims, not through arbitrary armchair-meandering, but through rigorous philosophical and metaphysical demonstration that that which has potency cannot actualize itself."

"You think philosophy is all "babble"."

I find nowhere in did I say that all philosophy is babble. Maybe yours is, but certainly not all.

"The problem is, the God question is a philosophical one."

I must insist that it is scientific as the god hypothesis (at least, the theist variant) makes testable predictions. It makes predictions about the nature of medicine, biology, and physics. The deist variant is one of a failure of imagination, still.

"The you bandy about the implication that I'm inconsiderate of your "evidence", which you say should suffice to convince a reasonable mind."

On the contrary, I assert that you have no evidence for your claims, not that I particularly have evidence for mine. You may have noticed that I remain in the position that "I do not know how the universe came to be than bask in glibness masquerading as a plausible refutation of a thoroughly scientific claim: that the universe brought itself into being." I avoid any claims to know how the universe began, save that the god hypothesis is unimpressive at best and useless at worst.

"I'll take it seriously once you show how it can have the same explanatory power a God hypothesis can have while still having some semblance of being non adhoc. "

And what is the power of the god hypothesis? That something intelligent and sentient must have created the universe? That requires even more explaining. It's much simpler to presume that the universe (or its prerequisites that have been proposed by Krauss, Penrose, and Hawking) must have always been here in some form. No need to posit additional attributes to the first cause such as intelligence or sentience.

My challenge remains unsatisfied: why should there be nothing rather than something?

Garrick,

I'm not saying their should be nothing rather than something, I'm saying there should be a prime-mover, or an uncaused cause, and that the cosmological argument rules out the universe itself, or whatever physical laws, as a candidate.

I'm also saying that the cosmological argument doesn't posit a God out of convenience. It's the opposite. Aristotle, who's act and potency argument was where most of the variations of the CA had been derived, wasn't even meant to show the existence of a God. But that's where it led to. The cosmological argument leads to theism, it doesn't start from it.

The God question is a purely philosophical one, because the scientific method needs to presuppose naturalism to work. You cannot know anything about the immaterial if you're employing a method that already presupposes it does not exist. You're cutting the branch that holds you and thinking yourself clever by doing so.

I won't go to back to each of your points. We both won't be persuading the other. But that's just as well, because we both don't seek to.

Thanks for this exchange. I apologize if I was being a bit too polemical in my previous posts.

Happy new year to you.

"… the cosmological argument rules out the universe itself, or whatever physical laws, as a candidate."

Why?

"You cannot know anything about the immaterial if you're employing a method that already presupposes it does not exist."

I don't immediately dismiss the supernatural on principle. The world would look vastly different, however, if the supernatural existed.

"Thanks for this exchange. I apologize if I was being a bit too polemical in my previous posts. Happy new year to you."

To be quite honest, this was very refreshing, and as I said before, this was exceedingly interesting. You might have noticed the level of discourse that's usually here.

Happy new year!

Just to answer your last question so you don't lose sleep over it. (I kid.) :

The cosmological argument rules out the universe or whatever physical laws as a candidate because they are, by their nature, contingent.

I pretty much studied the evolution of the cosmological argument from Aristotle to the medieval scholastics to Aquinas and Leibniz, and then finally to the modern version that's being popularized by Dr. Craig.

Anyway, I'm sure we'll be debating again. I check this blog often. I usually butt heads with innerminds. He's a nice chap.

Thanks again.

I agree that the universe as it is currently known to science is contingent.

Here are a few things that bother me about the CA, however:

(1) Are there logical reasons for ruling out an infinite regress of causes?

(2) Human science seems, at least to me, to be less than halfway toward achieving a final theory. Who is to disregard the possibility that in the final theory (considering that such exists), the Universe (both in the philosophical and physical sense) will turn out to have a logically necessary existence so that it will not require an uncaused cause? Remember, although science rests on the assumptions of naturalism, some versions of the final theory hope to discovery a (natural) link between a priori truths and the ultimate nature of reality. Aren't we prematurely anticipating the form that this final theory will take by assuming that only a supernatural entity can provide the link between being and non-being?

(3) This is a corollary of the previous item: Is it valid to assume that all natural facts must be contingent facts? Is it not possible to someday discover a fact that is both natural (not supernatural) and necessary (not contingent)?

(4) Still a corollary of (2): What are the reasons for supposing that the totality of nature (what one might call the Universe) is not its own uncaused cause? Who are we to deny once and for all the possibility that several causal chains back from the Big Bang is an uncaused cause that is not supernatural?

(5) Should we still hold on to Kant's strict dichotomy between a priori truths and a posteriori truths? Have not Kripke and others thrown serious doubts on the said dichotomy?

(6) Are all necessary facts a priori? Are there logical reason for denying the existence of necessary a posteriori facts? (Note: I am asking for logical and not practical reasons. The reason must have nothing to do with execution, only with logical possibility.)

(7) Does causality have meaning outside of time? That is, is it meaningful to assert that the cause of the Universe's existence is outside of time?

Given the above questions, I think the CA has a lot of gaping holes its supporters are happy to skirt around.

I am aware that the above questions are double-edged swords. I am not at all cozy with my atheism and naturalism. But given the current state of scientific knowledge about the ultimate nature of reality, I don't think anyone has the right to be cozy with their metaphysical beliefs.

Also note that the above challenges cannot be done away with by saying that the CA rests on premises that are prior to science, because it is this very premise that is being put under question. Who are we to say that science, even in its final form, will remain subsequent to logic?

I only have to answer your first question to undermine everything you said.

Yes. There are logical reasons for ruling out an infinite regress. See Hilbert's Paradox.

on your 7th question, it certainly isn't meaningless to say that something caused the universe and did so outside of (our) time. If it were meaningless, then we can forget about string theory, oscillating universe theories and other such.

And, you may not know this, but it's ridiculous to imply that science may undermine logic –which is what you did in the last sentence of your response– because logic is an important component of science. If divorced, it will make the whole project useless.

PD: '(1) Are there logical reasons for ruling out an infinite regress of causes?'

M: 'I only have to answer your first question to undermine everything you said. Yes. There are logical reasons for ruling out an infinite regress. See Hilbert's Paradox.'

DG: See Veridical Paradox.

And you can demonstrate that, yes? Can you demonstrate that Hilbert's Paradox is, in fact, false? If you say that the fact that this universe exists proves that Hilbert's Paradox is wrong, that's begging the question: You are assuming that the universe is eternal.

DG: See Veridical Paradox.

M: see XIII's response.

M: "Yes. There are logical reasons for ruling out an infinite regress. See Hilbert's Paradox."

Hilbert's Paradox:

'is a mathematical veridical paradox (a non-contradictory speculation that is strongly counter-intuitive) about infinite sets presented by German mathematician David Hilbert. …

These cases demonstrate the 'paradox', by which we mean not that it is contradictory, but rather that a counter-intuitive result is provably true: The situations "there is a guest to every room" and "no more guests can be accommodated" are not equivalent when there are infinitely many rooms.' – Wikipedia, http://goo.gl/44pA6

A NON-CONTRADICTORY speculation that is strongly counter-intuitive.

DG: See Veridical Paradox:

“The logician Willard V. O. Quine distinguishes Falsidical Paradoxes, which are seemingly valid, logical demonstrations of absurdities, from Veridical Paradoxes, such as the birthday paradox, which are seeming absurdities that are nevertheless true.”

Seeming absurdities that are nevertheless true.

Ergo Set Theory.

XIII: "And you can demonstrate that, yes? Can you demonstrate that Hilbert's Paradox is, in fact, false? If you say that the fact that this universe exists proves that Hilbert's Paradox is wrong, that's begging the question: You are assuming that the universe is eternal. "

Or I can do you one better and not only 'demonstrate' it, but prove it—the 'logical' part in Pecier's asking for logical reasons.

Better still, I can—well, not me personally, but Georg Cantor—prove it as TRUE.

So I repeat myself: See Veridical Paradox. See Set Theory.

Maybe Miguel meant See William Lane Craig's use [or misuse] of Hilbert's Paradox, and maybe mistook 'logical' for 'intuitional'.

'At the turn of the century, in Germany, the Russian-born mathematician Georg Cantor applied the tools of mathematical rigor and logical deduction to questions about infinity in search of satisfactory answers. His conclusions are paradoxical to our everyday experience, yet they are mathematically sound. The world of our everyday experience is finite. We can't exactly say where the boundary line is, but beyond the finite, in the realm of the transfinite, things are different.'

– Infinity is for Children—and Mathematicians!, http://goo.gl/X33O7

XIII: (i) 'If you say that the fact that this universe exists proves that Hilbert's Paradox is wrong, that's begging the question: You are assuming that the universe is eternal.'

Who's saying what, really? I mean:

(ii) 'If you say that the fact that this universe exists proves that Hilbert's Paradox is TRUE (as in, NOT logical (or not intuitive)), that's begging the question: You are assuming that the universe (or, for our purposes, the multiverse) is NOT ETERNAL.'

i, as I've already shown, is NOT my position, whilst ii is demonstrably a re-statement of your (or Miguel's) argument. Your appeals to intuition basically amount to saying that 'the fact that this universe exists proves that Hilbert's Paradox is ''true''—XIII and Miguel ''true''; i.e., illogical—such that an infinite regress cannot happen.'

I wonder, therefore, who, really, is begging the question?

1. You do know that Hilbert's Paradox is only a veridical paradox insofar as it pertains only to mathematics?

Yet what the KCA asks us to imagine is Hilbert's Hotel existing in reality. No one has ever denied that Hilbert's Hotel is strongly counter-intuitive yet can be demonstrated to be true in mathematics. That is because mathematics (and set theory) have prohibitions set in place that forbid certain operations when working with mathematical infinites.

The problem is that these prohibitions have no normative force in reality. As Craig points out, you can slap the hand of the mathematician who goes against these prohibitions but there's nothing you can do against someone who takes a book from an infinite library or a child who takes a coin from an infinite piggy bank.

In math, you can get around this contradictions simply by calling it 'undefined' but in the real world there is no such cop-out.

What this shows is that an actual infinite though mathematically possible is impossible in reality.

2. That's not what we do at all (that is, beg the question in favor of a temporally finite universe). Rather, what we're trying to show you is that Hilbert's Paradox results in logical contradictions.

And logical contradictions are, by definition, impossible in reality.

For example, it is impossible for some statement x to be both true and not true at the same time (e.g. it is impossible for the earth to both exist and not exist at the same time) as per the Law of Non-Contradiction (dialetheists notwithstanding).

On the contrary, neither Miguel and I are begging the question here because we are not assuming that the universe is eternal but are showing that it is not eternal by proving that an infinite regress (of anything) is impossible in reality.

I appreciate the clarification, but you're confusing, I think, the concept of infinity with the idea of an actual infinity.

(Krauss made the same mistake during his debate with Craig, which is something I pointed out to Garrick)

The concept of infinity is manipulable, of course, by our imagination; we can use it, we've in fact been using it (well not me, but others), in set theory, in contriving paradoxes and what have you. But an actual infinity is a logical impossibility, as Hilbert's hotel shows; an actual infinity would be akin to saying 2 + 2 = not 4.

But I'll leave you to your discussion with XIII as this is also, I think, what he's reasoning.

[Yes. There are logical reasons for ruling out an infinite regress. See Hilbert's Paradox.]

Noted. Let me get back on this point at some later time.

However, I do not believe that answering the first question undermines everything I said. The other questions are quite independent from the first.

[on your 7th question, it certainly isn't meaningless to say that something caused the universe and did so outside of (our) time. If it were meaningless, then we can forget about string theory, oscillating universe theories and other such.]

Nope, a supernatural God outside of time is on a completely different league from string theory and oscillating universes. If an atemporal God and string theory are comparable, then that would undermine one of the central claims of the CA. Isn't that why we supposedly need a God outside of time, because even quantum vacuum and pre-singularity scientific theories are supposedly not enough to surmount the challenges of the contingency of Being? Don't you agree that string theory and oscillating universe theories are incomparable to the supposed act of God's initiation of Being?

In fact, if I'm not mistaken, you even used their incomparability in your discussion with Garrick. You remember your reply when Garrick suggested the quantum void as a candidate uncaused cause? If you are to be consistent with that reply, then you must not compare God's atemporal causation with string theory and oscillating universe theories.

At any rate, what do you mean by time? Time, has a very precise definition in physics. There are two, actually, one used in GR and the other used in QM. The GR definition is quite fixed while the study of time in QM is still an active field of research. At any rate, it is these definitions that I had in mind when I asked my question. What definition of time do you have in mind?

[And, you may not know this, but it's ridiculous to imply that science may undermine logic –which is what you did in the last sentence of your response– because logic is an important component of science. If divorced, it will make the whole project useless.]

No, I was not implying that science will undermine logic; I agree that that's ridiculous and I sure as hell wouldn't make that claim. You know it's funny because I was actually implying the exact opposite: I was implying that science will turn out to be logical in the end. In other words, I was opening the possibility that the final theory of science will turn out to be a logical necessity. In that sense, a supernatural uncaused cause will be both unnecessary and superfluous.

Btw, are you familiar with the many competing views on the final theory of science? If you are not, then it's understandable why you utterly misunderstood items (2) through (7). They are all linked to the idea that the final theory of science will turn out to be a logical necessity. In short, in some versions of the final theory, logical facts and fundamental empirical facts (such as the universe's existence or the values of the fundamental constants) will turn out to be linked by necessity.

Personally, I am not sold to this view of the final theory. However, the possibility that this view is correct throws serious doubts to the very starting points of the CA project.

I am busy now, but your almost complete misunderstanding of many of my points deserve a respectable reply, so please wait for them. In the meanwhile, try answering items (2)-(7) again.

Pecier, do you mind if I just overlook your previous response and answer this one to streamline our discussion.

The rest of your questions may not be dependent on the first, but they certainly are rendered irrelevant by my answer to it.

A God shown by the CA will necessarily be outside of (our) time (at least Craig's CA) and so will other candidate universes and whatever universe creating mechanism –if you'd like to call it that– that created ours. So while string theory, per se, may be immune to this, some extensions that arise from the theory, without which the theory, at least for some scientists, won't work, won't be. Of course, I don't know where the consensus is on this. As far as I know, a lot of scientists even think the theory is bunk. The point is, in a lot of the theories (maybe not all) something will have to exist prior to the initial singularity where the state is said to be infinitely dense –meaning a "nothing state".

I don't believe that if some multiverse, or oscillating universe theory were true, then it would undermine a God. Maybe some old scholastic version of the CA, but not a God. The Borde-Guth-Vilenkin theorem posits that even if our universe was oscillating, say, it would still need a starting point. Any multiverse theory would just put the problem a step back since we will still have to explain a multiverse generating mechanism or something of that sort –which may be impossible to have evidence for because such a thing can only exist, like in what I previously said, beyond our universe and therefore outside of our time.

The conceptualization of time I'm referring to is the a-theory of time where only present events are real. I don't actually know if this answers your question.

As for science "turning out logical in the end", how should I know? Who knows? It seems logical to me now. What doesn't seem logical to me is when a conclusion some scientist makes is not based on science but on scientism, which has nothing to do with science.

[The rest of your questions may not be dependent on the first, but they certainly are rendered irrelevant by my answer to it.]

I'm sorry Miguel, but I don't really see your point here. What must I say to convince you that (2)-(7) are not invalidated by Hilbert's Paradox?

[I don't believe that if some multiverse, or oscillating universe theory were true, then it would undermine a God.]

Precisely. That is why you cannot answer the problem of atemporal causation as it relates to God by invoking string theory. And yeah, I also think that string theory is bunk. But who are we to be certain, right?

[The Borde-Guth-Vilenkin theorem posits that even if our universe was oscillating, say, it would still need a starting point.]

Well, that's true.

[The conceptualization of time I'm referring to is the a-theory of time where only present events are real. I don't actually know if this answers your question.]

Well, we can work with this view of time (although I'm not sold to it — it's inconsistent with time as it is understood in relativity theory). Now, how is God's atemporal causation of Being to be explained in this view of time?

[As for science "turning out logical in the end", how should I know? Who knows? It seems logical to me now.]

What I mean is that the existence of something natural (something that is not God) may prove to be a logical necessity in the end.

Well, this will seem pedantic. But remember that you asked me to.

Your second question suggests we shouldn't rule out a "natural uncaused cause". I'm saying that's logically impossible viz. my answer to your first question.

Your third question suggests there may be a natural fact that's not contingent but necessary. I'm saying that's logically impossible viz. my answer to your first question, and insofar as how we understand the word "natural" to mean. The onus is on you to show how it's possible for something natural to be non-contingent and necessary as a cause.

Your 4th question suggests we shouldn't rule out the universe as its own prime-mover. I'm saying that's illogical viz. my answer to your first question. The universe seems to be by its very nature contingent. Also, the cosmological argument, if sound, rules out self actualization. Your
welcome to try to refute the premises from which that conclusion is seen to follow.

Your 5th question, I'll have to admit, I scarcely understand.

Your 6th question is simply irrelevant to what the cosmological argument purports to show. Of course all "necessary facts" aren't a priori. I don't see what this has to do with anything, actually.

Your 7th question isn't covered by my answer to your first, which is why I went over it separately in my response above.

The a-theory of time is not inconsistent with relativity. Both the a-theory and b-theory are consistent with relativity. Einstein, however, seems to prefer the b-theory, as far as I've been able to read (I could be wrong). But it's not because of any internal inconsistency between relativity and the a-theory.

And if you're going to suggest that something natural may be the cause of everything, which is what you seem to suggest in your last sentence, then you'll have to give evidence for this. We seem to have at least prima facie evidence that that's not the case; that it cannot be the case; that everything natural is contingent. Unless you'll be referring to something outside the natural and calling that "natural", like some string theorists do. But, again, a good argument on why we must distrust our modal intuitions on this would be in order, as they seem to indicate against it.

Also, my central question, the very meat of my challenge, is (2). You are yet to answer that correctly. In fact, you have completely misunderstood it. (See previous comment.)

[If it were meaningless, then we can forget about string theory, oscillating universe theories and other such.]

Another thing: There is time in string theory and in oscillating universe theories. Causality is a perfectly valid concept in string theory, for example, because string theory is a scientific hypothesis (I don't think it deserves the designation 'theory' just yet). Meanwhile, the CA is supposedly immune to scientific challenges. And thus the philosophical/logical questions: If God existed prior to time, then what does his causing time to exist mean? How is causality to be defined in this singular instance of atemporal causation?

Again, as far as our current understanding of physical time is concerned, there must always be time as long as physical entities exist. Your adding the qualifier 'our' to your argument suggests that you cannot help but agree with this. One simply cannot deny that fact that even strings and previously collapsed universes have to have temporal existence.

They may have "temporal existence" of their own accord, but their extensions (some of them) will have to exist outside of our time. Sure, they may have their own "time", but it's outside the time of our universe. A multiverse, for instance, will have many universe's that exist outside of our universe, and therefore outside of our time. Whatever the mechanism that produces universes –that produces the multiverse– will have to be chronologically prior to our universe. I'm saying that even a natural explanation cannot avoid this rut; I'm saying that it's not the problem you seem to think it is.

O.K. I may have overlooked this. But Garrick asked a similar question, so I thought I already put this to rest. Anyway, I'll answer this here again:

You ask:

"If God existed prior to time, then what does his causing time to exist mean? How is causality to be defined in this singular instance of atemporal causation? "

— I'm not saying God "existed prior to time" I'm saying he exists outside of time. Phrasing it in the way you have ("existed prior to time") shows temporal relations, which is what makes you think it can't make sense. But to say God exists *outside* of time makes the relationship of God with time atemporal.

The contradiction that people see –maybe you haven't thought about this or maybe you have– is that the act of creating needs to be preceded by an intent to do so. So, the intent and act of creating in this case are seen to have temporal relations. But that's not necessarily the case since they can occur simultaneously. You can be performing the act of hanging from a tree while simultaneously having the intention of not falling –my example to Garrick (which is Craig's example actually).

So, God can create the universe outside of time while not being chronologically prior to it.

And if you're going to say that it doesn't make sense to cause time to exist, then any naturalistic argument that purports to show how the universe was created will be falling in that same rut, as I've explained previously.

Actually, I was referring specifically to dickie's assertion that a bulk of believers think that the universe is intelligently designed.

haha true, looks like dickie here love reading conservapedia

let's see what catholicism says on the subject: http://www.catholic.org/national/national_story.p…

even his own religion is against it. aww.

But Defensores Fidei is supposed to be an all-out defender of Catholicism!!!

Oh, snap.

Dickie, could it be you're violating the very same doctrines you so rabidly defend? :3

…and can you?

you mean you can't?

Doesn't change the fact that Intelligent Design is a bullshit theory with no scientific grounding, and is a fucking waste of time 😉

you mean with all the logic in you, you can't state the principle of causality and apply it to our world?

//Even Dawkins admits that there is at least seeming design in nature. //

Citations please.

I am tempted to tell you to look for it yourself in his books but being the New Year, i will be more charitable.“Biology is the study of complicated things that give the appearance of having been designed for a purpose.” {Richard Dawkins,The Blind Watchmaker, 1996, p. 1}“We may say that a living body or organ is well designed if it has attributes that an intelligent and knowledgeable engineer might have built into it in order to achieve some sensible purpose… any engineer can recognize an object that has been designed, even poorly designed, for a purpose, and he can usually work out what that purpose is just by looking at the structure of the object.” {Richard Dawkins,The Blind Watchmaker, 1996, p. 21}

ripped word per word from this site – http://www.creationism.org/heinze/AppearanceOfDes…

lets expound that article shall we.
Dawkins added that if anyone saw a machine on some other planet, he would know life had existed on that planet because machines are designed by intelligent beings. {p.2.} I must add, there are many molecular machines in living things. Their moving parts work together to do the work of every cell. Most of us would interpret all this as telling us that living things really were designed. Dawkins admits that living things look like they had been designed, but he does not believe they were. He goes on to use imagination, speculation, philosophy, and his wonderful story telling ability to undercut the evidence.

the same article praises Michael Behe's studies. who, was already pointed out to be laughing stock even in his own University and his own son.

quote-mining as usual.

“Ripped word per word from http://www.creationism.org/heinze/AppearanceOfDes… “hehehe that's why it's called a quote.

//hehehe that's why it's called a quote.//
hehehe it's called a quote-mine Dick.

nutjobs tend attract and quote from each others work.

if you want to quote do it right:

The difference is one of complexity of design.

(the extracted quote)
Biology is the study of complicated things that give the appearance of having been designed for a purpose.

(the part Dick and Heinze conveniently omit)
Physics is the study of simple things that do not tempt us to invoke design. At first sight, man-made artefacts like computers and cars will seem to provide exceptions. They are complicated and obviously designed for a purpose, yet they are not alive, and they are made of metal and plastic rather than of flesh and blood. In this book they will be firmly treated as biological objects.

the chapter talks about false analogy. how you cannot compare the inner workings of a human being (biology) to a thing like a computer (engineering). clearly you didnt read it, even if you did, you clearly did not understand it.

Dick and Heinze – can we get that as a new TV show title, its quite catchy.

I think it would be better if you had read the quote from the original text instead of from a secondary source. Quotes CAN be taken out of context, particularly in this example. Especially since secondary source seems somewhat… biased.

Thank you for the suggestion but i think you should read the entire context of our exchange so that way you know that my quote is not out of context.

What i said: “Even Dawkins admits that there is at least seeming design in nature.” I never said that he admitted that there is a designer.Do I need to grammatically deconstruct my sentence for you to understand it. Didn't I say “seeming”now given the quote on Dawkins, doesn't he say “give the appearance of…”did I say that he believes in it? Nope all I said was Dawkins makes mention of it… a seeming design nature.

//did I say that he believes in it? Nope all I said was Dawkins makes mention of it… a seeming design nature. //

So you admit that you quoted him out of his original context.

I quoted him based on what I said… that even dawkins mentions a seeming design in nature. you can only accuse me of quoting or taking someone out of context if I said that dawkins BELIEVES in design in nature and i present this quotation as a stand alone! Kailangan ko bang tagalogin?

so you did quote it out-of-context then; thanks for the clarification.

Oh sige ha panalo ka na. okay, you nitpicked me into submission. congratulations!

thanks for the win Dick. you made all possible.

//you can only accuse me of quoting or taking someone out of context if I said that dawkins BELIEVES in design in nature and i present this quotation as a stand alone! Kailangan ko bang tagalogin? //

Actually, you did quote Dawkins out of context, by insinuating that he believes in ID. Your original statement:

"i admit that for those who do not see any design in the universe, in spite of their acceptance of a LAw of nature, will never see anything in nature to be intelligently designed. so indeed the argument has to assume that people are honest enough to see design in nature. Even Dawkins admits that there is at least seeming design in nature. "

ohhhh how stupid of me… i forgot that dawkins did not believe in design. i forgot that he is an atheist. I forgot that he also said in that same book that he believes it is by chance…. i forgot i have his book and have read it.oh my oh my could it be that is why i said SEEMING…? again kailangan ko bang tagalogin ito… saabihin niyo lang para magkaintindihan kayo.

About the Author

Thomas Heinze served for 34 years as an evangelical missionary in Italy with WorldVenture, first in evangelism and then directing the publishing house, Edizioni Centro Biblico. Since retiring in Portland, OR, he has written five books and two minibooks published by CHICK PUBLICATIONS. He has a Bachelor's Degree from Oregon State University and a Masters in Theology from Dallas Theological Seminary.

False Expert; An evangelical theologist making himself appear as an expert in biology and is endorsed by noneother than jack chick himself.

Man oh man did you even think your response through? I didn't use his expertise on any theological arguments from his article but only a quote from Dawkin's book which he also quotes and is available from many other websites, wikipedia notwithstanding.. I could have gotten the quote from his book but I don't have it with me right now… heaven's sake!

actually i do. do you?

did i mention you as a proponent of the article? nope, maybe. dont care.
is the author some kind of loon? yep. just pointing it out. endorsed by Jack Chick!

For the sake of Jebuz!

i guess it was coincidental you got the same two identical quotes with the same identical punctuations. with the same argument, that Heinze and all lead ID supporters use. how serendipitous.

nice try weaseling out of it though. Think before you click!

Goes to show that when a person lacks any substance in the argument, he resorts to trivialities and hairsplitting.good day.

yep goes to show how an intellectually dishonest man-child digs his own graves when it comes to intelligent conversations.

Didn't I say I give you the victory of the argument. You've nitpicked me into submission. I can't have an exchange (intellectual or otherwise) with someone who wants to argue commas and periods. You can't even distinguish what should be rightfully referenced or not. You can't even distinguish that the quote can be taken from any of several dozens of pages in the web including wikipedia…. It referenced Dawkins as the origin of that quote, did you mean that I had to reference the other fellow who used that quote too when I didn't lift anything from his entire original work? Would it matter, was the quote false or inaccurate in any way? Is this a thesis defense or a formal dissertation? If this is what it has come down to thenplease that is why I said YOU WIN, enjoy your victory.

//I am tempted to tell you to look for it yourself in his books but being the New Year, i will be more charitable.//
aww how humble yet we found the quotes easily. if your position holds true, you should have mentioned exactly where you pulled the quotes. and since for the 3rd time you just insist you may have gotten it somewhere on a book or wiki… and dont cherry pick if you dont want to be nitpicked. hehe.

//Even Dawkins admits that there is at least seeming design in nature. //
didnt we just confirm you have taken it out of context. should we really play the grammar game?

blah blah blah. this is a thinkers board. not a Whine Cellar.

if you make a comment be damn sure to defend it. if you cannot defend it, retract it. since you can't do either. well…

Chill Dick. Want some AstroGlide with that?

Of course I can't…duhhhh. And from the looks of it, you can't either, well of course you can say Goddidit…but come on…will you really make it that easy?

perhaps you should study a bit first then when you can state the principle of causality we can talk.

And you should really pay more attention to actual experts, instead of your coffee-table apologists.
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YotBtibsuh0

yeah, i know the principle of causality…but that's not the point here, the point is…can you answer the principle of causality? Seems like you are saying something way over your head.

scientists can confidently say they cannot confirm… yet! technology can only take you so far.

however religious nutters can confidently confirm things despite lack of evidence. claims such as geo-centricism or flat earth.

sun, tides, thunder and lightning, natural disasters are also part of that last list.
primitive man's answer to thing they don't understand = Goddidit!

and when confronted with reality, they act like kids who have been told santa or the tooth fairy does not exist.