The doctrine of free will is a keystone in Christian theology. It is the principle by which theologians try to explain away the problem of evil in a world designed by a benevolent God. It is central to the tenet of redemption and the reason for the human sacrifice of Jesus.
With the advent of neuroscience, it has become increasingly more difficult to defend free will. We see more and more that what we view as our “selves” and our desires are products of circumstances that we had no control over (our genes, our upbringing, the amount of sleep we had, the smells of a room, noises in the neighborhood, etc.). And, as Sam Harris argues in his new book, Free Will, not only is free will an illusion, it is unintelligible.
Free will is not conceptually coherent, according to Harris. “Either our wills are determined by prior causes and we are not responsible for them, or they are the product of chance and we are not responsible for them.” No amount of quantum indeterminacy can even begin to make sense of a free will doctrine. No amount of theological finessing can make heads or tails of it.
The theistic position regarding free will maintains that we, in a very real sense, create our own thoughts (termed contra-causal free will)*. This is, however, at odds with what we know about the nature of the brain. Studies such as those performed by physiologist Benjamin Libet showed that activity in the motor cortex can be seen around 300 milliseconds before the a person becomes aware of a decision to move. Another study showed that observing a mere 256 neurons was sufficient to predict with 80% accuracy a person’s decision to move. Even without delays, our conscious self is not in control of the causes behind which and when neurons fire.
Though we feel free in our choices, we are not in control of this feeling to feel free. And therein lies the illusion. It seems that we are only free in the sense that we don’t mind what the unconscious operations of the brain tell us. Even our not minding is itself the product of unconscious operations that are out of our control. Neuroscience and informed philosophy has reduced “authorship” to our conscious mind helplessly witnessing the spontaneous appearance of unconsciously determined thoughts into consciousness. Harris writes, “From the perspective of your conscious awareness, you are no more responsible for the next thing you think (and therefore do) than you are for the fact that you were born into this world.”
Consider the mind of a person who murders a random pedestrian. In subsequent interviews, we find that this person exhibits no remorse for his actions and says that he would do it again, given the chance. Were we to discover that this person has a tumor in his prefrontal cortex (the site of much of our behavioral impulses), we might consider that he was not truly to blame for his actions. He was not responsible for his tumor or the precise consequences of his tumor, after all. But, how is this situation any different from the brain of a psychopath, which is known to have palpable differences with normal brains?
None of the circumstances that lead to a psychopathic mind are the fault of a psychopath. He did not choose to have a psychopathic brain. Neither does it imply that a psychopath is free because he desires to kill a person since that desire is not under his control either. Should we learn that a murderous psychopath had struggles with his bloodlust and earnestly fought against his compulsion, we can only conclude that his desire to murder won out over his other determined desires. Where is the freedom in that?
A psychopath has merely been unlucky to have inherited genes that predispose him to violence and a lack of empathy. This, of course, predisposes him further to situations that encourage him to hold cynical and anti-social beliefs. The lack of control of the psychopath is no different from our lack of control in having the minds that we have at this moment. A psychopath is as much a victim of neurophysiology as we are.
If you were to trade places with our hypothetical psychopath, “atom for atom” as Harris puts it, you would be him. There would be no extra part of you that would be there to see or experience the world in any different way. You would have no way to tame the murderous impulses with the more moderate impulses of your former body.
One need not be a naturalist to dismiss free will. Even outside metaphysical materialism, Harris argues, the notion that an immaterial soul is at the helm of our will does not rescue the notion of free will. “The unconscious operations of a soul would grant you no more freedom than the unconscious physiology of your brain does.”
Harris presents that the only philosophically defensible notion of free will is compatibilism, or the idea that determinism and free will are not incompatible. However, it appears that compatibilism and determinism are only different in that they define free will in completely different terms, though neither finds the theistic notion of contra-causal free will convincing. Compatibilists argue that free will is real in the sense that unconscious mental activity is still “you.” However, this does not seem to be what most people mean by “free will,” which is the conscious authorship of thoughts. It is certainly not what theologians mean by free will. Harris reduces the compatibilist position to “a puppet is free as long as he loves his strings.”
An important distinction should be made between determinism and fatalism. Fans of libertarian free will might point out that since our wills are determined, we should just lay back and watch as our bodies move themselves without conscious intent (fatalism). But that, of course, is to forget that conscious intentions, though caused by events prior to consciousness, are a part of the system which determines consequences. Intentions do matter and intending to just sit around is itself an intention. And this intention to be passive, Harris points out, will increasingly become more difficult as the compulsion to do something else grows intolerable.
That we are free in an absolute and metaphysical sense to decide how to act is a fundamental tenet of our ideas regarding moral responsibility and justice, whether in secular or religious terms. Harris cites the United States Supreme Court, stating that a deterministic view of free will is “inconsistent with the underlying precepts of our criminal justice system.” And, if we are in no meaningful sense the author of our thoughts, then the entire Christian notion of the afterlife (either heaven or hell in any formulation) is horrendous and damnable. Harris writes in the first page of his book, “Without free will, sinners and criminals would be nothing more than poorly calibrated clockwork, and any conception of justice that emphasized punishing them (rather than deterring, rehabilitating, or merely containing them) would appear utterly incongruous.”
Theists worry that without contra-causal free will, there can be no moral responsibility. For how can you fault a hurricane for leveling entire cities? How can you blame an alcoholic for being that way, when genetic predispositions and uncontrolled circumstances led to his being an alcoholic?
Of course, this appeal to consequences does not prove that free will is real. And, upon the slightest bit of inspection, we can see that the theist’s worry is unfounded. Moral responsibility is viable outside of free will. What we appear to morally condemn, and can reasonably maintain to condemn, in violent people (as in the psychopath of my previous example) is the intentionality. The intention and desire to murder is the real cause for fear. If there is anything that we can be held “responsible” for, it would be our conscious intentions, which we are aware of, since these best reflect what kinds of persons we are and how we will tend to act in the future.
If, after careful planning and much research, you decide to kill your neighbor, then that simply shows that you’re the kind of person who would kill your neighbor. You’re the kind of person who would spend hours deliberating on the best means to maim or kill another human being. If you were to find yourself naked in a car that crashed into a tree with your neighbor dead on the hood of your car, without any memory of how you got there, you’re probably not the kind of person who does this sort of thing. The aspect of intention, regardless of its determined origin, generally predicts the trends of behavior that we are likely to have. This gives us good reason to put a premium on conscious intention, in terms of blameworthiness.
The first example shows a person who simply has the mind of a murderer. We have good reason to fear the deliberate murderer and not the accidental one. Though, given determinism, we have no rational basis to hate either.
If we could incarcerate hurricanes, we would, so as to prevent further harm. What, then, does it mean for us to find out that we ourselves are weather patterns of intentions and actions—determined by lawful interactions outside our control? Since a person is fundamentally the epicenter of uncontrolled genetic predispositions and environmental circumstances, any conception of punitive or retributive justice is just incoherent. And what else is religious justice but punitive and retributive?
Without contra-causal free will, the justice of religion is simply absurd and malevolent. Adam was never free to choose which of his impulses would have won out in his encounter with the fruit of knowledge. The sins Jesus died for were the result of bad design by his father in heaven. To be fair, we cannot fault religion for having an unrealistic view of human nature, its creators simply did not know better. This does, however, further betray religion’s human and uninformed origins.
We can maintain a system of laws that is more fair and honest about what we are and what our brains make us to be. To keep everyone else safe, justice systems must rehabilitate criminals. And, in the impossibility of such rehabilitation, incarceration for the good of society is the only recourse. In light of what we know about brains and minds, punishment betrays the juvenile “justice” of our religious and prescientific past.
The knowledge that we are the products of causes outside our control may seem nihilistic and overwhelming, but it need not be. Our awareness should, instead, empower us to know that not every mood we have is meaningful (it can simply be because of lack of sleep). Knowing that we can take hold of the causal triggers of our personality (without denying that this too is due to prior causes), we can take effective steps to change our state of mind by introducing more causes (in the form of books, novel activities, other people, etc.) into the storm that is the mind. Realizing this can help us change our brains in a way that may initially be unconscious, but no less consequential.
We can escape the prison of the delusion that we are little gods immune to nature and accept the laws of nature for what they are. We can be free from fatalism without committing to nonsensical doctrines. Choices, beliefs, and intentions are as important as ever, even if they are determined by prior causes.
In the 66 pages of Free Will, Sam Harris presents a short but devastating case against the traditional and theological concept of contra-causal free will. It is by no means comprehensive, but it gets to the point quick without getting muddled.
*In The Nature of Necessity, the philosopher Alvin Plantinga defines contra-causal free will as: “If a person S is significantly free with respect to a given action, then he is free to perform that action and free to refrain; no causal laws and antecedent conditions determine either that he will perform the action, or that he will not.”
Free Will by Sam Harris is published by Free Press.
Garrick, is it correct to say that while individual factors/causes like genetics, upbringing, social exposure, etc. only influence and not necessarily determine our actions and decisions, when all these near-infinite factors/causes are combined, their overall effect is that they actually determine and not just influence our actions and decisions, and that we only have the illusion of free will because we cannot account for all these factors/causes?
I think it can all be summed up, when all the causal factors are accounted, that we do not control that which cannot occur to us. If a factor predisposes us to a certain thought, that is to the detriment of another (since it means that one thought increases in probability and others must decrease).
To sort of summarise and then wrap this up:
Miguel: 'This book isn't smart at all. Of course it will always seem smart and water-tight for those who don't bother to actually do the research on where the debate really is.'
'Pecier, as a practical matter, we will have to appeal to authority here in a discussion about the brain, mind, and free-will.'
'And, you really ought to know that we would have more practical reasons for appealing to authority –if we needed to– than Sam would.'
'You'll find that the consensus on [Harris' The Moral Landscape], at least among people in the know, is that it was a failure.'
'Truth is, in the free-will debate, you'll probably hear zero people cite Sam Harris […]. Scientists will cite him, however, but that just strengthens my point: scientists, apart from providing information about the brain, have no business in this debate.'
'As for what you say about the discussion being only between compatibilism and determinism, this is not true. […] Obviously, you'll only hear among your fellow "brights" the discussion falling between the lines of the determinists and compatibilists because those 2 sides are what fit well and fine with naturalism.'
d_gently: 'Here is the best or the closest to a consensus as we can get on the position of philosophers on free will: Accept or lean toward: compatibilism — 59%, Other — 14.9%, Accept or lean toward: libertarianism — 13.7%, Accept or lean toward: no free will — 12.2%' – The PhilPapers Surveys, http://philpapers.org/surveys/results.pl
'71% of 'people in the know' reject contra-causal free will.'
'[M]ost philosophers (and probably most psychologists and neuroscientists) would argue that we lack that sort of free will.' – person in the know Eddy Nahmias
'These capacities for conscious deliberation, rational thinking and self-control are not magical abilities. They need not belong to immaterial souls outside the realm of scientific understanding (indeed, since we don’t know how souls are supposed to work, souls would not help to explain these capacities). Rather, these are the sorts of cognitive capacities that psychologists and neuroscientists are well positioned to study.' – Nahmias
'This conception of [non-libertarian, non-immaterial, non-contra-casual] free will represents a longstanding and dominant view in philosophy.' – Nahmias
'[T]o establish the truth of determinism—a job better left for physics.' – Nahmias
—Accusations of 'misinterpretation!', 'quoting out of context!', 'argumentum ad populum!', 'd_gently is arguing that there is only one debate and no others exist!', 'emotional-laden ranting!', 'strawman!', and 'd_gently: all rhetoric!' later—
d_gently: 'Guy in the know, Sean Greenberg: ''Eddy's fine response, […] neatly limns both what position is taken on free will by most philosophers and the general state of play of the debates around free will.''
Read: not contra-causal, libertarian, indeterminist and belonging to the soul, free will. Read: not between determinists and non-determinists.
Read (Greenberg again): 'Most philosophers work their way into the problem of free will by considering whether freedom is compatible with determinism.'
Miguel: '[d_gently] still tries to save face by trying to make it seem like I was saying that all philosophers –all, mind you; every single philosopher– should be consulted, and that I couldn't have possibly meant only the ones who actually have something to say about the debate –the one that the author of the article above has framed.'
59% of people in the know, who are compatibilists (aka self-deluded soft determinists) … 71% of people in the know, who reject contra-causal free will … 56% of people in the know, who are non-dualists … guy in the know Eddy Nahmias—'associate professor in the Philosophy Department and the Neuroscience Institute at Georgia State University' (http://www2.gsu.edu/~phlean/) and another guy in the know Sean Greenberg—'published work has focused on issues in early modern moral psychology: in particular, on conceptions of freedom, and of the passions.' (http://bit.ly/ISYyn9), both of whom bear witness to the 'the general state of play of the debates around free will' …
— Experts before, but all now suddenly and conveniently have nothing to say about the debate? I wonder why that is….
'Then he quotes philosophers saying how libertarian free-will can't be true.'
An outright lie.
' Which he says proves the debate between determinists and non-determinists doesn't exist.'
And another one. Lies after lies after lies. I see we've gone from intellectual dishonesty to sheer dishonesty. Staying true to form, Miguel, eh?
You never disappoint. 😉
Like I said repeatedly: you're completely free to backpedal on, or even retract—in good faith—any of the claims you made in any of the threads. That route is always available to you. Do not ever think that it's too late.
Well, more bemusement ensues.
The guy quotes me and then asks everyone to believe it all proves I mean what he says I mean, despite reading it all in the context of where the author of the article himself frames the debate, makes it mean what he says I didn't mean. Funny.
d_gently asks the audience to believe him
d_gently: "I show, I show! He mean what I say, I quotes! I quotes!"
d_gently quotes: miguel: "Sayans bad! Sam Hallis bad!"
d_gently continues "yu see yu see! He say what I say he mean!
unbiased audience: "Ip read in oder context, he nat say dat naman ah?"
d_gently: "No he say paren! He say paren! "
unbiased audience: "WTF? As in, hwat da pakin shet?! Pak shet!?!"
d_gently teaches us debate lesson 2
d_gently's interpretation of what you say is what you say, even if it really isn't. He can quote
whatever you say and make it mean what he wants it to mean.
unbiased audience responds: "pak dat!"
Ho hum. What is readily understandable is that d_gently cannot make a case without relying heavily upon fallacious reasons rather than logical ones. It's not even that he needs to read what people write charitably, but rather that he simply needs to understand what has actually been written, and in what context.
When I said research "where the debate is" I meant *where* the debate is between the determinists and non-determinists. Because that's how the article frames the debate –between theists and non-theists; (ostensibly) between determinists and non-determinists. He thinks there's no such debate. His inability, however, to go beyond discussions within the naturalist orthodoxy, with which he's comfortable, doesn't mean such debates don't exist.
Even if his folly has already been expressly pointed out to him, he will still rabidly stick
with it –rancid stink that it is– because he's motivated by hostility and not actual 'free-thinking'. As the competent reader would have already noted, d_gently, the guy wearing the tin foil hat, the self-styled avenger of science, can attempt to spin it all he likes.
Miguel:
'[A]s a practical matter, we will have to appeal to authority [DG: philosophers, as per usual] here in a discussion about the brain, mind, and free-will.'
'[S]cientists, apart from providing information about the brain, have no business in this debate.'
'Soft Determinists [aka Compatibilists] still have a lot of self-deluding to do to harmonize their conclusions with reality. And don't dismiss libertarians so blithely because the evidence, to my mind, puts their case in the right. Obviously, you'll only hear among your fellow "brights" the discussion falling between the lines of the determinists and compatibilists because those 2 sides are what fit well and fine with naturalism.'
'[I]ntentionality, or the aboutness of thought, actually *proves* mind and brain are not one. It's not meant to contra causality. But that could just as well be what it can do if causality is only of the material kind, since intentionality disproves materialism.'
Here is the best or the closest to a consensus as we can get on the position of philosophers on free will:
Free will: compatibilism, libertarianism, or no free will?
Accept or lean toward: compatibilism — 59%
Other — 14.9%
Accept or lean toward: libertarianism — 13.7%
Accept or lean toward: no free will — 12.2%
(Also: God: theism or atheism?
Accept or lean toward: atheism — 72.8%
Accept or lean toward: theism — 14.6%
Other — 12.5%)
– The PhilPapers Surveys, http://philpapers.org/surveys/results.pl
A co-author—a philosopher, take note, you scientists and atheists—of a larger survey (but which used the above findings) had this to say (boldfacing mine):
'There is not a prevailing consensus on the questions of (1) whether free will is compatible with determinism and (2) whether humans have free will. However, I would estimate that close to 2/3 of professional philosophers are compatibilists about free will and determinism (they think determinism poses no threat to free will), with the other 1/3 roughly split between libertarians (who are incompatiblists who believe that we have free will, and hence that determinism is false) and hard incompatiblists or skeptics about free will (who are incompatiblists who believe that we do not have free will because determinism is true and/or indeterminism would not help secure free will). […]
Since compatibilists believe we have free will (though they need not, and I argue that there are threats to free will distinct from determinism that make "skeptical compatibilism" a live position), and libertarians believe we have free will (though they argue that compatibilist free will is not enough), it looks like about 85% of philosophers believe we have free will, which is almost as many as the 90-95% or so of non-philosophers who, in my surveys, say they believe humans have free will.
However, it may be that many non-philosophers associate free will with a non-physical mind (or soul) and with the power to make choices ungoverned by natural laws (I'm not sure how committed "the folk" actually are to these theoretical claims and am testing that by doing "experimental philosophy" surveys). If the folk understanding of free will does include such commitments, then most philosophers (and probably most psychologists and neuroscientists) would argue that we lack that sort of free will.
So, whether we have free will or not depends on how you define "free will" and it depends on metaphysical and scientific facts about the way humans and the world work.'
– Eddy Nahmias, http://www.askphilosophers.org/question/3425
What are we to take from this, hmm… That scientists and most philosophers are all deluded. 🙂
Someone wanted to go the 'philosophy good, science bad' route, so there.
I think it's also important to note that compatibilists and libertarians define free will in completely different terms. Determinists tend to share the definition of libertarians in attempting to refute contra-causal free will.
That is to say, a significant majority of philosophers reject contra-causal free will and instead argue on the details of why this is so and what kinds and definitions of free will we can reasonably value.
'I think it's also important to note that compatibilists and libertarians define free will in completely different terms.'
I believe the part I highlighted stressed this point (though I admit it could've done with less verbiage, for our purposes): 'non-philosophers associate free will with a non-physical mind (or soul) and with the power to make choices ungoverned by natural laws … most philosophers (and probably most psychologists and neuroscientists) would argue that we lack that sort of free will.' This is contra-casual free will, isn't it, sometimes referred to as libertarian free will, and which is the feature of the soul, both of which a majority of philosophers reject?
I'll let Eddy Nahmias do the talking again, in case there's doubt in the mind of some that I'm making this all up (emphasis mine):
'Many philosophers, including me, understand free will as a set of capacities for imagining future courses of action, deliberating about one’s reasons for choosing them, planning one’s actions in light of this deliberation and controlling actions in the face of competing desires. […]
These capacities for conscious deliberation, rational thinking and self-control are not magical abilities. They need not belong to immaterial souls outside the realm of scientific understanding (indeed, since we don’t know how souls are supposed to work, souls would not help to explain these capacities). Rather, these are the sorts of cognitive capacities that psychologists and neuroscientists are well positioned to study.
This conception of free will represents a longstanding and dominant view in philosophy, though it is typically ignored by scientists who conclude that free will is an illusion.'
– Is Neuroscience the Death of Free Will?, http://nyti.ms/v48aIL
(But!: Nahmias seems to cite a lot of science—not simply to disparage it, mind you, but to also help inform us on the evidences and the facts ('determinism—a job better left for physics', etc.)—even saying that neuroscience 'can help us rediscover free will.' Seriously! He mentions Sam Harris, too, sadly. Last, he also appears to be a soft determinist, presenting the position against that of the hard determinists' (whence libertarians?), so maybe he's deluded and we ought not to listen to him. Maybe he's just No True Philosopher™. 😉 )
Indeed, looking at the numbers again, we get a staggering 71% of 'people in the know' rejecting contra-causal free will…. Which comports well, I think, with the result of 56% being non-dualists—read: materialists/physicalists—and, perhaps, to some extent, 73% for atheism.
So 'people in the know' have spoken. What now?…
Yup. 🙂 Just to clarify for the people playing the home game. Thanks for the stats, D!
I don't think I said 'people in the know' think Sam's arguments are wrong. And, no, I didn't say science has nothing for us that would shed light on this debate. This would have been clear if you read what I said with the minimal amount of fairness.
Also, an appeal to authority is different from an argumentum ad populum. In any case, I wasn't trying to appeal to authority to be able to say Sam is wrong, but rather that –as far as I've been able to gather about his book– he fails to mention, or maybe even purposefully sidetracks, what should be at least one of the main contentions between the determinists and non-determinists, i.e., whether mind is all brain stuff.
The consensus on free-will among philosophers that you shared is exactly what should be expected given how they are also similarly parsed out into theists, atheists and agnostics. But, Yeah, I do know that was not what you were arguing.
[I don't think I said 'people in the know' think Sam's arguments are wrong.]
You'd have a point had I made that accusation which your railing against. Needless to say, I did not.
[And, no, I didn't say science has nothing for us that would shed light on this debate. This would have been clear if you read what I said with the minimal amount of fairness.]
Really…. Again with the intellectual dishonesty. You say 'we will have to appeal to authority here in a discussion about the brain, mind, and free-will'—a discussion which, according to you, scientists 'have no business in.' Your words.
[Also, an appeal to authority is different from an argumentum ad populum.]
It was you who was dismissing Sam Harris as irrelevant on the debate on free will, and you who wanted us to instead consult the proper experts. You are now being informed of what these experts say. You are now getting exactly what you asked for. And now that said experts don't agree with your assertions, they are now suddenly relegated as mere members of populace. Right.
Thanks for the lesson in logic, Miguel, but no thanks. Your attempt at an appeal to authority is fallacious, and you need to learn this soon. And about my own, supposedly fallacious, appeal to the majority (as if I referred to philosophers out of nowhere)?
'Non-fallacious examples of the ad populum: the appeal is not irrelevant when what most persons believe or what the select few believe does in fact determine what is true. Conventional truth such as the definitions of words, standard use of symbols, styles, or political elections are typical examples where the appeal to the majority , the experts, or the people-in-the-know would be relevant and so would not be fallacious.
A. If an elite group of people are in a position to know of what they speak, their authority is relevant and should not automatically be discounted. E.g., to remark that most physicians believe that a high fat diet is unhealthy, so that it follows that persons who have a high fat diet should change their eating habits, is to make a legitimate appeal.'
– Philosophy 103: Introduction to Logic: Argumentum Ad Populum, http://philosophy.lander.edu/logic/popular.html
Let's remind ourselves again who it was who said philosophers were the proper experts to consult in these matters….
[Pecier, as a practical matter, we will have to appeal to authority here in a discussion about the brain, mind, and free-will.]
The 'authorities' have (or had) spoken and they actually agree with Sam Harris as far as contra-casual/libertarian free will is concerned and are firmly in the same camp with him against the indeterminists/libertarians.
This is relevant, no?
[The consensus on free-will among philosophers that you shared is exactly what should be expected given how they are also similarly parsed out into theists, atheists and agnostics.]
Funny you say this, and for someone admittedly in the know about philosophy and the debate on free will. What should be expected?
You told us what should be expected alright. That the real debate lies between libertarians and compatibilists. That science is irrelevant in discussions about free will. That soft determinists—compatibilists—'still have a lot of self-deluding to do to harmonize their conclusions with reality.' That Sam Harris is one irrelevant, incompetent, mere populariser who 'by asserting, rather lazily without any argument (if he has one, please correct me), that mental states are 'physical' and all "beholden to the laws of nature", he has succeeded in making himself not just irrelevant but also a hindrance to actual progress in this age-old philosophical debate about free-will.'
All of which of course flies in the face of what the study tells us and, unfortunately for you, in the face of the very experts—philosophers—you bandy about.
Philosophers on the whole have long abandoned your much-treasured libertarian free will and actually look to the latest studies in psychology and neuroscience and engage with scientists. But then, let's not forget: being compatibilists they are also, according to you, self-deluded; and, as physicalists, are (were we to listen to you) not only irrelevant but also a hindrance.
So much for 'people in the know'….
What's remarkable is how, through his prose, d_gently is able to seduce even himself into believing what he said had an iota of substance.
If by "appealing to authority" I really intended what you are accusing me of, then I wouldn't have responded to Pecier thusly:
"[W]e would have more practical reasons for appealing to authority –if we needed to– than Sam would. He's written a book for crying out loud, while we argue with each other at comment boxes. If we can have 50 or more pages to make our case, and with the time to do so…"
And, next time, quote people in context. Below illustrates how you've done otherwise:
I say: "And, no, I didn't say science has nothing for us that would shed light on this debate."
d_gently responds: "Really…. Again with the intellectual dishonesty.. [S]cientists have 'no business in [the free-will debate].' Your words.""
My response: No, I'm being consistent. Because if you actually quoted what I said properly, you'll find I said exactly this: "scientists, apart from providing information about the brain, have no business in this debate. "
Science can shed light on it. But participate? Not so much. Well actually, Of course they can participate, and maybe give us a conceptual analysis of free-will if they fancied doing so, but then they would be philosophizing.
[It was you who was dismissing Sam Harris as irrelevant on the debate on free will, and you who wanted us to instead consult the proper experts.You are now being informed of what these experts say. You are now getting exactly what you asked for. And now that said experts don't agree with your assertions, they are now suddenly relegated as mere members of populace. Right.]
Read the first paragraph of the article. No, let me post it here for you:
The doctrine of free will is a keystone in Christian theology. It is the principle by which theologians try to explain away the problem of evil in a world designed by a benevolent God. It is central to the tenet of redemption and the reason for the human sacrifice of Jesus. [Yet!] With the advent of neuroscience… [Badum-dum-tss!]
The free-will debate, at least in this article, was being framed in the context of theism vs atheism (surprise!). Obviously, at the heart of that contention is whether mind is all brain. The people at the opposite ends of that table would be (ostensibly) determinists and non-determinists. Like I said, Sam Harris is irrelevant because (I guess I'll have to keep repeating myself) as far as I've been able to gather about the book, he "fails to mention, or maybe even purposefully sidetracks" the main contention between those 2 camps as though it has already been settled in his favor. It hasn't.
[Thanks for the lesson in logic, Miguel, but no thanks. Your attempt at an appeal to authority is fallacious]
Not surprising that you feel this way since you're interpretation of how I've attempted to appeal to authority is fallacious.
(continued below)
(continuation)
[about my own, supposedly fallacious, appeal to the majority (as if I referred to philosophers out of nowhere)? ]
I know you weren't arguing what you think I'm accusing you of arguing, i.e., that the free-will espoused by libertarians cannot be real because the majority don't think it so. Which is why I said "But, Yeah, I do know that was not what you were arguing." Yet, what's amusing is how you, in your last post, try to argue exactly that with the tripe I'll quote below:
d_gently: "A. If an elite group of people are in a position to know of what they speak, their authority is relevant and should not automatically be discounted. E.g., to remark that most physicians believe that a high fat diet is unhealthy, so that it follows that persons who have a high fat diet should change their eating habits, is to make a legitimate appeal.' "
I wouldn't be so cavalier in dismissing lessons in logic if I were you. Since you're clearly having so much trouble with it. Your analogy begs the question that one group –whose views, incidentally, coincide with yours– has more authority than the other. Secondly, "physicians" have empirical evidence that can show how high-fat diets conduce to unhealth, while the question of free-will depends too much on ones metaphysical framework for reality for anyone to have empirical evidence for. So, while you gave us a good example of how an ad populum can be legitimate, you fail to show why yours is. You'd think someone who constantly postures himself as an avenger of science would actually know enough science to know that.
[Let's remind ourselves again who it was who said philosophers were the proper experts to consult in these matters…. ]
Let's remind ourselves again that reading comprehension should be easy enough if one actually exerted the minimal amount of effort to it. I clearly said scientists can give us invaluable information about the brain.
[You told us what should be expected alright. That the real debate lies between libertarians and compatibilists. That science is irrelevant in discussions about free will…blah blah blah.]
So you keep saying. It seems you're under the impression that there's just one debate on the issue of free-will. The issue was framed in the context of theism vs atheism. One need only read the actual article we're commenting under. And, your inability to be cognizant of the other sides, or, for that matter, other debates, within the issue, doesn't mean they don't exist.
[But then, let's not forget: being compatibilists they are also, according to you, self-deluded; and, as physicalists, are (were we to listen to you) not only irrelevant but also a hindrance. ]
Or maybe you just put too much stock in superlatives despite the very informal setting in which the discussion is taking place, making one wonder how you fare in everyday conversation. But yes, I do sign on to the idea, as does Harris, that the compatibilists' free-will is incoherent.
All this sophistry devoted to shifting the blame or the burden of proof on your opponent. You always fall back on this tactic, like we've seen you in the discussion on Hilbert's Hotel, whenever you're shown information that disputes claims you've made. And as before, you're fooling no-one with it. 'Oh, but it's you, d_gently who appealed to authority, really, so it's you who need to show us why we should believe 71% of philosophers on free will or 56% of them regarding mind physicalism.' Yeah, right.
[Your analogy begs the question that one group –whose views, incidentally, coincide with yours– has more authority than the other. […] So, while you gave us a good example of how an ad populum can be legitimate, you fail to show why yours is.]
You were telling everyone to look to the 'right' group—not to Sam Harris nor other scientists, of whom you say shouldn't have any business in the free will debate. Which is exactly what I did: this is what the philosophers are, effectively, saying about free will—more importantly, about contra-causal free will—and the mind.
Of course, rather than honestly acknowledge the study, you instead try (unsuccesfully) to make it look to readers like all I'm doing is appealing to the authority of one group—the compatibilists (if it is them you mean)—over the libertarians. Miguel appealing to authority: legitimate! d_gently appealing to authority, by way of Miguel: fallacious!
Free will, 'as a set of capacities for imagining future courses of action, deliberating about one’s reasons for choosing them, planning one’s actions in light of this deliberation and controlling actions in the face of competing desires'—not contra-causal, libertarian free will—'represents a longstanding and dominant view in philosophy,' so says one person in the know, about people in the know.
Apparently, this is no longer legitimate or relevant, according to someone in the know about people in the know. Neuroscientists, psychologists, physicists, et al., can rejoice—they are now in the good company of philosophers!
Miguel (an earlier Miguel, that is; pre-PhilPapers survey), to Pecier: 'An you really ought to know that we would have more practical reasons for appealing to authority –if we needed to– than Sam would. He's written a book for crying out loud, while we argue with each other at comment boxes. If we can have 50 or more pages to make our case, and with the time to do so, then you can argue it would be a distinction without a difference. But, until then, you can't.'
So Sam Harris could have as well appealed to the 'proper' authorities—as per Miguel—not bad, bad science, and Sam Harris would still be wrong about contra-causal free will.
[Secondly, "physicians" have empirical evidence that can show how high-fat diets conduce to unhealth, while the question of free-will depends too much on ones metaphysical framework for reality for anyone to have empirical evidence for.]
Says the dualist, soul-believing libertarian… meanwhile also maintaining that libertarianis are correct because 'the evidence puts their case in the right.'
One wonders what or where this evidence is, and which proper experts to consult this time around (if it isn't the philosophers).
[And, next time, quote people in context. Below illustrates how you've done otherwise: […] if you actually quoted what I said properly, you'll find I said exactly this: "scientists, apart from providing information about the brain, have no business in this debate.]
Right, of course! I'm quoting you out of context—that's why I included and didn't take out the 'context', which still sits atop the thread we're in.
Science/scientists would help shed light on the free will debate … but shouldn't have a business in it… Makes perfect sense. Scientists, leave the deep thinking to the philosphers! —No, scratch that.
Neuroscientists, leave the deep thinking to the libertarians!
(That goes for you too, physicists on determinism. Sorry.)
[Let's remind ourselves again that reading comprehension should be easy enough if one actually exerted the minimal amount of effort to it. I clearly said scientists can give us invaluable information about the brain.]
'Equally' (not really), you also said they have no business in the free will debate. 'Scientists will cite him, however, but that just strengthens my point: scientists, apart from providing information about the brain, have no business in this debate.' (Don't think I didn't notice the late (face-saving) addition of the qualifier 'invaluable'. 😉 )
It's okay to backpedal and admit to it, Miguel. In any case, our readers will know the reasons for your doing so (or not doing so).
[It seems you're under the impression that there's just one debate on the issue of free-will. The issue was framed in the context of theism vs atheism. One need only read the actual article we're commenting under. And, your inability to be cognizant of the other sides, or, for that matter, other debates, within the issue, doesn't mean they don't exist. ]
So, first, it' really me who's appealing to authority. Now, I'm also the one who is ignorant by insisting there is, or must be, only one real debate within the free will issue. Apparently.
It's probably also me who has said the following: 'Of course it will always seem smart and water-tight for those who don't bother to actually do the research on where the debate really is.' Yes, it must be me who said this.
[[M]aybe you just put too much stock in superlatives despite the very informal setting in which the discussion is taking place, making one wonder how you fare in everyday conversation.]
Like I said, you're completely free to backpedal on, or even retract, any of the claims you made in any of the threads.
[But yes, I do sign on to the idea, as does Harris, that the compatibilists' free-will is incoherent.]
Yes you do; no you don't to the fact that the people in the know you told us to consult think, as does Harris and and the relevant science/scientists, that your idea of free will—the contra-causal free will of a non-physical soul—is incoherent.
[All this sophistry devoted to shifting the blame or the burden of proof on your opponent. You always fall back on this tactic, like we've seen you in the discussion on Hilbert's Hotel, whenever you're shown information that disputes claims you've made.]
Let's see.
[You were telling everyone to look to the 'right' group—not to Sam Harris nor other scientists, of whom you say shouldn't have any business in the free will debate. Which is exactly what I did: this is what the philosophers are, effectively, saying about free will—more importantly, about contra-causal free will—and the mind. ]
Maybe if I said this again, you'll actually get it this time.
If you cared to read the actual article above, it opened with how the theist's beloved "free-will", from which theodicies have been derived accdng. to the article's author, has now been discredited by neuroscience. That's the debate I'm talking about. What YOU did was to bandy about information showing that more people within the issue are debating about something else. I'm talking about a specific debate, i.e., the one between determinists and non-determinists. Sam Harris is irrelevant on this particular debate for the very reason that he (as far as I know) doesn't even consider the arguments contra determinism, much less argue against them.
[Of course, rather than honestly acknowledge the study, you instead try (unsuccesfully) to make it look to readers like all I'm doing is appealing to the authority of one group—the compatibilists]
So I'm supposed to acknowledge a "study" that shows most philosophers are determinists, so you would be magically correct about everything you said, despite that it has nothing to do with anything I was arguing for. Right. Funny thing is, from the onset, I did think you were neither appealing to authority nor committing an ad populum, (I even said that much: "But, Yeah, I do know that was not what you were arguing") which made me wonder about the utterly feeble attempt you made, giving 'legitimate examples' of those arguments to justify that which we both knew you weren't doing. I guess you were at first giving your self some plausible deniability, but ended up actually biting the bullet and trying to defend your illogic. Hilarious.
Your subsequent paragraphs aren't even objective reactions to anything I've said. It's just more of your emotional-laden rantings about how I've offended "science", how I've argued that the "real debate" is between determinists and non-determinists, and how, by appealing to authority, I was arguing libertarian free-will must be true, ignorant of the fact that most philosophers think otherwise.
I can see why you'd like everyone to believe I've done all that. Because it will be easier to attack those strawmen. You, again and again, keep demonstrating your failure to understand what's been said and understand the context the article frames the free-will debate in, all while unruefully claiming to have refuted an argument that hasn't been made. Buttressing my point about how you epically miss the point, is this absurd retort of yours:
d_gently says: "Neuroscientists, leave the deep thinking to the libertarians!"
As if anyone argued anything to that effect. Oh yeah, someone did. The strawman you created.
[It's probably also me who has said the following: 'Of course it will always seem smart and water-tight for those who don't bother to actually do the research on where the debate really is.' Yes, it must be me who said this.]
Because saying "*where* the debate really is" is exactly the same as saying "*what* the debate really is". Genius. The latter is what you want people to *think* I'm saying, to justify all the exaggeration and ground shifting you've done for rhetorical effect. Because, clearly, alongside the context of the article, I was saying *where* the debate is BETWEEN the determinists and non-determinists.
Any reasonable, unbiased thinking mid-wit would have gotten it by now.
[That's the debate I'm talking about. […] a specific debate, i.e., the one between determinists and non-determinists.]
After all this time you still really think your moving goalposts will fly by me unnoticed? For your own benefit (the following is obvious to readers) recall: 'Truth is, in the free-will debate, you'll probably hear zero people cite Sam Harris […] Scientists will cite him, however, but that just strengthens my point: scientists, apart from providing information about the brain, have no business in this debate.' 'Specific debate' my ass.
[Sam Harris is irrelevant on this particular debate for the very reason that he (as far as I know) doesn't even consider the arguments contra determinism, much less argue against them.]
It's not only Sam Harris, but your very own experts. So if he's irrelevant, then so are they. You've been ignoring (apart from insinuating that atheism is to blame) the survey and the pronouncements by your people in the know.
Expert Eddy Nahmian: 'If the folk understanding of free will' … read: the sort of free will espoused by you—contra-causal, libertarian, indeterminist and belonging to the soul … 'then most philosophers (and probably most psychologists and neuroscientists) would argue that we lack that sort of free will.'
'Even if neuroscience and psychology were in a position to establish the truth of determinism a job better left for physics—this would not establish bypassing.'
Another guy in the know, Sean Greenberg, reveals: 'Eddy's fine response, […] neatly limns both what position is taken on free will by most philosophers and the general state of play of the debates around free will.'
Read: not contra-causal, libertarian, indeterminist and belonging to the soul, free will. Read: not between determinists and non-determinists.
Read (Greenberg again): '[M]ost philosophers work their way into the problem of free will by considering whether freedom is compatible with determinism.'
[So I'm supposed to acknowledge a "study" that shows most philosophers are determinists, so you would be magically correct about everything you said, …]
Miguel: Look, Sam Harris not real expert! Look this way, to the Philosophers, the real experts!
Me: Okay! * Shows Miguel said real experts *
Miguel: No, d_gently, foul!
[ …. despite that it has nothing to do with anything I was arguing for.]
'Nothing to do'… Funny that.
Miguel, to Pecier: 'As a practical matter, we will have to appeal to authority here in a discussion about the brain, mind, and free-will.' … 'You really ought to know that we would have more practical reasons for appealing to authority –if we needed to– than Sam would.'
[Your subsequent paragraphs aren't even objective reactions to anything I've said. It's just more of your emotional-laden rantings about how I've offended "science", how I've argued that the "real debate" is between determinists and non-determinists, ]
Miguel: 'This book isn't smart at all. Of course it will always seem smart and water-tight for those who don't bother to actually do the research on where the debate really is.'
(To Garrick) 'As for what you say about the discussion being only between compatibilism and determinism, this is not true. Soft Determinists still have a lot of self-deluding to do to harmonize their conclusions with reality. […] Obviously, you'll only hear among your fellow "brights" the discussion falling between the lines of the determinists and compatibilists because those 2 sides are what fit well and fine with naturalism.'
Garrick's—and Harris', and, by extension, Pecier's—survey of the free will debate is actually correct, or closer to, the actual debate landscape among philosophers. Read (again): guy in the know Sean Greenberg.
Which then makes you wrong.
Do you not follow still?
[Because saying "*where* the debate really is" is exactly the same as saying "*what* the debate really is". Genius. The latter is what you want people to *think* I'm saying, to justify all the exaggeration and ground shifting you've done for rhetorical effect. Because, clearly, alongside the context of the article, I was saying *where* the debate is BETWEEN the determinists and non-determinists.]
Which is—and for throughout this thread, actually—Miguel-speak for Oh, Shit I Was Wrong But No Not Really Because What You Say I Said Is Not Really What I Said And This Is All Your Fault So No I'm Not Wrong.
The amazing thing is how I realize after each and every one of his posts, that, despite all his flim-flam, I've still managed to overrate the pedant.
He now knows he's completely missed his mark, so he (face-savingly) says I'm "moving goal-posts." As if that strategy hasn't been exhausted by him since Hilbert's Hotel.
Then he quotes me, and says I therefore can't mean what I'm saying I mean, because it's supposed to be proof that I mean what he says I mean.
d_gently: I quotes you migel! I quotes you here!: "Truth is, in the free-will debate, you'll probably hear zero people cite Sam Harris […] Scientists will cite him, however, but that just strengthens my point: scientists, apart from providing information about the brain, have no business in this debate.' "
d_gently continues: " See!? diz means you nat say what you say and you say what I say!"
miguel responds: WTF? AS in, watdafak!?
[It's not only Sam Harris, but your very own experts. So if he's irrelevant, then so are they. You've been ignoring (apart from insinuating that atheism is to blame) the survey and the pronouncements by your people in the know. ]
Here he still tries to save face by trying to make it seem like I was saying that all philosophers –all, mind you; every single philosopher– should be consulted, and that I couldn't have possibly meant only the ones who actually have something to say about the debate –the one that the author of the article above has framed.
d_gently: "He offend da science! Must..ganti..por..sayans… grrr!"
Then he quotes philosophers saying how libertarian free-will can't be true. Which he says proves the debate between determinists and non-determinists doesn't exist. There's a fallacy lurking in there somewhere. Maybe he can find it. Wouldn't bet on it, however. (Oh yeah, d_gently, don't think I didn't notice that you chose not to embarrass yourself any longer by defending your previous ad populum 😉 )
d_gently's conversashun wid miguel:
Miguel: "Sam Harris is irrelevant, bad science, not know where free-will debate iz"
d_gently: "Grr! Don't do dat to sayans!! Here iz consesas! hmp! I showing free-will about compatibilist and incompatibilist onli! hmmphh!!"
Miguel: "I mean debate in context by Garrick, da one Xtian versus atheist, da one determinist vs nondeterminist. I saying Sam Harris and sayans not relevance on dat!"
d_gently: "No you nat say dat! You say what I want you to say!! You move goalee! hmmp!!"
d_gently teaches us debate lesson number 1:
What you mean by what you said is what d_gently wants you to mean by what you said.
Miguel: WTF? As in, wat da mader pakin shet!?
Anyone can read my responses in the context of how the article frames the debate, and there won't be any problem. You want to make your own context because you realize, taken with the original context, you just about sounded, well, shall we say, dumb.
Seems my earlier comment got eated. Anywho, biology prof and second-string Horseman Jerry Coyne's been defending determinism at his blog whyevolutionistrue.wordpress.com, where he takes apart compatibilists like Plantinga and Massimo Pigliucci. Science trounces philosophy yet again.
Sam Harris presents a "devastating case"? Well, if you think he's also been able to present a "devastating case" in his last book that just rehashes all the arguments for utilitarianism, then maybe. But if you really believed this, among the people who ought to know the issue, you'll be finding yourself in odd company, however.
Sadly for Harris, the philosophers who are in the know — a lot of whom are even of the secular stripe– and who've been pondering this issue for ages, will scarcely take him seriously. Even those who agree with his views at least concede a huge chasm must be bridged to be able to account for mental states like intentionality. Sam? He thinks no such problem exists.
This book isn't smart at all. Of course it will always seem smart and water-tight for those who don't bother to actually do the research on where the debate really is. (Generally speaking, of course. Not implying anything about the author of this post.)
Hi, Miguel!
I'd be interested to know about these secular philosophers who are in the know who do not take him seriously and whether you mean for the dismissal of Harris to be comprehensive (i.e. most of philosophers in the world) or simply that there's "a lot of philosophers". Also, would this opposition imply that he's wrong?
To that end, what kind of opposition do you mean? From what I've read about the matter, the discussion seems to be regarding compatibilism and determinism, with libertarianism not even given airtime. But that's just me. What would you say?
I'm also curious as to whether we would even need an accounting for mental states such as intentionality to rescue contra-causal free will. Wouldn't intentionality itself, in whatever form it might take, be also subject to causal states in the brain? My own position on the matter is that this is beyond the scope of the book and neither I nor Harris attempt to explain it.
I'm also skeptical of your claim that Harris finds no problem with explaining fully mental states such as intentionality. Do you have a citation on this?
Thanks!
Philosophers, for the most part, already know everything Sam is saying and have been discussing it for a long time now. Sam is a popularizer. He adopts a position, grabs all the arguments pro that position, writes a book and says "voila, case solved!". All while breaking ZERO new-ground on the subject. Just take a look at what he did with his 'morality-can-be-objective-on-naturalism' book. You'll find that the consensus on that one, at least among people in the know, is that it was a failure. Of course, ordinary people, who believe that effortless erudition is possible via the internet, don't actually know this. They'll think this is all new, highfalutin, and state-of-the-art stuff.
Truth is, in the free-will debate, you'll probably hear zero people cite Sam Harris –despite that he's just about popularized the whole debate with his book and the marketing he's done for it. Scientists will cite him, however, but that just strengthens my point: scientists, apart from providing information about the brain, have no business in this debate.
Does this mean Sam is wrong? Of course not. It simply means he is irrelevant. Or, his relevance in this discussion lies only in his ability to get the public more interested, being the good popularizer that he is.
As for what you say about the discussion being only between compatibilism and determinism, this is not true. Soft Determinists still have a lot of self-deluding to do to harmonize their conclusions with reality. And don't dismiss libertarians so blithely because the evidence, to my mind, puts their case in the right. Obviously, you'll only hear among your fellow "brights" the discussion falling between the lines of the determinists and compatibilists because those 2 sides are what fit well and fine with naturalism.
you say " I'm also skeptical of your claim that Harris finds no problem with explaining fully mental states such as intentionality. Do you have a citation on this? "
You just said he didn't "attempt to explain it" yet made a "devastating case". So, Harris leaves out the single most difficult stumbling block to mind and brain unity, but still makes a "devastating case"? Mental states are what make his whole project untenable. You'd think he would at least show us how to circumvent this rut. Yet he makes no effort, like you say.
Lastly, no, intentionality, or the aboutness of thought, actually *proves* mind and brain are not one. It's not meant to contra causality. But that could just as well be what it can do if causality is only of the material kind, since intentionality disproves materialism. We can talk about this if you want, but this comment has gotten longer than I hoped.
I would find trouble with this had novelty been a prerequisite for sound reasoning. I find it highly valuable that popularizers whether in science or philosophy engage the public even at the expense of technical language. I don't think that this means at all that popularizers are irrelevant given the more academic philosophers and scientists.
"You just said he didn't "attempt to explain it" yet made a "devastating case"."
I'm sorry, but I really don't see how a devastating case against contra-causal free will necessitates a complete understanding of the brain and its processes. Neither does Harris (nor I, for that matter) make a case for metaphysical materialism nor against dualism here. I'm afraid you are arguing against things that were never argued for.
It's all well and good, Miguel, that philosophers think this and philosophers think that, but what do you think about the matter?
Which is why I said the level of his (non)irrelevance is wholly dependent on the value you put on popularizers of his sort. Obviously, if they're relevant by your account, then they are relevant by your account. He brings attention to things in a way that probably no other run-of-the-mill philosopher would be able to. He's eloquent and articulate. But has he been able to break new ground? No. Take from that assessment what you will, but the reality is that, it's only at least theoretically possible that what he brings to the table will actually shed new light.
While I agree that a devastating case against free-will need not include a complete understanding of the brain and it's processes, it should at least include a positive case for the unity of mind and brain –because causality, you'll agree, can't make sense of the immaterial. (well, maybe epiphenomenalists can, but I digress. Plus, Harris has made it clear he isn't one.)
What I'm actually arguing against is Harris's conclusion that free-will is an illusion. He argues for this, if I'm not mistaken, by making a case for the materiality of the mind. Now, the mind cannot be material for the very reasons I just gave.
What do I think about the matter? I think Harris is again wrong. Because the mind is not material, again, for the reasons that I've just given.
(added: Also, so you don't get confused, we are not using the word "intentional" in the same way. You are obviously using it synonymously with the word "goal". I'm using it to mean the meaningfulness of thoughts, or the aboutness of a thought. Crucially different.)
By the same token, if they’re irrelevant by your account, then, necessarily, they’re irrelevant by your account.
I completely agree that no new ground has been broken with his new book, but I think it is of great value, especially to those who are not inclined towards highly technical philosophy. It is coming to a point that popular philosophy might become even more important that popular science.
You are quite mistaken, though. He does not make a case concerning dualism or metaphysical materialism. Here is what he says,
“Even if you believe that every human being harbors an immortal soul, the problem of responsibility remains: I cannot take credit for the fact that I do not have the soul of a psychopath.”
“It is important to recognize that the case I am building against free will does not depend upon philosophical materialism (the assumption that reality is, at bottom, purely physical). There is no question that (most, if not all) mental events are the product of physical events. The brain is a physical system, entirely beholden to the laws of nature—and there is every reason to believe that changes in its functional state and material structure entirely dictate our thoughts and actions. But even if the human mind were made of soul-stuff, nothing about my argument would change. The unconscious operations of a soul would grant you no more freedom than the unconscious physiology of your brain does.”
Now, perhaps he is wrong in believing that this is the case. But, the fact of the matter is, he is not making a refutation of “the mind is not material.” If Harris is wrong, his error lies somewhere else in his reasoning.
Well, you're right. Thank you for pointing this out. From what you quoted, it does seem he isn't making his case in the way I, or for that matter, everyone else, was expecting him to. He seems to do it in a more incompetent manner, however; by asserting, rather lazily without any argument (if he has one, please correct me), that mental states are 'physical' and all "beholden to the laws of nature", he has succeeded in making himself not just irrelevant but also a hindrance to actual progress in this age-old philosophical debate about free-will.
This would be to the atheist like someone was arguing: "O.K. so, we know the earth is 6,000 years old, that means that evolutionists just have to have gotten it wrong. Now that we got that out of the way, onto the more substantive objections.."
Of course, this quotation is not his complete case regarding free will. Had it been, your analogy would be apt. I used the partial quotation to illustrate that he is not arguing against dualism or supernaturalism.
Well can you give me one example he uses to make the case that mind is only physical stuff and beholden to..blah blah blah.. ?
Of course I can't. The book doesn't deal with arguing that "mind is only physical stuff." That Harris extends his argument to exclude a physicalist assumption should have implied this.
Also, I don't think there is any argument needed for the claim that the brain is a physical system. The quotation, after all, said brain not mind.
"…because causality, you'll agree, can't make sense of the immaterial."
Kindly expound this further, Miguel. What do you mean by 'immaterial'? The laws of nature are immaterial. Even the wave functions of quantum mechanics are immaterial, if you use the physical definition. Heck, even causality is immaterial. So, what do you mean by 'immaterial' here?
"I'm using it ['intentional'] to mean the meaningfulness of thoughts, or the aboutness of a thought. Crucially different."
That does not remove the difficulty, which exists on your part, of reconciling contra-causal free will with the established causal link between neural processes and human behavior.
Obviously when I say immaterial, I mean non-material. No need to create problems where none exist. All those things you've bandied about are in fact material. If they weren't, you'd be hearing William Craig argue against materialism by saying "Wave function! Causality! Gotcha Materialists!"
And, I'm afraid the difficulty doesn't "exist on [my] part" but yours. It's you who has all his work ahead of him to try to show that the "established causal link between neural processes and human behavior" accounts for mental states like intentionality as well. Because, 'intentionality' is such that it should be in principle non-material. So the burden is all yours, I'm afraid.
[He [Harris] adopts a position, grabs all the arguments pro that position, writes a book and says 'voila, case solved!']
I think you have it the other way around. A good popularizer like Harris starts with surveying the relevant literature. After the survey, he then decides which position he can agree with based on its merits. Finally, he will write a book which gives a popular account of the ongoing debate and, since the he finds one position superior over the others, he will inevitably try to convince his readers of the merits of this position.
[scientists, apart from providing information about the brain, have no business in this debate.]
The origin of life, the configuration of the universe and the nature of the elements all used to be the within the domain of armchair philosophy. Now, they are well within the orbit of the positive sciences. I agree with Hawking in "The Grand Design" that traditional, armchair philosophy has reached its twilight years. For now, armchair philosophers can still say a lot about the mind because neuroscience is a very young field, but I don't think such state of affairs will last for long.
[Lastly, no, intentionality, or the aboutness of thought, actually *proves* mind and brain are not one.]
The Stanford Dictionary of Philosophy defines intentionality as "the power of minds to be about, to represent, or to stand for, things, properties and states of affairs." This does not negate the unity of mind and brain processes in any way. In other words, intentionality does not "prove" dualism.
Pecier, please raise these things, or at least the things you said here with the minimal amount of substance, at our thread above or in a new one.
I hope you appreciate that it can get confusing if I discuss matters at these lengths with more than one person on the exact same thread.
Hi Miguel.
"Sadly for Harris, the philosophers who are in the know…"
I seriously hope you are not appealing to authority here.
"… and who've been pondering this issue for ages…"
Also, I honestly wish you are not implying that the correctness of one's position on a matter is measured by the amount of time one spends thinking about it. I would like to think that we're clear that thinking about a problem for ages does not, by default, make you more correct compared to a person who just mulled over the issue.
"This book isn't smart at all. Of course it will always seem smart and water-tight for those who don't bother to actually do the research on where the debate really is."
What are your reasons for asserting this?
"I seriously hope you are not appealing to authority here."
Pecier, as a practical matter, we will have to appeal to authority here in a discussion about the brain, mind, and free-will.
And, what I was actually "implying" wasn't that the more time spent on thinking about something conduced to thinking about it more clearly –although that is very much almost always the case– but rather that Sam, lets other people do the thinking, and then just popularizes what he thinks of their thinking by writing a book about it.
"What are your reasons for asserting this?"
I think you'll find the reason in the paragraph you yourself quoted from me. Here's a clue: 'research..where..debate..is'
Hello Miguel.
"Pecier, as a practical matter, we will have to appeal to authority here in a discussion about the brain, mind, and free-will."
Why so? And could you please bring these authorities to bear on the problem at hand, namely, the problem of contra-causal free will? It would be helpful to all concerned if, instead of simply saying that Harris's ideas contradict with the ideas of certain authorities on the matter, you cite what these authorities have to say so that we can judge them for their validity.
"…but rather that Sam, lets other people do the thinking, and then just popularizes what he thinks of their thinking by writing a book about it. "
What is the difference between appealing to authorities on "brain, mind, and free-will" as a "practical matter" and letting "other people do the thinking?"
It's true that science popularizers, in general, do not make the discoveries they write about. But that does not mean that they simply let "others do the thinking" for them. It takes a lot of thinking to be a science popularizer, especially when the science involved is as dynamic and fluid as neuroscience. For example, one has to go through all the relevant literature to write a popular science book. And it certainly takes a lot of intelligence to restate jargon-heavy issues in such a way that they could be understood by the general reader. I, for one, salute Harris for being so good at popularizing so esoteric a subject.
"Here's a clue: 'research..where..debate..is'"
Yup, done that. And methinks the people who favor contra-causal free will in such debates tend to find themselves on the losing end.
See what I mean? If you simply appeal to "those debates that have been going on elsewhere," we end up in the stalemate situation where you think your side won and where I think my side won. So it's never helpful to simply assert propositions here without supporting them, because I can do that too.
However, if you want a fruitful debate here, then please, at the very least, provide us the relevant links.
So please, provide us the relevant links to why you think Harris's arguments against contra-causal free will are wrong so that we can asses their validity for ourselves.
Pecier, I wasn't arguing that "authorities" on the matter disagreed with Sam Harris, therefore he must be wrong. Obviously, many do, but that would be a rather dim-witted point to make –so you have to trust that it wasn't the point I was making– since authorities disagree on a lot of things.
And, you really ought to know that we would have more practical reasons for appealing to authority –if we needed to– than Sam would. He's written a book for crying out loud, while we argue with each other at comment boxes. If we can have 50 or more pages to make our case, and with the time to do so, then you can argue it would be a distinction without a difference. But, until then, you can't.
I agree that popularizers are all well and fine, but my point was a bit more nuanced than that. Sam could have accomplished the same by forgoing his book and writing a few words on a pamphlet that read "I'm for hard determinism. Google it."
And, you accuse me of merely asserting things like a little child claiming his action figure is better than yours. I've explicitly gave reasons for thinking why mind and brain are not one. If you were careful in reading what I said to Garrick –which seems to be what you've done earlier– you would have found that I've explicitly cited 'intentionality' and the aboutness of thought as a materialism defeater. Then I explained why a non-materialistic account will always, by default, be friendly to free-will.
I think it'll be interesting to note that there are some determinist Christians too, like the Calvinists (Presbyterians).
What I like about the Calvinists is that they bite the bullets of their awkward conclusions.
As Sam Harris delves deeper and deeper into neuroscience, he's sounding more and more like a Buddhist. Which is interesting.
Between "free will" and "God's plan", a lot of us must have already sensed an air of internal contradiction in doctrine and now this comes along. I've yet to wrap my head around intentions as presented here though.