Let’s get back to basics. The following is a case against a cosmological argument for the existence of God.
Intelligent (not “folk”) Christians will repeatedly tell you that faith and reason are both used in their theologies. Unlike the laity and the unwashed masses, they don’t rely completely on faith, or belief without evidence. Indeed, the Christian religion in its many forms has a long history of logical attempts, from Aquinas to Calvin, at trying to prove the existence of God and the plausibility of their doctrines. This is perhaps due to the fact that certain intellectuals in each tradition simply cannot reconcile their rationality with their religion’s doctrines.
Through tireless philosophical refinement of initially primitive and unimpressive doctrines such as the Genesis myth, we get sophisticated logical arguments such as Thomas Aquinas’ Five Ways. Seeing these attempts at logical proof, though, I am personally baffled by the intelligent theist’s recourse to faith. If God is provable through reason, of what use is faith? If faith is sufficient, why use imperfect human reason?
Philosophical arguments for God take various forms, such as the cosmological, ontological, and teleological arguments. There are, of course, many criticisms against most, if not all, of these. The cosmological (first cause) and teleological (purposeful design) arguments are empirical arguments, taking the world as it is and reasoning that there must have been a Creator.
One of the most interesting of these arguments, for me, is the Kalam cosmological argument. Unlike most arguments for God, it intends to at least be scientific in its attempt at proving that a personal God exists. Through its most vocal proponent, theologian William Lane Craig, the Kalam is used to argue that the universe must have had a cause. Formally stated, the Kalam appears as such:
(1) Everything that begins to exist has a cause.
(2) The universe began to exist.
(3) The universe has a cause.
Everything that begins to exist has a cause
Premise (1) asserts that everything that begins to exist has a cause. This statement evades criticisms such as those that Bertrand Russell put forward against Aquinas such as, “Who made God?” Since the Kalam argument states that everything that begins to exist has a cause, God, who is eternal and never began to exist, does not have a cause.
Physicists such as Victor Stenger have argued that not everything that begins to exist has a cause. When an electron increases in energy to an excited state and returns to its ground state, a photon appears. This appearance of the photon occurs spontaneously and is not a deterministic consequence. That is to say, in Stenger’s words, it is “without cause.” The same is true for the radioactive decay of the atomic nucleus. We can know the probability of decay but it is impossible to say exactly when the decay will occur.
William Lane Craig readily counters this by saying that that is not true causeless existence since nature, which God presumably made, is necessary for such events. However, Craig must now accept that probabilistic causes, if they are “causes” at all, are possible mechanisms for the beginning of the universe. This severely weakens the notion that a personal God predetermined the moment of creation with a purpose.
However, even accepting Premise (1) as true, we can move forward and still see that the Kalam argument ultimately fails in its misuse of time.
The universe began to exist
The discovery of the Big Bang model of the origin of the universe was very popular among theists. The Big Bang, they suggest, is proof positive that the universe began to exist. When Georges Lemaître first proposed the model, Pope Pius XII saw this as scientific evidence for creation, “it seems that science of today, by going back in one leap millions of centuries, has succeeded in being witness to that primordial Fiat Lux when, out of nothing, there burst forth with matter a sea of light and radiation, while the particles of chemical elements split and reunited in millions of galaxies.”
Theologians and apologists such as Craig and Dinesh D’Souza find that since the universe as we know it began 13.7 billion years ago in the Big Bang, then the universe began to exist and it had a cause for its existence. Craig, in the Islamic tradition of the Kalam, suggests that since the universe began to exist 13.7 billion years ago, then there must have been a “particularizer” to decide to begin the universe at that moment and not a moment before. And since this particularizer has the capability to decide and distinguish between moments, then this must be a personal kind of God with a mind analogous to ours (therefore not the deist’s God).
Remember, though, that Craig can no longer require this decision to create the universe to be particularized by a personal God since he must allow that probabilistic causes are possible causes for the universe. The mechanical circumstances necessary for atomic decay are all already in place, even though the effect of a decayed nucleus is delayed. The nucleus could decay in 2 seconds, it could decay in 100 billion years. This defeats the necessity of a personal God deciding to create the universe 13.7 billion years ago and not 12 or 20.
As James Still has seen, Craig’s view of time results in severe problems for the Kalam. It seems that in his view, time exists not in the physicists’ definition of time. Physicists use time in the relational view, where time exists relative to bodies in motion, like ticking clocks. This is integral to Einstein’s special and general theories of relativity, where the experience of time changes depending on velocity and the presence of mass. This effect has been confirmed and global positioning systems would fail without the corrections predicted by relativity. More importantly, general relativity shows that, if the universe did begin to exist, time itself began along with space, energy, and matter.
It makes no sense in the relational view of time to suggest that the universe could have had begun a moment before since there were no moments “before” the Big Bang, which is when time started ticking. Therefore, Craig seems to see time as absolute in his metaphysics. Personally, his view makes no sense to me. Perhaps he believes that events can be absolutely simultaneous regardless of frame of reference, which goes against special relativity. At the very least, we know that Craig clearly does not mean “time” in the way it is used by scientists.
It has been suggested that it is possible that the universe has simply always existed—a “brute fact,” in Russell’s words. This would remove any need for a creator since the universe did not “begin to exist.” However, Craig counters this by supporting Premise (2) with the following argument:
(4) An actual infinite cannot exist.
(5) An infinite temporal regress of events is an actual infinite.
(6) Therefore, an infinite temporal regress of events cannot exist.
Through this argument, Craig contends that it is impossible for the universe to have always existed since this would require an infinite temporal regress of events. Craig uses the example of Hilbert’s Grand Hotel to show that an actually real infinite would lead to absurdities.
Briefly, David Hilbert’s paradox of the grand hotel shows that if you have a hotel with an infinite number of rooms, it can accommodate an infinite number of guests. It should then be full after checking in an infinite number of guests. But, if another infinite number of guests should wish to stay in the hotel, one would only need to move the first set of guests to odd numbered rooms and the second group into even numbered rooms. You have now accommodated another infinite number of people in a supposedly full hotel. Craig argues that since this is a counter-intuitive result, then an actual infinite must be impossible.
It is important to note, however, that counter-intuitive results show up in science all the time. The greatest example of this is the discovery of wave-particle duality. A particle can be at many places at the same time. A particle can have many states at the same time. It is therefore not true that counter-intuitive results are necessarily impossible. However, we need not reject Craig’s use of Hilbert’s Hotel to see that Premise (2) in the Kalam is problematic.
Contrary to how Craig views the Big Bang model, the standard model of cosmology does not necessarily see the universe as beginning from a single infinitely dense point—a singularity. This prediction that the universe began as a singularity, via the Penrose-Hawking theorems, was because the Big Bang was erroneously viewed purely through the lens of General Relativity. Both Roger Penrose and Stephen Hawking would later revise their position. Taking into account the physics of quantum mechanics, which would dominate at the extremely small scales of the earliest moments of the Big Bang, Hawking says, “There was in fact no singularity at the beginning of the universe.”
It is completely possible, as Hawking suggests in A Brief History of Time, that the universe has no boundary in time. This means that t = 0 (where t = time) is merely in the middle of a continuous line of imaginary time (a concept necessary to describe quantum tunneling), like how the South Pole is not the end of the Earth, but just another point along the longitudes. Trace the longitude going through the poles of the Earth and you get a finite but unbounded geometry—a great circle; the same could be true for four dimensional space-time. It therefore stands to reason that time need not have a beginning, as a singularity would suggest.
In any case, singularity or no singularity, the scientific relational view of time avoids the problem of an infinite addition of events leading up to today because, although the age of the universe is finite, it is also true that the universe is eternal and has always existed. There has never been a time when there was no universe.
The universe has a cause
Craig asserts through an absolute view of time that actual infinities cannot exist. This would also apply to God. God cannot have existed through an actual infinite addition of events going back to nowhere. To get around this, theologians can assert that God is eternal not in the infinite number of events sense but because he is timeless. Unfortunately for the theist, since God is timeless, there would also never have been a time when God did not create the universe. The eternal universe would also be timeless in the same sense.
If Craig is to retain his absolute view of time, he must also reject the impossible timelessness of God. God must have begun to exist and himself have a cause. We can repeat Bertrand Russell’s challenge, “Who made God?” If Craig is to accept the physicists’ relational view of time, he must also accept that the universe is “eternal” in the same sense that God is eternal. Premise (2) fails and God is then an unnecessary explanation for the universe’s existence.
As Paul Draper notes, another problem with the Kalam cosmological argument is that it equivocates two senses of the phrase “begin to exist.” The strength of the Kalam cosmological argument is that it purports to be a proof of God from the evidence. It uses inductive reasoning to show that since everything begins to exist from causes, then the universe must also have begun to exist from a cause. However, the things we see to begin to exist begin in time. The universe, if it began to exist, began with time 13.7 billion years ago. We have no experience, no valid intuition, of things, let alone universes, beginning with time. Craig therefore commits the fallacy of equivocation in reasoning from the example of ordinary objects that the universe must also have a cause. Even if we accept Premises (1) and (2), the conclusion of the Kalam cosmological argument remains invalid. The eternal universe remains a brute fact.
TL;DR
The Kalam cosmological argument was a very strong case for the existence of not just a supernatural creator, but a personal one with a mind and thoughts. Because of the supposed impossibility of infinities in the real world, there is indeed a real problem for the naturalistic existence of the universe.
All of these arguments, however, have been fatally challenged by what we know today about the universe. The necessity of a personal creator is refuted by the existence of natural mechanisms for probabilistic causes. This means that naturalistic causes need not have their effects occur immediately after. The eternity of the universe is also supported by the dependence of time on space. In other words, without the universe, there was no time. Without time outside the universe, there was never a time without a universe. Hence, the universe has always existed and a creator is unnecessary to explain its existence.
It was perhaps impossible to have been an intellectually satisfied atheist until the discovery of relativity and quantum mechanics. The refutation of the Kalam heavily depends on the evidence that supports these theories. This did not have to be how nature is. As we learn more about the peculiarities of the universe, the God-shaped hole at the end of the universe is all but plugged.
All images are public domain except image on quantum tunneling by Jean-Christoph Benoist. Licensed under Creative Commons.
Prof Vilenkin said: “It is said that an argument is what convinces reasonable men and a proof is what it takes to convince even an unreasonable man. With the proof now in place, cosmologists can no longer hide behind the possibility of a past-eternal universe. There is no escape, they have to face the problem of a cosmic beginning (Many Worlds in One [New York: Hill and Wang, 2006], p.176).
Here is a video of Alexander Vilenkin explaining the Borde-Guth-Vilenkin Theorem (BGV). It doesnt depend on the standard model of Einstein’s General Relativity. He also addresses criticisms of his theorem.
https://m.youtube.com/watch?v=WOyQFkB1AGM
The idea that the universe is eternal in the past is dead. To continue to believe that in this day is to believe in the carcass of a dead superstition. That atheists still persist in believing this just proves that freethinkers are just incapable of giving up their most cherished superstitions.
1. Whatever begins to exist has a cause.
2. The photon began to exist.
3. Therefore, the photon has a cause.
Do photons just pop into existence? No.
What causes photons to exist? The excitation of electrons from one state to another.
But the great physicist Victor Stenger says photons just pop into existence without a cause. And Garrick believes him.
There is a thin line between good science and bad superstition, and Stenger just crossed it. A scientist however cannot exactly be blamed for doing bad philosophy. But there’s no justifying a philosopher for believing a scientist who does bad philosophy.
As a website said, “When physicists add “infinity” and “nothingness” to their conclusions, they are not anymore doing physics since the notions “infinity” and “nothingness” in their true sense are not empirical and can never be subjected to the scientific method. Rather, they are purely philosophical notions, hence, allowing us to subject them into a philosophical critique.”
http://catholicposition.blogspot.com/2013/11/can-…
Arguments for the existence of God are philosophical, especially of St. Thomas of Aquinas and also of Kalam. If you really want to fully refute these, then you should argue philosophically also.
Lawrence Krauss has excellent theories in this areas…about says it all!
Here’s an excellent point for point refutation of Garrick Bercero’s “The Eternal Universe”: The Eternal Universe and Science
Any say Garrick?
If your familiar with Stephen Hawking's book. The Grand Design, he and his co-author Leonard Mlodinow thought that the "First Cause" theory is not applicable to the Big Bang model, everything can be created from nothing. They proposed that with the Big Bang, everything was created, matter, space and energy and also time begins to flow. Time doesn't exist before the Big Bang thus no one including god has the time to think of a plan to create a universe…
1. From James Sinclair, "One can avoid this, as the Aguirre-Gratton model does, by reversing the arrow of time at the boundary (as Vilenkin told AA). But if you do this, then the mirror universe on the other side of the BVG boundary in no sense represents a past out of which our current universe evolved. Thus our universe would begin-to-exist, should the A-theory of time be true."
James also points out, "the Aguirre-Gratton model is not even suggested by its authors to be a model of our universe. Rather, they hope that it can serve as a springboard for the birth of our universe through some other physical process (some of which they briefly mention in their academic paper)".
Read more: http://www.reasonablefaith.org/current-cosmology-…
2. What Craig means by "topologically prior" can be understood by taking it to mean "causally prior", that is, the story of the evolution of the universe includes the state that is prior to the origination of time (and by implication, the universe).
However, I too am having problems with this as it strikes me as being circular.
I don’t mean that our universe does not have a greater than zero expansion rate. It appears to have such an expansion rate. Our universe, as Vilenkin proposes, tunneled out of a spaceless/timeless natural plane (which I call the UGM). This plane is what is not affected by the BGV, not just universes such as those proposed by Hawking, Carroll, or Aguirre (which all expand but still are not subject to the BGV).
I never meant to imply that you believed the universe isn't expanding.
Carry on. 🙂
Garrick,
The problem I see is that your UGM has features for which you provide no evidence; you say this UGM is "ontologically non-contingent" and has universe-making properties that are just inexplicable (which conveniently obviates certain questions about it –like why it won't create pink bunnies). You imply it's a brute fact, and while I'm not ruling out the fact that, at least in principle, it can be, you nevertheless give no reasons to support this.
The Cosmological Argument, it should be said, doesn't merely try to establish a cause that relatively differs in degree from other causes of which we can be familiar. Nor does it attempt to give an explanation for phenomena that's currently beyond science's reach.
The Cosmological Argument, as traditionally understood, evolved from attempts to demonstrate the need for causality to be undergirded by certain metaphysical preconditions. Therefore, what's being postulated by the argument is that which in principle has to exist, and that which in principle cannot be said to have had a cause. (Of course, other properties can and have been inferred, but let's overlook these for now.)
Now, it seems to me, what you're doing is you're saying, without evidence, that the UGM is it, while parrying putatively meaningful philosophical questions about its nature by saying 'it's just that way'. I hope you understand why this all seems ad hoc. (I used 'post hoc' previously, but 'ad hoc' is in fact the better word)
In my discussions with _XIII_, you’ll see that the properties of the UGM are not ad hoc and are supported by cosmological models of spaceless/timeless quantum mechanics. These stem from formulas that were created to solve other problems but turned out to show more fundamental properties in nature. The UGM is not a magic black box that makes any random thing and the physics supports this. The UGM creates zero total energy closed universes and the formalism of quantum gravity bears this out. It is arguably ontologically non-contingent because it is timeless and spaceless—eternal. It almost makes no sense to explain why there can be “nothing” and to ask how a lack of space and a lack of time can “begin to exist.” It might not be necessary, but, like Swinburne, I don’t think even God is logically necessary.
I think cosmological arguments tend to be question begging as they presume that everything has a cause or everything has an explanation. This already quite a loaded assumption that is tailor fit for gods. I said this elsewhere regarding the Leibnizian cosmological argument.
The Kalam’s intuition about causes is highly questionable. As I say in my piece, it conflates completely different meanings of “begin to exist.” In fact, it can be considered that nothing begins to exist in the Kalam’s sense since all matter and energy in our universe had the universe as their causal condition. Every “thing” that there is now has existed since the universe began. It’s just that the matter has come to be configured in such a way that they make things we conceive of as human beings and tables. If this is so then, as Jonathan Pearce shows, the Kalam would look like:
1. Everything that begins to exist has the universe as its cause.
2. The universe began to exist.
3. The universe had the universe as its cause.
The Kalam’s “everything” is actually just the same stuff that makes the universe up and becomes completely circular if we take into account the fact that nothing begins to exist in the universe apart from the causal conditions of the universe.
1. The universe that begins to exist has a cause for its existence.
2. The universe began to exist.
3. The universe has a cause for its existence.
The Kalam uses one example (our universe) to assume an all-pervading metaphysical rule.
Even then, our universe having a cause, given quantum tunneling/quantum gravity models, doesn’t even prove the supernatural cause desired by Craig.
Timelessness doesn't in any way entail ontological non-contingency. If you think it does, then lay out your case. The CA –at least classical versions– as you undoubtedly are aware, doesn't postulate timelessness as one reason for concluding the ultimate cause must be uncaused.
And the cosmological argument doesn't beg the question about contingent things having a reason for their existence –that part is presumed to be true because it is squarely supported by the evidence. What is in fact question-begging is your presumption of this premise to be "question-begging" without argumentative support. Now, you might say Quantum Mechanics shows that not everything has a cause, but, if you remember, this objection has been dealt with.
You say elsewhere there's no reason to think the Leibnizian CA is sound because it's "question-begging" as it presumes the existence of a necessary being; "the principle cannot be true if necessary beings don't exist"; "the principle can only be true if we already assume that at least one necessary being exists" But this statement is itself question-begging because the "weak form" of the PSR doesn't presume a necessary being exists, it concludes a necessary being must exist, precisely to escape an infinite ontological regress. You therefore beg the question about it's conclusion being unsound, again, without valid argumentative support.
Whether you're aware, you even imply classical CA's are sound by making the UGM out to be this "ontologically non-contingent" thing. The difference I see is that while the classical CA's use strict metaphysical demonstrations to show why something of this nature must be at the end of the line, you –assuming I'm heretofore successful in the case I've laid out– assert the UGM is it.
Now for all we know, you may be right and the UGM is in fact it. But you've skipped a lot of steps, it seems to me, in getting to your conclusions –at least for the ontology part. And the end result, to my mind, seems more improbable for the reasons I've previously given.
Neither did I suggest that timelessness did solely imply non-contingency. But the spaceless, timeless UGM has no stuff to begin existing at all.I think it's quite unfair to paint my complaint against cosmological arguments as “without argumentative support” when I lay this out in other threads. I will repeat it here. Even weak variants of the PSR can only be true, in that all beings will have an explanation, only if at least one necessary being exists. This is because, in a possible world with no necessary concrete beings, the PSR cannot be true since an infinite parade of contingent beings cannot sufficiently explain each other. Therefore, the assumption of the weak PSR already assumes the conclusion that at least one necessary being exists. The weak PSR may not explicitly assume it, but it definitely requires such an assumption to be true.
If it has "no stuff" at all, then how is it that it creates particular kinds of "stuff" and not the patently absurd ones of which we spoke. See, it has "stuff", and it's the kind of "stuff" that science can't in principle say doesn't exist on account of its inability to observe it. And if it's stuff that's "spaceless and timeless" then it's stuff that still cannot be said to be in principle ontologically non-contingent by virtue of just these features.
I'm sorry for not being clear, I wasn't saying the contentions you raise against the CA –particularly, the Kalam– are without merit, I was saying the contentions you raise against the PSR are. And I'm afraid you're doing it again by making the conclusion its premise; it's not that "all beings will have an explanation, only if at least one necessary being exists." but that, since, so far as we know, all beings or existents have an explanation, a necessary being must therefore exist.
Suppose you say to a creationist that evolution is supported by the fossil record, and he responds by saying you're begging the question because you need evolution to be true for it to be supported by the fossil record. You would respond firstly with an open-mouthed expression of incredulity, and then you'll say that rather than providing bad grounds for believing in evolution, the fossil record furnishes us with the opposite.
In other words, you require the support of the fossil record for evolution to be true, and not the truth of evolution for the fossil record to support it. Likewise, we require beings or existents to have explanations to support the notion of a necessary being, and not a necessary being to support the notion that beings or existents have an explanation.
What the creationist could say is that the fossil record doesn't support evolution (of course, he would be wrong), and what you, in turn, could say here is that beings or existents, or, maybe, some beings or existents, don't have explanations, but, as you undoubtedly must be aware, without any supporting argument, that would just be to beg the question.
(I'm sorry! This will be my final post on this seeing as you must be exhausted by having to respond to all these lengthy arguments. I applaud you for the remarkable amount of research you've put into this. 🙂 )
I think this is where I must resign to ignorance. The spaceless, timeless phase from which Vilenkin's or Krauss' universe models tunnel from or fluctuate from, or via however mechanism, is simply is devoid of any material. No particles, no waves, no nothing. I don't know why quantum mechanics should even still operate in such a condition, but the math checks out, at least for Vilenkin and Krauss.
What I'm showing with my example of a possible world with no necessary beings is to illustrate that the PSR is only effective if it assumes that a necessary being exists. Sorry if I keep repeating myself, because it seems rather self-evident to me. (I understand that it's rarely ever the same for everyone. 😛 ) For example, in a possible world that only has contingent beings, let's go one by one and explain each being. At some point, there will come a time where an approach towards an infinite regress of explanations occurs, or a complete cessation of explanations. In a possible world such as this, the PSR would be false (since not everything has a sufficient reason). If we were to live in a possible world with a necessary being, then the PSR would be true. Therefore, the PSR's truth value, our premise, is completely dependent on what kind of world we find ourselves in.
I think the analogy with the fossil record fails because we are certain that the fossil record exists (if we are certain about anything at all.) The fossil record is not a metaphysical principle that guides us in proving evolution. It is an a posteriori finding of paleontology. It counts as evidence for evolution. It does not prove evolution; it makes it more likely. It could be the case that the fossil record will not validate evolution. Even to this day, the fossil record could eventually show that evolution was a very effective, but nonetheless illusory, model. I doubt it, but it's not beyond possibility. Science is provisional, after all.
However, in the case of the PSR, it is our guiding principle. We are not certain that it is true because of evidence—we assume it is true. (As I've explained before, we've only ever found contingent beings explaining other contingent beings, never necessary beings explaining contingent beings.) As Leibniz's cosmological argument shows, there is no way at all for a true PSR to lead to an invalidation of the 'necessary being' conclusion. The PSR is not evidence for a necessary being, it is our axiom for finding the necessary being.
I think assuming the PSR is like assuming metaphysical naturalism. If this is assumed, then, necessarily, no gods exist.
Consider this syllogism:
(1) Everything that exists is natural
(2) God is not natural.
(3) Therefore, God does not exist.
Premise (1) is not evidence for no god; when assumed axiomatically, metaphysical naturalism is a principle that will always certainly result in a 'no god' conclusion. Now, a naturalist could say that certain things count as evidence for premise (1) (just like certain things could make the PSR more likely), but I don't think it could ever be axiomatically true.
In any case, I truly do appreciate the time you've given me. I've explored so many ideas you've clarified that I will probably dwell on for an infinite temporal succession of events.
@D.Gently
D.Gently: "What it does is put a 'limit' specifically (but not limited) to inflation, or a series of inflations, for the past direction."
That, however, is precisely the reason the BGV Theorem implies an absolute beginning (since the expansion cannot be past-eternal). This is why virtually all the exceptions to the BGV Theorem posit an average expansion rate ≤0. Garrick's UGM, for example, is completely static (it's expansion rate is not greater than zero) which is how he proposes it evade the implications of the BGV Theorem.
The problem is that these exceptions are universally plagued with intractable problems such that they hardly furnish us with proven alternatives to the implications of the BGV Theorem.
D.Gently: "I repeat Vilenkin's subsequent clarification: 'the words “absolute beginning” do raise some red flags'; (Does your theorem prove that the universe must have had a beginning?) 'No.'"
This is a bit misleading.
Vilenkin's reply, when asked directly what were the implications of the theorem, was that the simple answer was "yes" but that if you were willing to get into subtleties, the answer would be "no, but". There are indeed ways to circumvent the universe's having a beginning as I've always conceded from the beginning.
This is why Craig actually devotes several pages discussing these exceptions to the theorem in his article in the Blackwell Companion to Natural Theology.
Garrick: "Again, to clarify what all these scientists are saying, Vilenkin and Guth included, our universe is subject to the BGV theorem, the non-expanding era of space-less and timeless nature is NOT."
The problem with your UGM is that it's incoherent.
The Laws of Physics merely true propositions that describe how the universe operates and propositions have no causal powers. To illustrate, take Newton's Law of Universal Gravity and let's call it G: "that every point mass in the universe attracts every other point mass with a force that is directly proportional to the product of their masses and inversely proportional to the square of the distance between them".
Now, does G, a proposition that describes how gravity operates, cause the Earth to pull at the moon? No, it does not. What it does is describe the reason why the Earth pulls at the moon (that reason being gravity). It is not the proposition G that causes the pulling motion but gravity.
Even if we were to concede that your proposed UGM is Platonic, it still wouldn't solve this problem of causal inefficacy.
"The problem is that these exceptions are universally plagued with intractable problems such that they hardly furnish us with proven alternatives to the implications of the BGV Theorem."
Problems such as?
The UGM is not even an exception to the BGV theorem. It was never made to describe the UGM since it is not a universe. It is not a space-time continuum. It is the spaceless/timeless ontological prior of our universe, and perhaps of many other universes.
I'm not saying, nor is Krauss or Hawking saying, that the laws of physics, being propositions or ideas in scientists' heads, are themselves causally effective. I'm saying that "nothing" itself, that is the very physical absence of space and time, still maintains properties and tendencies that lawfully behave according to the uncertainty principle. The very fabric of nature has properties beyond space and/or time. That's why physical nothing (no space or time) is still "something", according to quantum mechanics (which, again, can operate even outside of space and/or time). This did not have to be the case. It could very well have been that quantum mechanics was found to require space to operate. But that is not what the theories bring to bear.
Cyclic models have an entropy problem, for example, while static models that give rise to the universe via quantum fluctuations are themselves metastable and thus past-finite. On a side note, this quasi-static metastable quantum vacuum (with an expansion rate of zero) is really quite similar to your UGM with the important distinction that it's still spatio-temporal.
And how exactly would this "nothing" (your UGM), that is timeless and spaceless, have causal powers anyway?
Quantum Mechanics breaks down past the singularity for the very simple reason that the realm wherein Quantum Mechanics operates ceases to exist (there being no space nor time). You are essentially redefining what Quantum Mechanics is if you're proposing it can operate timelessly and spacelessly.
The UGM you are proposing is completely ad hoc (that is, it's arbitrary in it's properties). Krauss' nothing is not nothing, as you yourself admit, and yet you keep extrapolating it past the singularity when Krauss' nothing presupposes space and time.
None of the models I've put forward, Hartle-Hawking, Aguirre-Gratton, or Carroll-Chen, are cyclic. The HH model has a universe with no boundary in time, no true beginning in time (as in the great circle analogy in my piece). The latter two examples are biverses, which mean that the universes are momentarily static at an arbitrary point called t = 0 then inflate at opposite time directions. They are also not quantum fluctuation models, rather they are quantum tunneling models. All three models are eternal universes. All three of these models have no singularity, all three not refuted by BGV. Indeed, a full picture of the Big Bang that includes quantum gravity is expected to not have any singularities.
There's a very big difference between quantum mechanics being unable to describe a singularity and "ceases to exist" past a singularity. This latter assertion is completely unsound. I am not redefining QM at all because the formulas used to prove known mechanisms such as particle-antiparticle annihilation are the same formulas used to show that QM operates outside of space and time. There is nothing ad hoc about any of this.
The spatio-temporalness of models such as Tryon's are problematic because of finite space. The independence of physical nothingness on space-time makes ALL the difference. It's like saying rocks are similar to bread with the important distinction that they are made of completely different atoms.
The causal powers of the UGM stem from the fabric of nature itself being shown through quantum mechanics as being subject to the uncertainty principle. This is highly counter-intuitive, but as I've said multiple times, our intuitions cannot dictate nature. Incredulity at the possibility of potentialities in spaceless/timeless nature is not an argument.
The UGM's properties are not arbitrary since its properties were not finely-tuned to give out a desired result. As I said, nature did not have to be this way, that it can be described by the uncertainty principle even in the absence of space and time.
Krauss' nothing does not presuppose space or time. Maybe you mean space and time in some non-scientific context.
"The lesson is clear: quantum gravity not only appears to allow universes to be created from nothing—meaning, in this case, I emphasize the absence of space and time—it may require them. "Nothing"—in this case no space, no time, no anything!—is unstable.
Moreover, the general characteristics of such a universe, if it lasts a long time, would be expected to be those we observe in our universe today." —Lawrence Krauss, A Universe from Nothing
XIII: 'This is a bit misleading. Vilenkin's reply, when asked directly what were the implications of the theorem, was that the simple answer was "yes" but that if you were willing to get into subtleties, the answer would be "no, but".'
No, not in the slightest misleading. For one, I gave a link and reference to the complete statement by Vilenkin, and second, Garrick actually provided the whole quote beforehand—after which one would find my shortened "No" quote (together with my suggestion of thinking of the BGV as pertaining more to the expansion or expanding regions). Here it is again, in full this time:
Stenger: 'Does your theorem prove that the universe must have had a beginning?'
Vilenkin: 'No.' [As in No, the theorem does not prove the universe must have had a beginning.] But it proves that the expansion of the universe must have had a beginning.'
Your contention has always been that the BGV proved the universe must have had an absolute beginning. If there 's any misleading being done, intentional or otherwise, it's your selective quotes and your continued refusal to even acknowledge what has been said in the paper itself, clarifications by its authors, and summaries given by the other competent physicists in the field..
You really need to move on from the BGV (your misuse and misunderstanding of it) as it is clear Garrick's UGM occupies a different realm. Beyond the expanding region of spacetime of the initial inflation where the BGV ends ('What can lie beyond this boundary?') is, I think, more spacetime for you to traverse, alongside a whole host of competing (scientific) accounts*—before the UGM is in sight.
(* Perhaps here, instead of the BGV, you can make use of one of Vilenkins more recent papers, co-authored with Audrey Mithani, in which they consider cyclic evolution and the emergent universe models and come out with the same conclusion, the universe is probably past-incomplete: Did the universe have a beginning?, http://arxiv.org/abs/1204.4658.)
@d.gently
I never denied that Garrick's UGM doesn't evade the BGV Theorem. I keep repeating myself. Remember, I said that universes with an average expansion rate greater than zero must have had a beginning in the finite past. This is precisely what Vilenkin says that the theorem proves that the expansion of the universe must have had a beginning.
This of course means that universes that do not have an expansion rate that is greater than zero aren't affected by the BGV Theorem. I have been clear about this from the very beginning so any accusation of misleading is grossly inappropriate.
XIII: ‘I keep repeating myself.’
So must I, it seems.
XIII: ‘Remember, I said that universes with an average expansion rate greater than zero must have had a beginning in the finite past. This is precisely what Vilenkin says that the theorem proves that the expansion of the universe must have had a beginning.’
Except that's not exactly what you’ve been saying. ‘[T]he theorem shows that any universe with an expansion rate greater than zero must have had an absolute beginning … The problem is that our universe does have an expansion rate greater than zero and that means that the universe must have had an absolute beginning.’ I’m sure, or would hope that, you agree that it is critical to note the massive difference between the paper's author saying the theorem only proves a past boundary to the expansion of the universe and you (or Craig) saying the theorem proves the absolute beginning of the universe. The two statements aren’t interchangeable, but that is exactly what you are attempting to do here.
XIII: ‘This is precisely what Vilenkin says that the theorem proves that the expansion of the universe must have had a beginning.’
Exactly … and that when asked if he thought the theorem proved the absolute beginning of the universe, the answer was ‘No.’ This stands in direct opposition to what you are—or have been—insisting that yes, the theorem proves an absolute beginning to the universe.
XIII: ‘This of course means that universes that do not have an expansion rate that is greater than zero aren't affected by the BGV Theorem.’
This is inaccurate; the universes in the three models that Garrick already mentioned are all expanding and yet evade the BGV. (Aguirre, http://bit.ly/NWi4Xr: 'What all of their theorems do are (a) write out a set of conditions which they consider to correspond to eternal inflation, then (b) show that the region in which these conditions hold is geodesically incomplete. This would indeed be consistent with eternal inflation “emerging from a primordial singularity”, but it is also consistent with eternal inflation just being grafted onto some spacetime region that is not eternally inflating by their definition.')
XIII: ‘I have been clear about this from the very beginning so any accusation of misleading is grossly inappropriate.”
…while it's perfectly fine for you to say to me to ‘[reread] the quote and not just [concentrate] on the parts that catch [my] eye’, and say that my quote of Vilenkin is a bit misleading, right? 😉 Maybe it wasn't your intention, but your take of the theorem, as I've already shown, is misleading all the same.
1. Even Garrick's UGM concedes that the universe must have had an absolute beginning.. Anyway, the basic presupposition that the BGV Theorem proves that the universe had an absolute beginning isn't wrong (and I'm sure you already know that I have quotations from Vilenkin to that effect). When you want to get into subtleties, of course there are exceptions to the theorem but the problem is that none of those exceptions work (since they universally run into intractable problems) so I'm still not wrong when I say that the BGV Theorem proves that the universe must have had an absolute beginning.
Here, let me simplify it for you:
(1) If the exceptions to the GBV Theorem do not work, then the BGV Theorem proves that the universe must have had an absolute beginning. (x -> y)
(2) The exceptions don't work. (x)
(3) Therefore, the BGV Theorem proves that the universe must have had an absolute beginning. (∴y)
2. They evade the theorem because their average expansion rates aren't greater than zero.
3. That remains to be proven, of course. 🙂
But the exceptions do work and have no "intractable problems". :/ Vilenkin himself says that a prior contraction avoids the BGV singularity prediction.
Aguirre explains why Craig and Sinclair's objections are unsound,
"First, there is no singularity—that is the whole point [of the model]… In the Aguirre-Gratton type model, the idea is to generate a steady state. If you do so, you can use the BGV theorem to show that there is a boundary to it. We have specified what would have to be on that boundary to be consistent with the steady state, and argued that this can be nonsingular, and also defines a similar region on the other side of that boundary… In the natural definition of this model, there is no earliest time, and all times are (statistically) equivalent."
Again, as Carroll emphasizes, the BGV theorem is a GR theory. It does not account for the physics of quantum mechanics that would dominate at the smallest scales.
Sorry but I can't really reply as much as I want to as IntenseDebate is pushing me to my wit's end (what with these constant "your login session has expired" and "your connections has timed out" crap). I literally am rendered incapable of posting most of the time.
Anyway, the Aguirre-Gratton Model is a model that evades the theorem by stipulating that "the arrow of time reverses at the t = –infinity hypersurface, so the universe ‘expands’ in both halves of the full de Sitter space". In other words, time flows in both directions (both 'forwards' and 'backwards') from the initial singularity.
The problem? As Craig points out, the other side of the de Sitter space is not our past. The other side of the de Sitter space bears no temporal relation with anything on our side (not even the possibility of it).
Besides, as Craig surmises, the primary reason this scenario fails is that "this gross reconstruction of time denies the evolutionary continuity of our universe which is topologically prior to t and our universe".
I know the BGV to be a moot point from the moment you brought it up, but I think in these kind of discussions about 'proof' it's important that this kind of inaccuracy (from my point of view, it goes without saying) about a theorem does not go unchallenged.
XIII (emphasis mine): '[T]he basic presupposition that the BGV Theorem proves that the universe had an absolute beginning isn't wrong (and I'm sure you already know that I have quotations from Vilenkin to that effect). When you want to get into subtleties, of course there are exceptions to the theorem but the problem is that none of those exceptions work (since they universally run into intractable problems) so I'm still not wrong when I say that the BGV Theorem proves that the universe must have had an absolute beginning.'
To what effect? Well, let's consult Vilenkin.
Vilenkin: '[I]f someone asks me whether or not the theorem I proved with Borde and Guth implies that the universe had a beginning, I would say that the short answer is "yes".'
So, Yes: it implies the universe had a beginning. Does it prove the universe had an absolute beginning? Vilenkin says No. XIII says yes.
Vilenkin: '[T]he words “absolute beginning” … raise some red flags.'
Does the theorem prove that the universe must have had a beginning?
XIII: 'Yes.'
Vilenkin: 'No. But it proves that the expansion of the universe must have had a beginning.' ('Absolute beginning' raise some red flags.)
That 'but' subtlety is worth getting into—I think moreso by you—since it's actually that 'but' part that is of use to you: it is when you actually have him on record say anything about proofs about beginnings of some kind (except of course that he's talking about the expansion(s) itself).
We have three other relevant and competent physicists say the same thing as Vilenkin does about what the theorem does and does not prove. One would've thought the views of these authorities count for something … esp. having seen you pull an argument from authority when it suited you when trying to knock down one of Garrick's points.
How you can still say you are not wrong in saying the theorem proves an absolute beginning to the universe beggars belief.
This is the last I'll say anything about the BGV because it looks like it might hamper discussions bet. you and Garrick on the other important—perhaps more critical—points on the personhood arguments and counter-arguments from both sides. (Unless of course this BGV crops up again, then I have no choice but to respond to it.)
Speaking of personhood… I have, I think, what may be a counter to the changeless (and/or atemporality) feature of the person-ful God, should he be the first cause, so I'll run it by you and Garrick and forego the BGV objection for now. I'll put it up, time-permitting, as soon as it's in a coherent form.
(One last thing. You stress, 'Even Garrick's UGM concedes that the universe must have had an absolute beginning.' True. But don't forget it's you who wanted to relegate the UGM into being part of the universe in the first place, so we are where we are not for anyone but yourself. 🙂 )
Part1
Let's recap. Let's deal with each premise in turn and address your objections to each in turn.
(2) The universe began to exist.
Much of the confusion stems from the fact that we seem to be using two different definitions for the word 'universe' so let's define it here. I propose that the most plausible definition of the word 'universe', as contained within the discourses typically broached when discussing the KCA, would be as 'the set of all contingent objects (whether abstract, platonic or concrete)'.
This does not, for example, rule out your UGM. Much of my reservations (regarding your objections) are also rendered moot since we are, it seems to me, in agreement that the universe began to exist but differ as regards to what caused it.
That brings us to the first premise:
(1) Whatever begins to exist has a cause.
Self-explanatory. This is the metaphysical underpinnings that provide the foundation of the KCA and what differentiates it from other formulations of the Cosmological Argument. This is basically a non-local Causal Principle (CP)
Again, we seem to be in agreement here since your UGM postulation requires this premise to be true.
(3) Therefore, the universe has a cause.
Shouldn't be controversial since this conclusion necessarily follows from the truth of premises (1) and (2) which seems to me that we are in agreement on.
Part 2
And finally, there's:
(4) Conceptual analysis of the properties of this first cause yields characteristics that are of theological significance.
This one is where our chief disagreement lies. You maintain that (4) is plausibly false by virtue of the fact that this hypothetical first cause need not be a personal mind. This implies that nothing of theological signifiance actually follows from the initial conclusion (3) of the KCA.
An ultramundane cause of the universe that is not a person but is enormously powerful, timeless, spaceless, immaterial, beginningless, changeless, uncaused need not actually have any notable theological implications since a UGM seems a perfectly plausible alternative.
I've three problems with this conclusion:
1. It does not follow from the fact that the FC need not be a person that the FC is, in fact, non-personal. It's a non-sequitur. There's a large difference between a KCA that fails completely in proving theism to a KCA that points to an FC that might be God.
2. You point out that conceding that probabilistic causes are possible is sufficient to explain how a temporal effect could have come from a timeless cause. This is false (though I missed it before) since the FC is changeless (at the very least, prior to the universe's origination).
The FC is changeless because an infinite regress of events is impossible (and change is an event). This prima facie rules out probabilistic causation as regards to the FC.
3. Moreover, change implies temporality as the UGM transitions from one probabilistic event to the other (that either actualizes or fails to actualize). A further postulate necessary for your probabilistic UGM is, in fact, the existence of time (directly contradicting some of your earlier statements). In fact, a succesion of events is pretty much definitive of what time is (especially on the relational view).
The arguments for the personhood of the FC stills stands. Cheers. 🙂
I will just clarify that time is not simply changes in a system (since a tunneling particle changes in position but experiences no time at all while within an energy barrier). It is a specific parameter in physics that takes entropy (number of states) in a system. The UGM has no time and no direction in time since it never has net change in entropy (all universes are zero total energy). I'm afraid that our different conceptions of time is guilty of much of our misunderstanding. So, strictly speaking, while the UGM has universes bubbling in and out of it, the UGM itself remains timeless since it has no space parameters or entropy to speak of.
I think we can agree that the universe, that is, our specific universe, began to exist and has a cause. In other words,our space-time continuum has an ontological prior.But, if the definition of universe is everything that is physical or logically contingent, (including the UGM) then I don't think the Kalam is successful.
As I stated elsewhere the Kalam's Causal Principle appears to use one example to create an all-encompassing metaphysical rule. I will reformulate it here based on the clarifications you and I have put forward.
Everything that we know to exist has our specific universe as its causal condition—the matter particles that make up you, I, and the computers we are using to communicate. That is, their beginning of existence is synonymous to the beginning of the existence of our own universe.
So, in the Kalam's metaphysical intuition that is the causal principle, it seems to only refer to one example to prove that the natural causal conditions of our universe (UGM) began to exist. If you'll allow me, this seems to me what the Kalam looks like once the broader natural picture is taken into account. I also clarify the different meanings of "begin to exist" such that the equivocation of the Kalam is clear.
(1) Everything that begins to exist in our universe has our universe as its cause.
(2) The universe itself began to exist.
(3) The natural causal conditions of our universe have a cause.
I think you'll agree with me that this is a nonsensical conclusion. I also think that this is the only scientifically informed version that the Kalam can take.
(Part 3 of 3)
On another front, Leibniz’s form of the cosmological argument was put forward. Classical cosmological arguments were made under the view that the universe is eternal. I clarify my position that the UGM is logically contingent but causally independent. I also argue that while Leibniz’s principle of sufficient reason may survive attacks from quantum indeterminacy, using it to prove the existence of a necessary being is question-begging. This is because the principle cannot be true if necessary beings don’t exist because this would result in an infinite regress of contingent beings explaining each other’s existence (which is a priori impossible, rendering the principle false). A weak form of the principle of sufficient reason states that beings that exist must have explanations, either in other beings or by necessity of their nature. The principle can only be true if we already assume that at least one necessary being exists. Therefore, its application in proving the existence of a necessary being is circular.
(Part 2 of 3)
_XIII_ questions my use of quantum mechanics to refute the personhood argument for the identity of the first cause. I argue against the personhood argument’s assumption that mechanistic causes must have their effects take hold immediately. If this is the case then the universe must exist through an infinite series of events in time (which is impossible!) since the cause of the universe is eternal. Quantum mechanics shows a naturalistic process where conditions can be present without the effect occurring immediately. I don’t think this point was adequately challenged so I consider, at the very least, the particularizer argument for the personhood of the first cause defeated.
However, two other arguments about the personhood of the first cause were presented. Namely, (1) there are two types of explanations: scientific/naturalistic and personal. Since the singularity phase of the universe cannot have a scientific explanation since it was outside space and time, then the first cause must be personal; (2) there are only two kinds of immaterial, uncaused, timeless, and spaceless things: abstract objects (propositions, numbers, etc.) and personal minds. And only personal minds could be causally effective (propositions cannot cause anything to occur).
I argue that a possible naturalistic mechanism exists as elucidated by a quantum theory of gravity. I admit that such a theory is far from established and needs a significant amount of work. But, as I explain, we can reasonably speculate on what such a theory will contain when general relativity and quantum mechanics are reconciled. As has been shown by scientists such as Lawrence Krauss, expanding the sum-over-histories approach by Feynman to space itself will result in quantum gravity explaining how space can itself appear spontaneously. These spaces will be tiny self-contained highly compact universes with a zero total energy. This would therefore not violate laws of conservation since gravity counts as negative energy versus the positive energy of matter. This idea is not logically impossible, therefore it is not necessary for the explanation for the universe to be personal. Our own universe appears to have a zero total energy.
Furthermore, this era that is ontologically (but not temporally) prior to our universe, which I will call the universe-generating mechanism (UGM) is exactly this: timeless and spaceless. It is, however, not devoid of potential, so it will not satisfy the theologian’s desire for absolute nothingness (which seems to require the special pleading of a lack of all potential except supernatural potential). In fact, quantum mechanics shows that absolute nothingness is unnatural. The uncertainty principle simply requires that out of the absence of space and time, space must spontaneously appear. This is a rather counter-intuitive state of affairs that I don’t think could ever have been the result of armchair philosophy. Therefore, I can justifiably refute the two objections: that our universe cannot have a scientific explanation and that only personal minds are the only causally effective timeless and spaceless things.
However, what about the explanation of this UGM? Would its existence and nature admit of a scientific explanation? Here I would readily concede, no. I believe this is simply a brute fact. I do not even believe that this UGM is logically necessary since its non-existence does not result in contradictions. Its existence is inexplicable. I also do not think that a personal God is necessary to explain the UGM’s existence since it is already eternal and timeless and it certainly is not clear that it can even have a beginning of existence.
I’ll try to summarize here as fairly as I can the very lively and interesting discussion that has gone on so far. I will change phrasing that I used as I found a lack of clarity in my own views, which were gradually refined by the challenges presented. My thanks to Pecier, Miguel, innerminds, and _XIII_.
(Part 1 of 3)
My article here shows that William Lane Craig problematically switches between different views of time: absolute and relational. The former assumes that time is metaphysical. As I said, I personally have trouble understanding this definition as this is not the scientific view. The latter is the scientific view as shown through special relativity: absolute simultaneity is nonsensical and two events can counter-intuitively occur temporally prior to each other due to their frames of reference. The physicist’s time is dependent on motion and mass. I also show that the personhood of the first cause is problematic given quantum mechanics.
To argue against the eternity of the universe, Craig assumes that time is absolute. Because of this, the universe cannot have existed forever because an actual infinite series of events is impossible. At the same time, Craig argues that God is timeless in the relational view. Unfortunately for Craig, as I show in my piece, our universe also had a timeless phase, so it also has always existed (there has never been a time with no universe).
Miguel and _XIII_ in the comments section have not addressed this and I don’t think there really is anything that can be said against my argument. Craig clearly and unfairly argues against the eternity of the universe by switching his views of time depending on convenience.
my point is simple. proving the origin of the universe would not satisfy any religious dogma as they are all very local. from standpoint alone, all of them are wrong by assuming that their deity created everything and yet never mentioned about the extreme size of the universe, focused on just one planet (aside from mormon theology). this limitation points that man, in that age of intellectual gap, had filled in his limitations with his own limited reasoning.
deism is out of the point either, because that assumption was based from the thinking that a deity/creator is plausible. to think it was suggested during the time when people "live" along monsters and magical creatures.
nobody knows at this point in time. i could say the universe created itself, and it is not a god as how we define god. slipping in every deity's name in such a topic only makes things more complicated, and thus religion hasn't had simplified any answer to a question. only worsened it.
Oh where to begin..
I don't get what you mean here by what you say Craig says, but Craig says –at least in his debate with Enqvist– that most physicists don't hold to Quantum Logic, and therefore the rules of logical inference, presumably from which he derives the premises of the KCA, still hold. In fact there are many interpretations of QM that are very much unlike the one held by Hawking (Copenhagen?) in that they are deterministic. As far as I've been able to gather, there is no consensus on which is the right interpretation, but the Copenhagen one seems to be the most well-known to lay people. Nevertheless –and this challenges your use of QM to counter causality as it is conventionally understood– QM is merely descriptive; it's fallacious to infer that, because QM describes a state without describing its cause, that state must therefore not have a cause. It would be the same as saying the motion of planets have no cause because Kepler's Laws of Planetary Motion speak nothing of them. In any case, so-called uncaused QM events are still based on Quantum laws and the prior conditions out from which they arise making one wonder why we are asked to throw the metaphysics of causality out the window just because we've yet to understand the principles on QM under which it operates?
Another observable folly here is that science is telling us what doesn't exist by what it cannot observe (no observable cause, therefore no cause exists). This is odd, one would think, since science in principle can only tell us what exists, or what it infers exists, from that which it can observe. You would think that science, in principle, cannot tell us what doesn't exist based on what it cannot observe, but it is doing exactly that. Of course, this isn't an argument against causality in QM –for all we know they're right; things happen in QM for which there is no cause– but rather that, if that were indeed the case, science cannot in principle tell us about it.
So much more I can say about your post, but the above will do for now.
There are actually very few deterministic interpretations of quantum mechanics. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Interpretation_of_qu… Even then, deterministic interpretations of quantum mechanics can still hold that many states exist at the same time (such as the many-worlds interpretation). Hidden variable interpretations such as the deBroglie-Bohm interpretation have largely fallen out of favor.
In any case, I don't have to hold that quantum mechanical events are "uncaused." I said this in my piece, which should answer all of the objections listed here.
You concede, I think, more than you intend, since, if you won't go the universe-is-uncaused route ("I don't have to hold QM events are uncaused"), that leaves you with one option: the universe caused itself (or if you believed in a multiverse, then the multiverse caused itself).
The problem with this is that people who say this –like Hawking– don't seem to know what it entails. It would entail that the universe itself is a necessary entity; the universe exists out of a necessity of its own nature. One thing we know about the universe is that it's contingent –and therefore cannot exist out of a necessity of its own nature.
Another thing is that –and I hope this will be easy to follow– if the universe can cause itself, then anything can cause itself, because before the universe caused itself, there wasn't anything about the universe that would make it tend to cause itself, for before it was caused, it wasn't anything.
or
If something can come out of nothing –since that would mean it would essentially cause itself to exist out of zero pre-existing material– then anything can come out of nothing.
That's why it is argued –I think by Craig as well– that whatever caused the universe was an agent who had *intended* the universe to be as it is, and who is in principle uncaused. We have prima facie evidence, at least, that the universe cannot bring these qualities to bear.
How do we "know" that the universe is contingent? Is that not exactly the conclusion that the Kalam is trying to prove? Interestingly, quantum mechanics shows that everything (in the quantum scales) that can happen will happen. Why should the universe not be necessary?
More importantly, I contend, it is nonsensical to say that the universe was nothing before it was caused, because there was no before it was caused. There was no time outside the universe.
I think the biggest error here is assuming that the universe is comparable to any old thing. I think you'll agree that God is not comparable to ordinary things, why should the universe that began with time be comparable to objects beginning to exist in time?
The Kalam is trying to prove theism while the universe being contingent is taken as a premise. We have prima facie evidence that the universe is contingent –everything in it is. Its contingency is an expansive property and thus does not commit the compositional fallacy. This of course doesn't prove the universe is contingent, but it's still evidence that tips the scales in favor of, if not theism, then non-materialism.
It doesn't matter if there was "no time outside the universe", something need not be chronologically prior to be ontologically prior. In fact, you echo this in your post when you imply quantum energy is that eternal thing from which the universe emerges. Krauss and Hawking may bandy about the 'north of north pole' argument whenever it suits them, but they still make implications of other universes and universe-generating mechanisms from which our universe has its ontology.
Even if I grant you that quantum energy –or whatever it's called–, from which the universe emerges, is non-contingent, and therefore, necessary, you will still fall in the same rut of which I previously mentioned; this quantum energy will necessarily have causal qualities to it that would make it tend to create universes and not, say, pink bunnies. Thus, we can still ask why it creates what it creates and not pink bunnies? And there could be 3 possible answers about the nature of this eternally existing and necessary thingy:
1. This Q energy is just that way. (which is unsatisfactory)
2. This Q energy has intention. (Deepak Chopra will be pleased)
3. Actually, it can create pink bunnies. (patently absurd)
Neither of which you, Hawking, Krauss, or anyone else has philosophical or scientific arguments to back up, and therefore seems to amount to nothing more than a post hoc rationalization that's neither based in science or philosophy, but flouted anyway in support of strongly held anti-theistic metaphysical commitments.
I think I wasn't clear by "contingency" so, for that, I apologize. Yes, the universe is logically contingent, in that not every world will have a universe exactly like ours and its non-existence would not result in contradictions. If a set includes contingent stuff, then it must be contingent itself since the set could be composed of other stuff (as in pink bunnies). However, how do we know that the universe is ontologically contingent? Is this not what the Kalam is trying to prove?
It's completely possible that the universe is simply ontologically necessary, or non-contingent (to be clearer 🙂 ). Its existence is not dependent on some other thing since it is eternal. Being such, it would be a brute fact. The universe's eternity is supported by general relativity and escapes the impossibility of an actual infinite.
Since the eternal universe is logically contingent, but ontologically non-contingent, any explanation for its existence would be nonsensical, even with an appeal to a logical necessity such as a god. (For that matter, how do we even know that actual logical necessities can even exist?)
If the universe is logically contingent and ontologically non-contingent (eternally existing) then no explanation, not even a logical necessity, can be its "ontological prior." That would mean that if the universe is necessarily entailed by the logical necessity it would be itself a logical necessity, which would contradict its logical contingency. It would also mean, whether it was logically necessary or logically contingent, that it is no longer ontologically non-contingent, if it has a cause, God.
The Kalam tries to show that the universe is ontologically contingent. Therefore, to assume that the universe is ontologically contingent is to beg the question.
I think that if you do, as you did, grant the logical necessity of the laws of nature then our debate would be composed of cosmology and no longer abstract philosophy. We would then discuss symmetry breaking and fundamental forces that would lead to our current state of affairs. That would be the context in which we can ask why it creates what it creates.
Even if it the universe were eternal, that does not entail it would need no explanation, in fact the previous versions of the cosmological argument assumed the universe was eternal. But, hell, my head is spinning from all these words. Let's just leave it at that, and once again thanks for this exchange.
As I lay out in my previous response, ontologically non-contingent beings, such as the universe, cannot be explained, in principle. To try to would result in logical contradictions.
Thanks as well, Miguel! 🙂
And I was just about to bring out the popcorn. You two shouldn't get too friendly with each other cause it takes the fun out of watching you debate. 🙂
[Even if it the universe were eternal, that does not entail it would need no explanation]
Does this mean that God's presumed eternal existence requires an explanation as well?
[the previous versions of the cosmological argument assumed the universe was eternal]
Correct me if I'm wrong, but from what I can remember, previous versions simply stated that everything that exists has a cause, and that's why they had to refine it into "everything that begins to exist" or else they would be committing special pleading by saying that everything that exists has a cause except God.
"Does this mean that God's presumed eternal existence requires an explanation as well?"
Well, to take the Leibnizian version: whatever exists that derives it's reason for existence outside itself must ultimately, down the line, derive existence from that which has its reason for existence in itself.
In other words, whatever is contingent must ultimately derive its existence, down the line, from something that is not only non-contingent, but necessary –something that couldn't, in principle, have failed to exist, and something that, in principle, cannot be said to have had a cause or an explanation. The whole point is to show that there HAS to be something like this –so nothing is posited arbitrarily. Therefore it makes no sense to ask, as Dawkins does, what the cause of God is.
My contention was that there is nothing in this universe that seems to exist necessarily. If scientists think there was –like Quantum energy– I'd be glad to hear the arguments in support of it. Of course, that's not all I can say about that, but leaving that aside for the moment.
"Correct me if I'm wrong, but from what I can remember, previous versions simply stated that everything that exists has a cause, and that's why they had to refine it into "everything that begins to exist" or else they would be committing special pleading by saying that everything that exists has a cause except God."
Let's just say there are many versions. Aquinas assumed the universe was eternal, and the others –like Leibniz I think– did not formulate their arguments in consideration of the universe's beginning. The point is that even if every state of the universe was caused by a previous state that extended infinitely to the past, that does not entail that this collection of states exist necessarily. We can still ask why this collection of states exist, and since the collection of states do exist, then the question is still a meaningful one. In other words, previous versions sought to answer just that 'why' question without consideration of any beginning point.
[My contention was that there is nothing in this universe that seems to exist necessarily.]
I would like to point out, as Garrick did, that the universe did not begin to exist in time. Time itself is contingent upon the universe’s existence. It’s not like there was a time when there was no universe. And with this I contend that unless there is an absolute time or a “time beyond time,” the universe is a necessary entity because time exists.
Innerminds,
like I said to Garrick, however, one need not be chronologically prior to be ontologically prior. So this argument of yours which is identical to the 'north of north' pole one doesn't really obviate the question of what caused the universe or whether it's necessary.
May I ask what are the arguments to support the contention that God is ontologically prior in addition to being chronologically prior that cannot be applied to the universe or to whatever universe-generating mechanism?
Well with respect to the cosmological argument –and all its variations– they can be applied to the universe and whatever universe generating mechanism; I mean, you can reformulate the Kalam to try and show the universe or the UGM is the thing that in principle has to exist from which everything else owes its existence. But the conclusion, for me at least, becomes fantastically more improbable for reasons I've given above.
It's like the CA argues that down the line, that's what in principle must exist (and then Aquinas spends hundreds of pages exfoliating this conclusion and inferring the characteristics of God), while science, on the other hand, is saying that since it can only account for X, therefore X is what ultimately is down the line, therefore X is that thing which in principle has to exist, and even if it can be accounted for, it will just say it's inexplicable (since it will really be, in principle, inexplicable).
Now, if you're telling me that's a warranted conclusion on the part of science, then fine. We'll be at an impasse. But,really, it will be laughable if a scientist says it's a "scientific" conclusion, because it clearly isn't.
[science, on the other hand, is saying that since it can only account for X, therefore X is what ultimately is down the line, therefore X is that thing which in principle has to exist]
That doesn't sound like science. Science would more likely say something like, "After reviewing the available evidence as of this time, we can only account for X and there is no evidence to support the existence of something prior to X."
[and even if it can be accounted for, it will just say it's inexplicable (since it will really be, in principle, inexplicable). ]
Doesn't this sound very much like what the theists would say about God as the necessary cause, that his existence, consciousness, and power (including his ability to exist beyond time) are all inexplicable?
[Now, if you're telling me that's a warranted conclusion on the part of science, then fine. We'll be at an impasse. But,really, it will be laughable if a scientist says it's a "scientific" conclusion, because it clearly isn't.]
Of course it's in no way a warranted conclusion on the part of science. But that goes the same for the conclusion that the universe was caused by God.
By the way, Miguel, could you please add me up on Facebook? You know my full name so you can search me. 🙂
"That doesn't sound like science. Science would more likely say something like, "After reviewing the available evidence as of this time, we can only account…"
Tell that to the gnu atheists then, because, that's not what they do, actually.
"Doesn't this sound very much like what the theists would say about God as the necessary cause, that his existence, consciousness, and power…"
Aquinas spends hundreds of pages inferring these characteristics from the argument's conclusion –so does Craig. I think you should read their papers and see they're doing nothing of the sort. Obviously, many characteristics about God will be inexplicable, but remember, the CA only gets you to soft theism. The other things Christians know about God they learned from revelation.
"Of course it's in no way a warranted conclusion on the part of science. But that goes the same for the conclusion that the universe was caused by God. "
I'm sorry but no. Again, read at least Craig's whole explication of the Kalam. He doesn't posit anything arbitrarily. Or read Aquinas's 5 ways (you will however have to first understand his metaphysics, or you'll completely miss his points.)
"By the way, Miguel, could you please add me up on Facebook? You know my full name so you can search me."
Sure Jong. I'll do that.
[Tell that to the gnu atheists then, because, that's not what they do, actually. ]
Gnu atheists =/ = science.
[Aquinas spends hundreds of pages inferring these characteristics from the argument's conclusion –so does Craig. I think you should read their papers and see they're doing nothing of the sort.]
Could you please give me a link so I can see if I can refute them?
[Obviously, many characteristics about God will be inexplicable, but remember, the CA only gets you to soft theism. The other things Christians know about God they learned from revelation. ]
As the deists would say, "revelation can only be revelation in the first instance. For example, if God revealed something to me, that would be a divine revelation to me. If I then told someone else what God told me it would be mere hearsay to the person I tell. If that person believed what I said, they would not be putting their trust in God, but in me, believing what I told them was actually true."
By the way, someone just added me up on Facebook but I'm not sure if it's you. Could you please PM me? Thanks 🙂
[Could you please give me a link so I can see if I can refute them? ]
Start with the Kalam. Aquinas will be difficult since everything he says will seem nonsense if you don't understand Thomism. Just go to Craig's website really, and go through his scholarly articles. I've read almost everything there –not that I understood all of it.
[As the deists would say..]
Who cares what they say? 😀
I PMed you on Facebook. 🙂
[Who cares what they (the deists) would say?]
For starters, people who are serious about determining whether what their religion claims to be the Word of God is really the Word of God. Won't you agree that the cosmological and teleological arguments merely try to prove that there is a creator but does nothing to support the contention that such creator continues to intervene in the affairs of the universe? There are also no logical arguments to prove the existence of the soul and heaven and hell and especially the rules for gaining entry to heaven – all these come from claims of "divine revelation" which the deists would argue are mere hearsay.
The levity seems to have been lost on you, innerminds. Of course we should take people seriously.
The CA and Teleo argument tries to prove theism, not deism –or, at least, theism on it would be more probable than deism.
Deists can call it hearsay if they wish. But at least for Christians, it's knowledge that verifies, not knowledge to be verified, because knowledge that God exists is, as Plantinga argues, properly basic.
Care to explain how the CA and Teleo arguments prove theism more than deism?
No you're right. Kalam, if works, shows personal creator, which could be indifferent to us for all we know. But in tandem with Teleo, it shows theism, because we get a personal creator who gives 'purpose' (telos – greek word for purpose).
However, previous Cosmological arguments presupposed the truth of Thomism (separate arguments for this) which meant evil was ontologically posterior to good, therefore any 'God' shown by the CA would, in principle, be all-good, thus proving, if the arguments work, theism, not deism.
The God shown by the CA would support whatever God is presupposed by other beliefs, be it Thomism, Islam, or deism. But in itself, the CA only supports the deistic creator.
As for the purpose in the Teleological Argument, it only means that during the Big Bang God made sure that all the values would be just right up to the last decimal point so that 13.7 years later there would be at least one planet hospitable to human life. It does not argue that God continues to intervene after the Big Bang.
It's wrong to say the CA in itself only supports a deistic creator, since it also supports a theistic one. The teleos' conclusion can be further deduced towards theism; if the whole universe's purpose was us, theism is just more likely. None of Craig's arguments except the resurrection and 'God's inner witness' show God 'intervenes' . But his whole case is a cumulative one.
Let me rephrase then. In itself, the CA (and the TA for that matter), if correct, only proves the existence of a creator; it does not go so far as to prove that such creator continues to intervene in the universe after the Big Bang. And if according to the TA the whole purpose of setting the right values at the Big Bang is to make at least one planet hospitable to human life 13.7 billion years later, that does not necessarily mean that God answers prayers or gave souls to humans and puts believers in heaven and nonbelievers in hell.
I believe nobody in the history of apologetics tries to argue the TA by itself accomplishes those things.
Yes, but unlike the CA and TA, the arguments and contentions that supposedly corroborate with them to build a cumulative case for the existence of an intervening god cannot be considered seriously in forums like this because they are not based on reason and evidence but on alleged revelation.
On what you say: Yes for the 'inner witness', No for the arguments for the resurrection. Latter is, for me, the most airtight of Craig's arguments
The resurrection story is airtight? Or do you mean unfalsifiable? 🙂
No I mean airtight. Check out a paper done by the Mcgrews
Hi Miguel!
I think we all agree now that nothing can be chronologically prior to the universe. However, I believe Garrick has made a strong case in his article that there need not be anything ontologically prior to the universe (or, if you want, to the universe-generating mechanism that spawned ours).
Let me digress a bit before expounding that point. Imagine a particular radioactive atom. According to quantum mechanics, it will decay after some time. When? We can never, even in principle, know. All we can ever know is the probability that it will decay at a particular time, beyond that the universe allows us no further knowledge.
Now let us relate the quantum randomness of radioactivity to the universe-generating mechanism. What universe will be spawned by the mechanism? Perhaps, if we have a complete cosmology (something we are still very far from having), we can have the probability that the mechanism would spawn our own universe, as well as the probability that it would spawn pink bunnies (yay!). So, is our universe necessary? If the probability that it will be generated by the mechanism is not equal to unity, then the answer is no. I think we all /suspect/ that this is correct. But does this make the universe ontologically contingent on something else? No, it does not.
Furthermore, does this make the universe-generating mechanism ontologically contingent on a personal consciousness? Again, it does not.
You see, an entity need not be logically necessary (like St. Anselm's God was supposed to be) to be ontologically non-contingent. The universe-generating mechanism might be logically non-necessary (we cannot give a logical answer to why it is the way it is), but it has no bearing on the eternity of its ontology. In other words, it can have existed for eternity (in the timeless sense, of course) and be the way it is without being as true as '3 plus 5 = 8.'
Nice to hear from you again, Pecier.
If I understand you correctly, you're saying the universe generating mechanism need not be ontologically prior to that which emerges from it by virtue of the indetermincy of QM? I don't get why you would think this; if P's ontology is based on Y, then it doesn't matter whether P emerges from Y indeterminantly –because P still emerges from Y. In other words, Y would have properties that would conduce to P emerging from it indeterminately. To say nothing of your conclusion about these things of which science tells us doesn't exist based on what it cannot observe.
If this universe generating mechanism, like you say, can probabilistically produce pink bunnies, then it already has produced pink bunnies and other patently absurd things of which we can imagine (and other things we can't) –since this mechanism, like you say, has existed for all eternity. That's the absurd and, in my opinion, untenable consequence you are left with by going that route.
Also, if your conclusion is that this universe generating mechanism doesn't have any ontological base, then you'll have to say it exists out of a necessity of its own nature, for if the reason for its existence cannot be found outside itself, then the reason for its existence must be in itself.
But let's grant for a minute that the mechanism exists out of a necessity of its own nature, lets see what you are left with: a mechanism that produces not just universes (with pink bunnies or otherwise) but pink bunnies, and, well, Peciers and Miguels debating each other while standing on their heads, and so on. Of course, you're free to believe all this, but you'll understand if I, on the other hand, believe you do so just to escape theism.
Now maybe if we can say this mechanism only produces that which it intends to.. but, naw, that would make it sound more like God –we can't have that now.
Hello Miguel,
I said:
"But does this make the universe ontologically contingent on something else? No, it does not."
However, I can now see that I should have said this instead:
"But does this make the universe-generating mechanism ontologically contingent on something else? No, it does not."
So yes, I agree with your first paragraph. After all, the decay of an atom is still contingent on the decay mechanism, indeterminacy aside.
As for your second paragraph, I believe you are again confusing the two senses of 'eternal'. By saying that the universe-generating mechanism (UGM) is eternal, I do not mean to say that it has gone spawning stuff for an infinite amount of time. Instead, what I mean is that nothing can be chronologically prior to the UGM so that there can be no "before" it and that there was never a time when it did not exist.
Also, it is easy to imagine that the UGM has constraints that will prevent it from spawning what you would call "patent absurdities". However, the fact that the UGM has constraints does not necessitate anything outside of it to set these constraints. Even if the constraints of the UGM are not logically necessary, if it is ontologically non-contingent then it does not need any explanation outside itself.
Pecier,
I was already granting you there never was a time before the UGM, but, like I said, what's ontologically prior need not be chronologically prior. In other words, even if there was never a 'time' before it, that doesn't mean it exists necessarily –or that it exists out of a necessity of its own nature. I don't have to talk about 'time' here, you can leave that out completely. I'm talking about ontology not chronology.
And, if I grant you that this UGM exists out of a necessity of its own nature –which you've pretty much just asserted here with neither philosophical or scientific argument, presumably simply to support your metaphysical biases– and has constraints that would make it tend to produce only universes (of various properties, granted), then we can ask why it just creates what it creates and not, say, pink bunnies, and we will be left, again as I said to Garrick, with 3 possible answers:
1. This Q energy [UGM in our case] is just that way. (which is unsatisfactory)
2. This Q energy [UGM in our case] has intention. (Deepak Chopra will be pleased)
3. Actually, it can create pink bunnies. (patently absurd)
Now, let me clarify that these questions are meaningful ones EVEN if the UGM exists necessarily, because these are all questions about the nature of the UGM and not about anything on which its ontology is based.
Again, each one of these conclusions, though, are left without any supporting argument, and, again, seems like a post hoc rationalization done simply to escape theism. To say nothing of how much more faith one would need to believe them over the theistic response (or maybe not).
If I may interject. 🙂 We are not claiming that the UGM is a logical necessity, merely ontologically non-contingent. It exists inexplicably, not out of its own nature. This may be psychologically unsatisfactory, I will grant, but this is not a rational objection. I don't think it's fair either to allege that picking this choice is motivated by aversion to theism.
There is no rational basis for requiring that everything to have a reason for being. If it were so, God's free choice, which is composed of contingent members would itself need explication. Perhaps you will argue instead that only beings that exist need explication. I would argue in return that this principle is also irrational.
Our intuition of requiring reasons for everything has only ever resulted in finding logically contingent beings as reasons for logically contingent beings—never logically necessary beings as reasons. It's a useful intuition (particularly in science), but there is no reason that we should ever find a logically necessary being as the endpoint of all explanation.
As I've put forward, it is completely possible that a logically contingent being is ontologically non-contingent. That is to say, the UGM does not exist "out of a necessity of its own nature." It is merely inexplicable. In fact, it is even possible that God himself is logically contingent but ontologically non-contingent in a possible world where no actual beings exist. Why not the UGM?
The Kalam proposed a formidable challenge against the UGM's eternity. Now that this is no longer a stumbling block, I noticed that you argued instead similar to the form of a classical cosmological argument. However, I think it hinges on an irrational premise—that everything that exists needs a satisfactory reason for being: contingent beings explained by external beings, necessary beings explained by their very nature.
I contend that it is logically possible that there are inexplicable beings—brute facts. These would be logically contingent ontologically non-contingent beings—beings that would result in logical contradictions if they had explanations. I do not even exclude God from the possibility of being under this category. Instead, I reject God as a needless entity.
The extra words muddle things up a bit. When you say "ontologically non-contingent" I take it you simply mean 'not contingent', as in the UGM (or universe) is not contingent, and is therefore its own ontology.
(What do you even mean when you say something is "logically contingent [yet] ontologically non-contingent"? It doesn't seem you're using the words in the normal sense. I take this to simply mean something that has no ontological base)
The problem is that what you're proposing is incoherent; You say the UGM (or whatever) is "ontologically non-contingent" yet doesn't exist necessarily. That doesn't make sense. Again, if the reason for something's existence isn't found outside itself, then it will necessarily have to be within itself; something that's, in your words, "ontologically non-contingent" will have to exist out of a necessity of its own nature. We are just logically inferring the conclusion from what seems to be a sound premise. If you're saying the UGM is "ontologically non-contingent" then you are necessarily saying it exists necessarily.
You say: "but there is no reason that we should ever find a logically necessary being as the endpoint of all explanation."
But there IS a reason. Leibniz's argument. You can, of course, try to refute his argument, but to just assert that "there is no reason" won't do.
So, you have a timeless quantum thing (UGM, or what have you) that inexplicably exists out of a necessity of its own nature, and has properties which are also, in principle, inexplicable, yet are nevertheless what make it tend to create only universes. All of which you have zero evidence for. Come on man –this doesn't seem post hoc to you?
I think the confusion stems from the words that mean different things. I may have clumsily expounded on this. As I've put forward, there is a difference between logical necessity and ontological non-contingency. Logical necessities must exist and must exist in all possible worlds. I'm skeptical that even God can be this logical necessity in a possible world where no actual beings exist—this notion is imaginable and has no prima facie contradiction. Logically contingent ontologically non-contingent beings simply have no cause for their existence, not even logical necessity. It is logically possible for them to not exist (it doesn't result in contradictions as in the logical necessity of propositions).It is completely possible that there simply is no reason for the UGM's existence and its universe-making nature. It's just there.Leibniz's argument there being a necessary being stems from a premise which I wholeheartedly reject: the principle of sufficient reason. Sorry, I should have fleshed this out before saying there was no reason. What I mean is, there is no logical reason for the principle to be true and therefore no reason to believe that a concrete actual necessary being exists to explain everything. Necessary beings have never been found to explain contingent beings. And there is no reason we should not find a logically contingent being as the just-is start point of explanation, itself being inexplicable (ontologically non-contingent).While psychologically unsatisfying, this does not strike me as post hoc because there is no reason that nature should follow our modal intuitions. In fact, there is all the evidence that we should not trust our intuitions about how nature is. I hope I'm not being needlessly contrarian.
Just as an aside, Alexander Pruss in his article in the Blackwell Companion to Natural Theology provides no less than 8 justifications for accepting the Principle of Sufficient Reason.
Here's one of them:
2.2.7. Philosophical argumentation
It is morally acceptable to redirect a speeding trolley from a track on which there are five people onto a track with only one person. On the other hand, it is not right to shoot one innocent person to save fi ve. What is the morally relevant difference between the two cases? If we denied the PSR, then we could simply say: “Who cares? Both of these moral facts are just brute facts, with no explanation.” Why, indeed, suppose that there should be some explanation of the difference in moral evaluation if we accept the denial of the PSR, and hence accept that there can be facts with no explanation at all?
Almost all moral theorists accept the supervenience of the moral on the nonmoral. But without the PSR, would we really have reason to accept that? We could simply suppose brute contingent facts. In this world, torture is wrong. In that world, exactly alike in every other respect, torture is a duty. Why? No reason, just contingent brute fact.
The denial of the PSR, thus, would bring much philosophical argumentation to a standstill.
– Alexander Pruss, The Liebnizian Cosmological Argument, The Blackwell Companion to Natural Theology, p.45
This is a red herring. Denying PSR does not entail there being no sufficient reason for anything. There are morally-relevant neuropsychological (therefore, empirical) differences between the two examples beyond the crude summation of persons.
In any case, we need only one example of a brute fact to refute the PSR's universal applicability—such as in quantum mechanics.
It's not a Red Herring. Three reasons:
1. First, an argument from authority: this is a professional philosopher with doctorates in Philosophy and Mathematics writing for one of the most respected publications in Academia (Wiley-Blackwell). Elementary fallacies would almost certainly have been weeded out by peer review and the editorial process well before publication.
2. Second, what you're talking about isn't a Red Herring. What you're referring to is a non-sequitur.
3. It's not a non-sequitur simply because he isn't arguing that denying the PSR entails that there is no sufficient reason for anything. Rather, what he's saying is that the negation of the PSR provides us with an undercutting defeater for philosophical argumentation since philosophical arguments is chiefly concerned with explanations of philosophical phenomena.
If the answer to the question 'why' is sufficiently answerable by the simple answer 'it just is' then philosophical argumentation is rendered worthless because that sort of answer would suffice for just about any question you can think of.
It's a red herring because it distracts from the issue and misleads readers into thinking I said things I did not.
1. It's a red herring with respect to this debate, not in whatever context the piece came from.
2. Not interested in debating this.
3. Sure, you could always ask why, but there's no reason there should always be an answer.
True, you never said that but it's still not a Red Herring. Pruss' point is still completely relevant to our discussion simply because Pruss' is here trying to prove the PSR (which is what we're discussing).
What Pruss does here is called a reductio ad absurdum (reduction to the absurd) where he shows that a rejection of the PSR implies an absurd conclusion, i.e. if the PSR is not true then philosophical argumentation is worthless.
We can (crudely) formalize the argument as follows:
(1) Brute facts exist. (x)
(2) If brute facts exist, then philosophical argumentation is worthless. (if x -> y)
(3) Therefore, philosophical argumentation is worthless. (y)
The key premise being premise (2). Were we to accept the existence of brute facts (in rejecting the PSR), why would it not be the case that for every question P (that we can't answer), that the answer should by p (it just is)? If we are justified in believing p as an answer to one question, why wouldn't we be justified in Q as well?
Problem with (2) is its universal applicability. We could very well replace it with a weaker premise, a more reasonable one.
(2b) If brute facts exist, then some philosophical argumentation is worthless.
(3b) Therefore, some philosophical argumentation is worthless.
How do we know which ones end with "just is"? Some questions allow for further probing. Some questions just end full stop. Philosophical argumentation, and perhaps scientific investigation, will show which ones are which. Pruss assumes that "just is" answers are done by fiat instead of argumentation. That needs not to be the case, as in the non-contingency of UGM.
This is fun. 😀
The nature of the problem is what implies it's universal nature and you touch on this in the second part of your post. What you have to realize is that by differentiating between questions that allow for further probing and questions that just end full-stop is that you ended up providing an explanation for brute facts.
You just explained brute facts as facts that do not allow for further probing and mired yourself in a logical contradiction (since brute facts, by definition, allow for no explanations, they just 'are').
See the problem? The problem with brute facts is you can't even explain why they're brute facts! That is why if brute facts were to exist, it would have to be utterly arbitrary which facts would qualify for facts as such.
I too am enjoying. 🙂 If you'll humor me, I will refer to quantum mechanics to show that certain things simply cannot have sufficient reasons.Sufficient reasons must satisfactorily explain why one state of affairs obtains and not another. They must satisfactorily show that given this sufficient reason, the effect must obtain necessarily. Between two possibilities, a sufficient reason will explain why it is one case and not another. You can refer to my cereal example for a non-quantum case.There can be no sufficient reason, in principle, for quantum effects because they are probabilistic. That is, it isn't enough to say that an atom will decay once every 28 days. A sufficient reason must satisfactorily show why a decay event occurs at one moment and not another. If the PSR were true, the following would have a sufficient reason: why did a nucleus decay now and not in 100 billion years? Alternatively, why did a photon appear after the electron fell to its ground state now and not in 100 billion years? Quantum mechanics posits that there can be no reason, in principle. They are true random events.Empirical bases can point us towards causes that are themselves inexplicable. I am not explaining why brute facts are brute facts but how we can try to determine whether a question has a brute fact answer or not.
Only if you take "sufficient" to mean "deterministic".
It seems to me that there's nothing insufficient about an indeterministic explanation for quantum phenomena. What's happening here is that you seem to be arguing against a very strong version of the PSR whereby only deterministic reasons are sufficient to explain some phenomena x.
That hardly seems to be a plausible PSR given the difficulties you highlight.
Care to put forward a more amenable version? 🙂
From Pruss again, here:
"For simplicity, I shall stipulatively use the term “fact” for a true proposition. The PSR states that every fact, or every contingent fact, has an explanation, and this is the standard tool in Leibnizian arguments for handling the Glendower and Regress problems."
– Alexander Pruss, The Liebnizian Cosmological Argument, The Blackwell Companion to Natural Theology, p.26
Is not the specific appearance of photons a fact that needs a sufficient explanation? Why would the state of affairs be such that one photon emission event obtains and not another?
Yep, it does (need an explanation) and that explanation is that the nature of the quantum vacuum (probabilistic) is the reason that one state of affairs obtained and another didn't.
I suppose a weak enough PSR can simply accept that there can be no sufficient reason for specific probabilistic events but can explain them in general.
Thanks, _XIII_! 🙂
Yep, but it's a weak form of the PSR only in the sense that it's relatively restricted (being applied only on contingent facts).
So far as I know, the PSR has never been formulated to include only deterministic explanations (even during Liebniz' time).
Let's assume that an infinite regress of contingent beings cannot fully explain each other's existence.
Case 1: No necessary being exists.
If no necessary being exists and an infinite number contingent beings cannot sufficiently explain each other, then the PSR is false since not every existent being can be logically explained.
Case 2: At least one necessary being exists.
The PSR is sound.
As we can see, the PSR can only be true if a necessary being exists. Therefore, it cannot be used to prove that at least one necessary being exists (as in Leibniz's Cosmological Argument) as this would beg the question.
Hi Miguel,
Consider the following statements:
(1) Y exists.
(2) It is not the case that Y is ontologically posterior to some Z.
(3) Y exists necessarily.
For the sake of argument, let us agree that statement (1) is true. You believe that when I assert (2), then I am logically bound to assert (3) as also true. Likewise, you believe that the falsehood of (3) logically entails the falsehood of (2). What follows is my justification why I find the preceding line of reasoning unconvincing.
If Y = UGM, then I assert the following:
T(1) = True
T(2) = True
T(3) = False.
Notice how these assertions do not lead to a contradiction. They also have the added benefit of having valid justifications. The first assertion – the truth of (1) – is backed by scientific evidence and by the mere fact that we can argue about it. The second assertion – the truth of (2) – is suggested by the latest understanding of quantum theory. The last assertion – the falsehood of (3) – comes from the fact that ‘UGM does not exist’ does not lead to a logical contradiction.
Given these, I cannot see how your objection to the UGM’s simultaneous ontological non-contingency and logical non-necessity holds up. As best as I can see, if you want to deny the naturalistic origins of the universe, then you must deny the truth of proposition (2). But if that's the case, the falsehood of (2) should be your conclusion and not a part of your premise.
(2) isn't backed up by anything. You're asserting that it's a feature of the UGM. But if (2) is true, then (3) is true, and it does not matter whether its being false doesn't entail a contradiction –the avoidance of that doesn't mean it's sound.
You just assert (2) and 'not(3)'.
While the CA argues that something in principle has got to have those features, you assert that the UGM has those features.
And like moth to a flame, I am drawn to this article. 🙂
I'll split my comments on my different objections to your article.
First, you lodge a critique against premise (1) of the Kalam Cosmological Argument (KCA) by maintaining that a-causal events are possible as evidenced by atomic decay and certain events within the quantum vacuum.
Craig's reply, as you anticipated, is that these are not true examples of creation ex-nihilo since these events occur only under a set of specific conditions that are necessary for these events to occur. There is, for example, a relation between atomic decay and the sun (though what this is is still not clear). In the case of quantum events, it is the quantum vacuum itself that provides the indeterministic cause for them (as it is the necessary and sufficient conditions that cause the events).
You retort that this means that Craig concedes that probabilistic causes are possible and that's correct (if by probabilistic, you mean indeterministic).
I don't see how this concession justifies your conclusion however: that this severely compromises Craig's contention that the First Cause (FC) is personal. In fact, you never support this conclusion but merely asserted it. How would it be the case that since probabilistic causes are possible (provided that necessary and sufficient conditions exist, e.g. the quantum vacuum) weaken Craig's case for the personhood of the FC?
The personhood of the first cause is argued for using the principle of determination, where the first cause is necessarily personal because it needs to be able to distinguish between moments and put a gap between its own existence and the consequence of an effect. Only a person can choose to drink a glass of water now or later. This principle is under the misapprehension that mechanistic causes must have their effects immediately occur once all the pieces fall in together. This is refuted by the existence of probabilistic causes, where even though all the circumstances necessary for an effect are in place, the effect can occur whenever.
If we assume an absolute view of time, as Craig does in arguing for the particularizer, this means that the first cause decided to create the universe 13.7 billion years ago. It is asserted that if the cause is naturalistic, then the universe must have existed through an infinite series of events, since non-personal naturalistic causes must have their effects occur immediately. This is impossible, according to Craig.
However, since probabilistic causes are possible causes, the objection (that a person is the only kind of cause capable of creating a universe in the precise moment that ours started ticking) falls flat. For example, assuming an absolute view of time, an atom's decay will create a universe (of course this is not how things work). That primeval atom will then be able to "wait" to create the universe not immediately upon its own existence. It can decay in 2 seconds, or in 100 billion years. Thus, it is not necessary that a person is needed for a gap between its own existence and its "decision" to effect a consequence.
But the "nothingness" that preceded (not in the temporal sense) the universe isn't anything like the quantum vacuum. The "nothingness" that preceded the universe wasn't anything. It has no properties, not even potentialities, for potentialities are properties and "nothings" don't possess properties.
Suppose however that what you're saying is that whilst there was 'something', it wasn't a person but merely a Universe Generating Mechanism (UGM), as you and Miguel call it, then you have to explain how the UGM is relevantly similar to the Quantum Vacuum such that, like in the vacuum, there would exist the necessary and sufficient conditions for the universe to be generated.
The problem is this: while probabilistic causes are possible, we have no reasons to believe that our laws of physics can be extrapolated beyond spacetime. The Causal Principle is a meta-physical principle which is the reason why the KCA extrapolates it beyond the spatio-temporal confines of our universe but the Laws of Physics are not.
Hence, Craig gives two more arguments for the personhood of the FC:
1. One, originating from Swinburne and taking a cue from Liebniz, there are two (2) types of causal explanations: scientific explanations (in terms of laws and initial conditions) and personal explanations (in terms of agents and their volitions). The problem is that the first state of the universe (the singularity) cannot have a scientific explanation since neither space nor time (the arena wherein the Laws of the Universe operate) exists.
The conclusion can only be a personal explanation.
2. Two, there are only two things that we know of that could be called immaterial, uncaused, beginningless, timeless and spaceless: abstract objects (like numbers, sets, propositions and properties) and personal minds. Since abstract objects are causally effete, the conclusion could only be that the FC was(is) a personal mind.
A point of clarification: the laws of nature need not operate in space or time. As long as the laws hold, space and time will spontaneously appear due to the quantum instability of nothing (let's call it "natural nothing" to distinguish it from your metaphysical nothing).
It begs the question to posit that there even exists a "beyond space-time" or beyond physical laws (to be more precise, since the laws apply outside of space or time). Of course the laws of nature would not be able to bring about the universe if there exists a "beyond physical laws" where only God can do stuff.
The second reason forgets that the laws of nature are abstract (immaterial, uncaused, without beginning, timeless, and spaceless) but not "causally effete."
I have grave doubts about the causal principle or principle of sufficient reason. I don't even think it serves the theistic side well. It is an artifact of bad physical intuitions.
The principle sufficient reason asserts that everything has a sufficient reason for being. The existence and possibility of probabilistic causes is an example why the principle is unreasonable. A sufficient reason must explain why an effect is the way it is such that no other effect could have been. For example, it is not sufficient to explain the presence of an empty bowl on the dining table by saying that John eats cereal four times a week and today might have been one of those days. It could be that today was not one of those days and a burglar came into the house and ate cereal. The sufficient explanation must show satisfactorily that John ate cereal on this particular occasion and left the cereal without cleaning up.
The existence of probabilistic causes prevents the causal principle to take hold. Why did the atom decay at this particular moment but not later? There is no sufficient reason, in principle. It just happens. It is not a sufficient reason to say that, in general, the probability of atomic decay is every 0.2 seconds. We need to explain sufficiently why the atom decayed now and not before or after. But, let's ignore probabilistic causes. The causal principle has even more fatal problems.
Let us grant that God is logically necessary and he exists. Is his existence a sufficient reason for our state of affairs in this universe? No. We must explain why God even created a universe. But, let's say creating is just the sort of thing God will always do. This would mean that God is not free to not create and is bound by his nature to create universes and not pink bunnies. But, let's bite this bullet, let's say God is not free to not create universes. Is this sufficient to explain our state of affairs? Still no. Why did God create this universe and not a different universe? Is God not free to create other kinds of universes? Why a universe with me?
As I explained in a different thread, ontologically contingent beings, if they are entailed by logical necessities, are logical necessities as well. All the way down, we'll find that everything is a logical necessity. If the existence of God is to be sufficient reason, there would be no possible worlds where God could not have made me. God is not free to do anything. He is a person locked-in his body helplessly watching mental and physical events occur as a result of his nature.
I therefore reject the causal principle, not because I don't like God, but because it makes no metaphysical sense. I propose the concept of "ontologically non-contingent," which is distinct from "logically necessary." These are beings that are simply inexplicable. I do not exclude God from being categorized under this concept. It is possible that God is inexplicable, in fact, this seems to be more reasonable than appealing to logical necessity. God is inexplicable, his reason for creating is inexplicable, his reason for instantiating our possible world is inexplicable.
You're degressing, Garrick. The points I raised had nothing to do with the Principle of Sufficient Reason (PSR). In fact, the KCA doesn't even need the PSR in order to be viable. Needless to say, the Causal Principle (CP) on which the KCA depends on as it's premise (1) is a completely different thesis from the PSR.
On-topic:
1. First off, you maintain that the Laws of Nature don't need spacetime in order to operate. If that's true, then they cease to be physical laws as they transcend the physical universe. In a sense, they're meta-physical laws in your view.
Well, as a thesis I can't even begin to comprehend how you can assert that.
The Laws of Nature are laws that describe how nature generally operates. They do not 'cause' anything. Rather, they are a description of the way things tend to operate within fixed circumstances and settings. The Law of Gravity doesn't cause the moon to revolve around the earth, gravity does that. Rather, the Law of Gravity is a description of the tendency of two bodies to attract one another.
Thus, the Laws of Nature are, in fact, causally effete. They are nothing more than descriptions and descriptions have no causal powers.
2. More importantly, there isn't even a Law of Nature that describes how the universe (could have) originated ex-nihilo. I have never heard of a Law of Spontaneous Universal Creation Ex-Nihilo, for example.
3. Why would it be question-begging to posit there being an FC that is beyond spacetime? If both premises of the KCA are sound then the cause of the universe is not spatio-temporal. That is not in dispute.
Since we're working under the assumption that the first two premises of the KCA are sound (since we're discussing the personhood of the FC, not the first two premises), I don't see how that would be question-begging. An FC that is immaterial, spaceless, timeless, beginningless and enormously powerful (ommitting the personhood since it is in dispute) is, by definition, beyond spacetime.
1. The laws of nature don't all* need to operate within space and time since some describe the dynamics of both space and time. The quantum vacuum of the UGM would be both outside space and time.
I think you're splitting hairs about the descriptiveness of laws. Let "law" = "the tendencies of nature to do what it does."
*Some laws need to operate within space and/or time. Quantum mechanics does not.
2. There is one, it's quantum mechanics. Lawrence Krauss shows that a quantum theory of gravity would not only show how objects behave in space, it would be capable of showing how space itself can spontaneously appear from the instability of natural nothingness. This would occur as allowed by the uncertainty principle. This is a natural consequence of extending the Feynman sum over histories approach to space itself (similar to how particles can appear in and out of existence). Of course, this presupposes the existence of the laws of nature, or the tendency of quantum indeterminacy to make nature do stuff (if you will). This might not satisfy your threshold for "nothing." So, if you mean there isn't a law of nature for spontaneous creation of laws of nature, you got me there.
3. It's question-begging to assume that the first cause is beyond the laws of nature, not beyond space-time. Since it tries to prove that the cause is beyond the natural world, it begs the question to assume a prior supernatural universe where only one thing can do anything at all—God.
1. That's a double standard fallacy. How are Quantum Laws relevantly different from other Physical Laws?
2. Krauss' "nothing" is not the "nothing" that exists prior to the universe's creation. Krauss' 'nothing' is nothing more than the quantum vacuum itself which, far from the metaphysical 'nothing' being discussed in the KCA, is actually a roiling sea of quantum fluctuations with a rich substrata and governed by physical laws. That is not nothing.
Krauss is here guilty of the fallacy of equivocation.
3. Then you have to define what 'nature' is since you're using the term in very non-conventional ways (that is, you're extrapolating nature to exist outside of the universe). Nature has always been defined as being co-extensive with our physical spatio-temporal universe.
Besides, it's really not question-begging since the logic isn't circular (we aren't assuming the conclusion to be true in order to prove a premise). Rather, it follows a strict logical structure: if the premises are true, then the conclusion cannot be denied. The FC isn't being assumed to be beyond nature (in order to prove that the FC is beyond nature), rather that is proved by the nature of the argument (i.e. the FC would have to have existed outside the universe and sans the universe in order to have caused the universe into existence).
An entity that is timeless, immaterial, beginningless and spaceless is pretty much definitive of what an entity would be like if it exists beyond nature.
1. I never said quantum laws are not physical laws, they simply operate on different parameters and different scales as other laws such as electromagnetism.
2. I even specifically differentiated "physical nothing" from your "metaphysical nothing." No equivocation necessary.
3. You don't get to define what nature is, I'm afraid. Besides, why should "always been defined" limit what we know about nature? If we've found that certain laws hold outside space and/or time, why should our intuitions take precedence? I'm not even claiming that quantum laws are metaphysical. They are still natural laws: non-personal and mechanistic.
Let me clarify, if the UGM is eternal and outside space and outside time, which quantum gravity would have to be if it is to describe the dynamics of space itself and it is still not sufficient to explain the universe because we assume that there exists an outside of the outside in a metaphysical realm where no potential* for creation exists, then of course only a god could create from this realm.
*No "natural" potential, because it seems that a special kind of potential would need to exist in the metaphysical pre-UGM plane—supernatural potential. And only God can create from this potentiality. Needless to say, this line of argumentation is rather unfair, with special pleading upon special pleading.
1. How are they relevantly different from other physical laws such that they can operate sans space and time?
2. No, the equivocation is still there since you're extrapolating Krauss' nothing (which is not nothing) to be the nothing that exists causally prior to the universe's origination.
The 'nothing' that existed prior to the singularity isn't Krauss' nothing, but a metaphysical nothing denoting the absolute absence of anything: not time, not space, not even potentialities.
And this isn't an a priori assumption on my part (in case you call me out on question-begging). This is an a posteriori conclusion reached on the basis of premise (2) "The universe began to exist".
3. Later on this.
1. Quantum gravity laws that describe space must operate outside of space since, after all, they show how space can appear. That's the relevant difference.* But they are still physical laws. Some laws need specific kinds of post-Big Bang particles to work with, such as electromagnetism. The Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle does not. And the uncertainty and instability of space-time being absent results in the spontaneous appearance of closed universe spaces. These universes have a total energy sum of zero, but there are pockets of non-zero energy within where matter particles and radiation can exist. Ultimately, the positive energy of matter is cancelled out by the negative energy of gravity such that the conservation of energy is not violated. Krauss, Hawking, Hartle, and other scientists argue that our universe, being eerily flat, shows the exact geometry of a universe that has zero total energy.
*The technical difference is that the Feynman sum over histories approach for antimatter particles takes into account all paths between two points such that it is independent of space and time labels to account for each point on each path. This method is important to describe nature without using special frames of reference. Now, applying this to space describes all possible configurations of space, as it appears out of physical nothing (like particle-antiparticle virtual particle pairs).
2. As in the mechanism I show in 1, natural nothingness is unstable due to the uncertainty principle, universes pop in and out of natural nothing (spacelessness and timelessness). Now, you may posit a prior metaphysical nothing that would satisfy your true nothing. I don't have an issue with that since I am not saying that such a thing is identical to natural nothing. You may object that natural nothing is not really nothing because there remains the mechanistic potential for universe creation. Again, no issues there. At some point, though, metaphysical nothing begins to look like "something where only God can do anything."
1. That's circular logic (otherwise known as begging the question).
I'm asking you how quantum laws are relevantly different from other physical laws in order for them to be extrapolated to work outside the universe and then cause the universe into existence.
Your answer? That they must operate outside the universe in order to be able to cause the universe.
(As an aside, are you proposing an alternate model to the Standard Big Bang Model? Since you seem to be arguing that the universe did not have an absolute beginning since you seem to be arguing for the existence of spacetime outside of spacetime which is just weird, to be honest.)
2. The nothing that exists prior to the universe is metaphysical nothing, not Krauss' natural nothing and this isn't controversial.
All our best contemporary cosmological models predict an absolute beginning of the universe. You'd have to dispute premise (2) in order to argue for a quantum vacuum that existed prior to the universe's origination in the Big Bang. What you're doing here (by arguing that a quantum vacuum existed prior to the universe's beginning) is arguing that the universe did not begin to exist.
1. Let me start over. Quantum gravity laws are not special laws. They're just like any other law but they operate on space configurations. They operate in the absence of space. This is just what they do. I'm not really sure what else you'd like me to say. It's like asking me why the uncertainty principle operates outside the existence of particles. The mechanism isn't fully fleshed out since there are still more steps to a fully integrated quantum gravity theory, but it only needs to be plausible and logically possible. Quantum gravity would then be the UGM discussed elsewhere.What I've laid out is not in the standard model of cosmology as the standard model only mostly contains classical (non-quantum) gravity. All physicists recognize this lack and look toward the eventual combination of general relativity and quantum mechanics. But, formalism allows for speculation on what this quantum theory of gravity must contain and this includes the application of the uncertainty principle on space itself. These are not fringe ideas as they've been put forward by Hawking and Hartle. I can't even make this stuff up if I tried. :P2. I'm not sure what you're asking here either. Certain models of quantum gravity show a universe generating mechanism that, according to Krauss, requires the absence of space and time. Science isn't concerned if this does not look like the metaphysical nothing theologians want. This spaceless and timeless phase spontaneously results in tiny highly compact zero-energy universes due to the uncertainty principle. Some of those universes will have laws like ours due to symmetry breaking. This is a plausible but unproven mechanism for the appearance of a universe such as ours.This does not necessarily refute the Kalam. You can just as easily move the Kalam to say that the natural nothing began to exist because science sure isn't married to the idea that our universe is the only thing there is.
1. This clarifies things a bit: the crux of your argument is Krauss' theory (crudely summarized as there being a pre-existent quantum vacuum which formed the basis of a non-personal universe generating mechanism).
Krauss' theory hinges on the possibility of the 'nothing' that exists before the universe's origination is not metaphysical 'nothing' (as I see it) but rather a something 'nothing' (if that makes sense).
It's not question-begging per se but it's still a pretty weak argument. More on this below.
2. The problem with Krauss' theory is that the Bord-Guth-Vilenkin Theorem applies even to Krauss' hypothetical pre-existing quantum vacuum (since the Theorem shows that any universe with an expansion rate greater than zero must have had an absolute beginning).
Krauss' theorem doesn't solve the problem of absolute cosmic beginnings, it merely pushes the problem up one story (in the sense that even the quantum vacuum had to have had a cause).
This has actually been the subject of a debate between Dr. William Lane Craig and Dr. Lawrence Krauss last year (titled, IIRC, "Is there evidence for the existence of God?"). When Craig pointed out that even Krauss' hypothetical quantum vacuum must have had an absolute beginning, Krauss had no answer (instead appealing that we should just basically do more research and trust in the 'powers' of science).
There's a debate transcript on http://www.reasonablefaith.org if you're interested.
I readily concede that it is not illogical to ask whether the UGM had a beginning. I am unsure of your application, however, of Vilenkin's work. The UGM is not expanding.
Also, I must clarify that Vilenkin himself does not think that his work proves that our universe had an absolute beginning:
"[I]f someone asks me whether or not the theorem I proved with Borde and Guth implies that the universe had a beginning, I would say that the short answer is “yes”. If you are willing to get into subtleties, then the answer is “No, but…” So, there are ways to get around having a beginning, but then you are forced to have something nearly as special as a beginning."
Furthermore, BGV's work does not prove that the universe came from absolute nothingness (devoid of natural potential).
"[T]he state of “nothing” cannot be identified with absolute nothingness. The tunneling is described by the laws of quantum mechanics, and thus “nothing” should be subject to these laws. The laws of physics must have existed, even though there was no universe." — Alexander Vilenkin, Many Worlds in One
What you're calling the UGM is now misleading because what you call the UGM (as you now apply the term) is no longer a universe generating mechanism but a part of the universe (since it's not 'nothing).
The first quotation is the stock-standard reply whenever a KCA proponent brings up the BGV Theorem and it is, of course, misunderstood by many atheists to mean that Vilenkin himself doesn't believe in an absolute beginning of the universe.
Here's why:
1. To say that would be basically saying that Vilenkin is suffering from cognitive dissonance since in the very same book, Vilenkin goes on to say that, "There is no escape, they have to face the problem of a cosmic beginning". (Many Worlds in One, p.176)
2. Vilenkin's "No, but" is, in fact, already incorporated in my initial assertion.
Remember, I said that the BGV theorem proves that all universe with a past expansion rate greater than zero (which are pretty much the only cosmic scenarios that evade the implications of the theorem).
The problem is that our universe does have an expansion rate greater than zero and that means that the universe must have had an absolute beginning.
3. What about your second quotation?
What Vilenkin is talking about here is his pet theory of cosmic beginnings that Craig calls "quantum tunneling" where he tries to provide a plausible version of the universe's origination with neither an efficient nor a material cause.
The problem here is that, as Vilenkin points out, the "nothing" that would produce this hypothetical universe is not, in fact, "nothing" but a "something" (a theory competely at odds with his contention of an absolute beginning to the universe).
Thus, he draws the mistaken inference (just as you have) that the "laws of physics must have existed, even though there was no universe" (Many Worlds in One, p.186)
His problem is the same as yours in that he fails to realize that the Laws of Physics are causally effete because they are merely descriptions of how physical objects operate.
You appear to be using an outdated meaning of "universe" which means "set of everything physical". That has been no longer the use of "universe" for decades. Here's Vilenkin on what universe means: "So, by “universe” I mean the entire connected spacetime region." To avoid any further confusion, I propose this classification (because it's what I mean and what scientists mean).
UGM (natural nothing, absence of space and time) -> set of all possible universes -> our universe
This is what Vilenkin, Krauss, and Hawking mean when they say that the laws of the universe exist and operate even without universes. The uncertainty principle acts even on the absence of space and time, the UGM. It is not "causally effete."
There is no dissonance—you seem to have equivocated a deprecated meaning of "universe" with its modern definition. Vilenkin contends that our universe had a "cosmic beginning" from natural nothingness, the UGM. He did not mean that the UGM had a cosmic beginning.
Again, the BGV theorem does not apply to the UGM phase because it has never expanded and it never will. Space expands. The UGM has no space parameters. Our universe has space parameters and is expanding at an increasing rate. It is therefore subject to the BGV theorem, unlike the not-expanding UGM.
The G in the BGV, Alan Guth writes:
"Putting [general relativity and quantum mechanics] together, one can imagine that the universe started in the total empty geometry – absolute nothingness – and then made a quantum tunneling transition to a nonempty state. Calculations show that a universe created this way would typically be subatomic in size, but that is no problem . . . Vilenkin was able to invoke inflation to enlarge the universe to its current size."
The totally empty geometry is the UGM and the quantum tunneling event resulted in the spontaneous appearance of space—our universe (perhaps one of many).
GB: 'I must clarify that Vilenkin himself does not think that his work proves that our universe had an absolute beginning.'
XIII: 'The first quotation is … misunderstood by many atheists to mean that Vilenkin himself doesn't believe in an absolute beginning of the universe. … The problem is that our universe does have an expansion rate greater than zero and that means that the universe must have had an absolute beginning.'
Here is Vilenkin himself on the matter (emphasis mine):
'I would say [Craig's statement] is basically correct, except the words “absolute beginning” do raise some red flags. The theorem says that if the universe is everywhere expanding (on average), then the histories of most particles cannot be extended to the infinite past. In other words, if we follow the trajectory of some particle to the past, we inevitably come to a point where the assumption of the theorem breaks down—that is, where the universe is no longer expanding. This is true for all particles, except perhaps a set of measure zero. In other words, there may be some (infinitely rare) particles whose histories are infinitely long.'
– Stenger, Victor J. The Fallacy of Fine-Tuning: Why the Universe is not Designed for Us. Amherst, NY: Prometheus, 2011. pp. 127-30 (via poster 'Teton', http://bit.ly/LgrM54)
I'd suggest rereading the quotation, D.Gently. You might just find that nothing Vilenkin said contradicts anything I said.
Of course the assumption of the theorem breaks down at some point simply because this point is the beginning implied by the Theorem. This is why Craig is "basically correct" on his fundamental assumptions about the BGV Theorem.
In other words, "the histories of most particles cannot be extended into the infinite past".
Like I said, I suggest rereading the quote and not just concentrating on the parts that catch your eye.
P.S. @Garrick, I'm preparing a pretty lengthy reply on the points you raise so it might take some time. Cheers. 😀
Stenger asks Vilenkin further, "Does your theorem prove that the universe must have had a beginning?"
Vilenkin replied, "No. But it proves that the expansion of the universe must have had a beginning. You can evade the theorem by postulating that the universe was contracting prior to some time. For example, Anthony in his work with Gratton, and Carroll and Chen, proposed that the universe could be contracting before it started expanding. The boundary then corresponds to the moment (that Anthony refered to as t = 0) between the contraction and expansion phases, when the universe was momentarily static. They postulated in addition that the arrow of time in the contracting part of space-time runs i the opposite way, so that entropy grows in both time directions from t = 0."
Sean Carroll was then asked by Stenger regarding his model, "I think my answer would be fairly concise: no result derived on the basis of classical spacetime can be used to derive anything truly fundamental, since classical general relativity isn't right. You need to quantize gravity. The BGV singularity theorem is certainly interesting and important, because it helps us understand where classical GR breaks down, but it doesn't help us decide what to do when it breaks down. Surely there's no need to throw up our hands and declare that this puzzle can't be resolved within a materialist framework. Invoking God to fill this particular gap is just as premature and unwarranted as all the other gaps."
Again, to clarify what all these scientists are saying, Vilenkin and Guth included, our universe is subject to the BGV theorem, the non-expanding era of space-less and timeless nature is NOT.
To reiterate my article, finite past does not preclude eternity. It is also important to stress that while most particles have finite histories, the fact that even some have infinite histories is not insignificant.
XIII: 'Of course the assumption of the theorem breaks down at some point simply because this point is the beginning implied by the Theorem. This is why Craig is "basically correct" on his fundamental assumptions about the BGV Theorem.'
The theorem does not prove the absolute beginning of our universe, let alone the UGM being proposed by Garrick. What it does is put a 'limit' specifically (but not limited) to inflation, or a series of inflations, for the past direction.
'Inflationary spacetimes are not past-complete
I. Introduction. Inflationary cosmological models are generically eternal to the future. In these models, the Universe consists of post-inflationary, thermalized regions coexisting with still-inflating ones. … [T]he inflating regions expand so fast that their physical volume grows exponentially with time. As
a result, there is never a time when the Universe is completely thermalized. In such spacetimes, it is natural
to ask if the Universe could also be past-eternal.'
Their answer to that question, as you very well know, is no. But more importantly, for our purposes at least, the authors later ask: 'What can lie beyond this boundary?' …
What does that tell you?
This just doesn't tally with your claim that the theorem proves the universe had an absolute beginning. There's no exegesis needed, not by you or me, to derive any other conclusions other than that which the authors themselves (plus two other physicists whose area of expertise we're treading in) were clear in laying out. I repeat Vilenkin's subsequent clarification: 'the words “absolute beginning” do raise some red flags'; (Does your theorem prove that the universe must have had a beginning?) 'No.'
Read about inflation, and I promise you it will be clearer to you why all the physicists mentioned here are more circumspect (than you and Craig and co.) in their summary of the accounts, including their own, of the pre-inflationary universe, and that a better way (one that departs slightly from Garrick's view, I think) to think of the BGV theorem is to think of it as 'proof' that it is the inflationary expansion/s of the universe that cannot continue eternally to the past—and not that the whole universe (pre-inflation included and ToE aside) could not have.
To be clear, I'm not asking that you abandon the BGV theorem. (If anything, I find it curious that you are touting and appealing to an inflationary model of our universe. I wonder what form the theodicies and the fine-tuning arguments will take when faced with the infinite universes of inflation. But I digress.) It's just that in this case it just doesn't apply to Garrick's UGM—the theorem simply wasn't designed to give you a picture of that pre-initial inflation event. Here's the paper again:
'Whatever the possibilities for the boundary, it is clear that unless the averaged expansion condition can some-how be avoided for all past-directed geodesics, inflation
alone is not sufficient to provide a complete description of the Universe, and some new physics is necessary in order to determine the correct conditions at the boundary.'
I'm starting a new comment branch since this shortening of comment space annoys me.
Kindly reply there please. Cheers. 😀
[although the age of the universe is finite, it is also true that the universe is eternal and has always existed. There has never been a time when there was no universe…The universe, if it began to exist, began with time…The eternity of the universe is also supported by the dependence of time on space. In other words, without the universe, there was no time. Without time outside the universe, there was never a time without a universe.]
The above excerpts effectively argue that the universe is eternal, but then I googled the word "eternal" and found this:
e·ter·nal
adj.
1. Being without beginning or end; existing outside of time. http://www.thefreedictionary.com/eternal
However, there are other definitions of "eternal" that don't contradict with the eternity of the universe, such as:
"valid or existing at all times" http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/eternal
In the "without beginning" sense, this could mean an infinite addition of events, which Craig argues is impossible—for God and for the universe. This is why God's eternity for Craig must be in the relational view of time, timelessness. Unfortunately, the universe also qualifies for such an eternal existence. Also, falling back on the relational view contradicts the "particularizer" argument, because it depends on God deciding to create the universe 13.7 billion years ago and not a moment before. Remember that there are no moments before the universe in the relational view of time.
In the existing outside of time sense, there are models of the Big Bang where the moments when our universe was smallest were during an era where time was like a dimension of space, as in the Hartle-Hawking no-boundary condition. That is, it initially existed out of time, in imaginary time, like in quantum tunneling. There are also models, where time started ticking concurrently with the appearance of space, as in a singularity. This would mean that there are no moments in the universe outside of time. In either case, the universe would have had existed "at all times" since there are no times in which the universe did not exist.
[It was perhaps impossible to have been an intellectually satisfied atheist until the discovery of relativity and quantum mechanics.]
Dawkins also said that he "could not imagine being an atheist at any time before 1859, when Darwin's Origin of Species was published."
I used to agree, but I think the Kalam is more resilient than the teleological argument. Without the possibility of a timeless universe, I don't see how a universe could exist without a personal creator.
very very informative, i can't stress this enough. a good article and a good read!
at the end of the day, we all have to face reality with a logical mind. it's our very nature that lead us into seeking "causes" and hoola baloo explanations. but when it goes down the drain, nobody would bring a dying love one in a temple or in a church for a magic show. not if we have hospitals – a product of man's triumph which is science.
and oh i sure can see the faces of their clueless victims.. we still have a long way to scientific and well informed Philippines.
It might be best if you got off your high horse.
Rationality and science aren't the sole domain of the irreligious just as irrationality and dogmatism aren't the sole domain of religion. There are plenty of good and bad apples on both sides of the debate.
im aware of those and perhaps i was "on my high horse", but if you ask me to take the back seat while the other side never follow that rule, undisturbed in indoctrinating children, i say it is that "courtesy" that gives them ground, undeserving respect by simply slipping in their existence in every good aspect of the society.
the fact that religion/God has been an invalid argument makes it that there was nothing to be arguing about from the beginning. for it to be called debate, the subject should have been valid and specific which, that side had long eluded because the side of reason gives it courtesy it doesn't deserve.
There you go again generalizing the "other side" as if every single theist is guilty of religious coercion. Demonizing the "other side" is typically no more than an overgeneralized, unsubstantiated, propagandistic, hyperbolic caricature of the "other side" and no more substantive than a political mudslinging match.
Such an atmosphere is very unconducive to truth because it tends to get buried under the barrage of polemic from both sides (as each seeks to one-up the other).
The fact just is that Philosophy of Religion isn't the opened-and-shut field that you seem to think it is. Theism hasn't been defeated at all (nor has it been relegated to the dustbins of contemporary academic thought).
In fact, the opposite is true. It is atheism (or more accurately, naturalism) that is currently on the retreat in academia. There is, as of right now, an ongoing renaissance and revival of theistic philosophical thought with theists, once more, having a "seat in the table".
While it might be far too easy to simply disregard this and caricature the "other side" instead of actually dealing with hard philosophical problems using reason and logic, for someone who's actually interested in the truth would be well-advised to engage the other side in dialogue instead of polemic .
ok thanks for pointing out my blatancy.
i just don't get it why are they so jacked up in slipping in theism here well in fact there are so many other possibilities let alone the universe could have been created – yes – but not of a divine nor conscious supernatural being. space, unstable energy, etc. that may have been existing for the nth time in this infinite universe. why is it has to be an aware creation? nobody even know if this is the first universe in existence.
the "meaning" supplied in theism has never ever simplified any search for truth. this default thinking only made the search more vague and bias.
I can't speak for my fellow theists but for me at least, one of the reasons is that the deliverances of reason lead me to those conclusions.
i hope its not a case of the general theistic reasoning.
scientific reasoning in its true form does NOT address an inquiry with the conclusion/predetermined proposition as the first step. and im afraid this is what separates theistic logic and science.
There is no such thing as 'theistic' reasoning. There's reason and there's logic. A belief is either rational or it is irrational. A theist who is guilty of circular logic isn't guilty of using 'theistic' reasoning, he is guilty of using circular logic. Period.
It's not this hypothetical theist's theism that leads him to a faulty conclusion, it's his faulty logic.
putting the blame to the theist's "faulty logic" can lead to million faulty schemes throughout theism. putting the fault to a human is an age old escape goat strategy in preserving the claim of infallibility of scriptures.
though i agree that circular logic(which i referred earlier as theistic logic) is indeed a hindrance in searching for truth, the problem still remains for theists.
given that the origin of our universe is a creation, how can it be guided or divine? and still, given that it was guided, how can it be connected to any Earth deity let alone a desert deity who commands massacre of entire nations or circumcision of babies? as for me, considering theism is the first step to circular logic. starting with a predetermined conclusion is not scientific. tnx