One of the principles of secularism is doing good for goodness’ sake: “Whether there be other good or not, the good of the present life is good, and it is good to seek that good.” The English secularist George Jacob Holyoake, who coined the word “secularism” in the mid-19th century, asserted, “Individual good attained by methods conducive to the good of others, is the highest aim of man, whether regard be had to human welfare in this life or personal fitness for another. Precedence is therefore given to the duties of this life.”
Since this utilitarian ethical principle is not grounded on the moral dictates of a transcendent being, i.e., God, it is not surprising that theists are quick to criticize it as lacking an ontological foundation, meaning there is no basis for conceptualizing such moral system in the first place. They then proceed to cite David Hume’s is-ought problem and G.E. Moore’s naturalistic fallacy, insisting that it is impossible to derive an “ought” from an “is” or to infer moral obligations from mere observations of nature, and that what is naturally pleasant or desired is not necessarily “good”.
While Hume wrote in A Treatise of Human Nature that it surprised him to find an ought instead of an is, there seems to be nothing in the book expressing the impossibility of bridging the is-ought gap. Hume only said that “’tis necessary that it should be observed and explained; and at the same time that a reason should be given; for what seems altogether inconceivable, how this new relation can be a deduction from others, which are entirely different from it.”
Moreover, the rules apply to both theists and nontheists, and if the requirements for bridging the gap are set to go beyond common sense and into ontological obsession, I doubt that even Divine Command Theory can bridge it. Someone claiming that God exists and has laid down certain rules (an is statement) is also expected to explain why we ought to act accordingly, and after all the rationalizations have been exposed and eliminated, it all boils down to one thing: we ought to obey and please God for the welfare of our souls.
While the secularist does not necessarily rule out the possibility of a life after death since it’s unprovable either way, he gives priority to his welfare in this life: “For a future state Secularism proposes the wise use of this, as he who fails in this “duty nearest hand” has no moral fitness for any other.” And since claims of divine revelation are all hearsay and our common sense dictates that the Bible is a dangerous guide to morality, secularism “offers the guidance of observation, investigation, and experience. Instead of taking authority for truth, it takes truth for authority.”
The word ought was originally used to express duty or obligation (and this is probably how Hume intended to use it), but modern usage has expanded its meaning to also indicate advisability or desirability. Since the secularist believes in the improvement of this life by material means and that science is the available Providence of man, if he wants to be happy then he knows what he ought – what he is well advised – to do, and that is to seek happiness in ways that are conducive to the happiness of others so as to encourage mutual effort in perpetuating everybody’s happiness.
As for the naturalistic fallacy, while it is true that “pleasant” is not necessarily tantamount to “good,” it seems that all of mankind’s conscious acts are ultimately motivated by pleasure. The blogger Philosophy Bro put it succinctly:
As for the theists who define “good” as something that God commands or desires, the is-ought problem is thrown back at them: why do we ought to do good and obey God? And if they are honest enough they will admit that it’s because they want to have a pleasant eternal life in Heaven and avoid perpetual torment in Hell.
And so it seems that for the theist and nontheist alike, morality, or at least the standard by which a person judges actions with either approval or disapproval, is ultimately rooted in the pursuit of pleasure and the avoidance of pain. In Of Vice and Virtue, Hume wrote, “For granting that morality had no foundation in nature, it must still be allowed, that vice and virtue, either from self-interest or the prejudices of education, produce in us a real pain and pleasure.” An article in Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy paraphrases Hume: “[I]t is because we are the kinds of creatures we are, with the dispositions we have for pain and pleasure, the kinds of familial and friendly interdependence that make up our life together, and our approvals and disapprovals of these, that we are bound by moral requirements at all.”
And while the secularist does not concern himself with ultimate or eternal scenarios of pleasure and pain as much as the immediate and foreseeable consequences of his actions, it does not mean that his morality is inferior. In The Science of Good and Evil, Michael Shermer explained that “like everyone else, I face judges that are in their own ways transcendent and powerful: family and friends, colleagues and peers, mentors and teachers, and society at large. My judges may be lowercased and occasionally deceivable, but they are transcendent of me as an individual, even if they are not transcendent of nature…real people whose lives are directly affected by my actions, and whose actions directly affect my life.”
The secularist’s judges may not be as fearsome as a deity capable of sentencing people to eternal torture, but he nevertheless respects them deeply and holds himself accountable to them. That’s because in this life, which is the only life we really know exists, these human judges influence our welfare and happiness in ways that we can clearly see and foresee. As such, we are accountable to them because we are ultimately accountable to ourselves.
Hi, innerminds. 🙂
On reading your article, it seems to me that you basically argue three main points (listed below):
1. That the is-ought gap is problematic for both theists and non-theists alike.
2. That our oughts, supposing that they exist, are constituted by more than just obligations but also desires and advisabilities.
3. That for the theist and non-theist alike, morality is ultimately rooted in the pursuit of pleasure and the avoidance of pain.
Let us examine each and see if they stand up to philosophical scrutiny:
The is-ought gap
You point out that the is-ought gap, while problematic for non-theists, it also is so for theists. You contend that the rules apply to both theists and non-theists alike (of course!) and that the theistic answer is implausible in much the same way as the non-theists is, in that while we can infer from the theistic thesis that God laid out certain rules for moral conduct, it thus not however follow that we ought to follow said rules.
This, however, comes from a misunderstanding of the theistic position which you take to be be Divine Command Theory (DCT). DCT, however, maintains much more than that our oughts are constituted by God's directives towards moral conduct in that He also manifested these directives into our very nature. Insofar as it is in our nature to be moral, our oughts are constituted by that which is manifested by our own intrinsically moral nature. So summarized, it is our nature to be moral, i.e. we naturally strive towards the 'highest good'. The question of why we ought to follow God's commands is no more substantive than the question of why we ought to be good. The only question is if the good really is constituted by God's directives for moral behavior which you do not dispute, not implying, of course, that you accept them.
The supposed equivalence is nowhere to be found.
As a point of curiosity however, you point out that Hume never really maintained that the is-ought gap is impossible to bridge. Being that this doesn't necessarily mean that the is-ought gap is, in point of fact, bridgable (or vise versa), this is a non-argument.
Our Oughts
This point is particularly problematic because it's a fallacy of equivocation, in that you are using moral terms in distinctly non-moral ways. The modern usage of ought is irrelevant when we're speaking of ethics. What's important is the moral usage of the word 'ought', not it's modern usage. If you wish to maintain, however, that our moral oughts are indeed constituted by our desires (perhaps desirism?), then I need something a bit more substantive than a bland assertion.
Pleasure and Morality
This is the most contentious of all but since I'm lazy (lol), I'll get to this tomorrow.
Here's to a stimulating conversation! Cheers. 🙂
Hi XIII, my favorite theist! 🙂
[DCT, however, maintains much more than that our oughts are constituted by God’s directives towards moral conduct in that He also manifested these directives into our very nature. Insofar as it is in our nature to be moral, our oughts are constituted by that which is manifested by our own intrinsically moral nature. So summarized, it is our nature to be moral, i.e. we naturally strive towards the ‘highest good’.]
What about those people who torture and kill other people for fun, people who don’t “naturally strive towards the highest good”? Did God somehow fail to instill the oughts into these people’s nature? What happened to his omnipotence? Also, at what point exactly in the evolution of man did God start instilling these oughts? Surely our apelike ancestors didn’t have these ought back then? Lastly, assuming that these oughts are indeed instilled in our nature, why do we “ought” to act according to our nature when the existence of sadistic killers shows that we can do otherwise?
[As a point of curiosity however, you point out that Hume never really maintained that the is-ought gap is impossible to bridge. Being that this doesn’t necessarily mean that the is-ought gap is, in point of fact, bridgable (or vise versa), this is a non-argument.]
This is an argument that the theists’ claim about the is-ought gap being unbridgeable has no basis. Moreover, in case you didn’t notice, I quoted Hume: “’tis necessary that it should be observed and explained; and at the same time that a reason should be given; for what seems altogether inconceivable, how this new relation can be a deduction from others, which are entirely different from it.” Now if the leap from is to ought cannot be “observed and explained” and that a reason cannot be given “how this new relation can be a deduction” then it seems illogical for Hume to write that passage in the first place.
[The modern usage of ought is irrelevant when we’re speaking of ethics. What’s important is the moral usage of the word ‘ought’, not it’s modern usage.]
I never intended to assert that advisability constitutes a “moral” ought. That’s why I wrote, “The word ought was originally used to express duty or obligation (and this is probably how Hume intended to use it).” As for the modern usage, I only meant it as a practical guide based on common sense. The secularist may not have a moral ought in the sense of duty or obligation to God, but he does have a practical ought in the sense of advisability.
[On reading your article, it seems to me that you basically argue…That for the theist and non-theist alike, morality is ultimately rooted in the pursuit of pleasure and the avoidance of pain.]
This is what I wrote: "And so it seems that for the theist and nontheist alike, morality, or at least the standard by which a person judges actions with either approval or disapproval, is ultimately rooted in the pursuit of pleasure and the avoidance of pain."
Isn't that what I said?
I was just emphasizing what came after "or". In any case, I'm looking forward to hearing what you have to say about it. 🙂
Hi, innerminds, my favorite (atheist?), haha.
Divine Command Theory (DCT)
While DCT stipulates that our moral intuitions constitute a universal human moral intuition, it does not make the further stipulation that this intuitions are infallible or that they cannot become clouded by environmental 'factors' like upbringing, education, culture, etc, etc. That we have this intuitions does not mean that they are always clear or that they cannot be ignored.
At what point? No idea. That's no longer a philosophical question but an anthropological one.
Is-Ought Gap
This is precisely my point. Hume merely muses that there is a gap between what constitutes an 'is' and what constitutes an 'ought'. That this gap is unbridgeable is a much-debated subject but suffice to say that the claim that the is-ought gap is unbridgeable does not stem from Hume but from the naturalists' inability to solve it. This is why Hume's view is irrelevant. It's the naturalists' attempts to bridge it that are in contention.
As for DCT, well, if it's not infallible, then what's the point of claiming that God is omnipotent? Also, why do we ought to follow our moral intuition considering that some people don't have it in the first place?
As for the is-ought gap, if the requirements for bridging it are set so high to the point that naturalists cannot bridge it, I bet that with the same requirements the theists cannot bridge it either.
[At what point? No idea. That's no longer a philosophical question but an anthropological one.]
The problem is philosophical as much as it is anthropological, and the following are just examples of questions that are implied by Jong's challenge: Was there a quantum leap from our being an amoral species to our being a moral one, or was the transition gradual? Has the transition been completed or are we still in the process of what we might call our "moral evolution"?
Also take note that the second question shows that the problem has heavy practical implications. To wit, consider the following moral problems: When do we start treating a living organism as a moral agent? What kinds of moral rights should we afford a given living organism? What kinds of moral obligations should we expect of the said organism? If there are species that are in the process of "moral evolution", how are we to treat them? What rights and obligations do they have? (Note that such questions are critical to the issue of speciesism and the Great Apes Movement.)
[Insofar as it is in our nature to be moral, our oughts are constituted by that which is manifested by our own intrinsically moral nature. So summarized, it is our nature to be moral, i.e. we naturally strive towards the 'highest good'.]
To me this implies that even if God existed, an atheist will not be missing out on anything when it comes to morality. Given your assertion, a person therefore does not need to believe that God is the ultimate source of morality in order for her to follow God's morality. So basically you are asserting that even though God is the ontological basis of morality, moral epistemology is independent of his existence. Sounds weird to me.
[To me this implies that even if God existed, an atheist will not be missing out on anything when it comes to morality. Given your assertion, a person therefore does not need to believe that God is the ultimate source of morality in order for her to follow God's morality.]
— You're right.
Hello again Miguel! I'm sorry I did a little French leave on you last time. I was so busy these past few days, being a double working student and all.
Anyways, are you saying that the conclusion I drew from XIII's argument is valid (using his statement as premise), or that it is both valid and true? Because if it is true, to me it implies that you are divorcing morality from intention. Consider a person who accidentally and unknowingly follows God's commands. Should her action be considered moral? Or better yet, consider a mentally challenged person (basically a retard) who by accident "obeyed" God's moral dictates. Can his action be thus considered moral?
It's quite O.K. I understand that these things can drag on and get tedious. I don't take it against you or your arguments for your having left. I can't promise that I wouldn't be doing the same thing at some point in this debate. That simply means that we're normal people who have other things to do.
On your question: yes the conclusion you drew from XIII is correct. And I think XII will think so too. None of us are arguing that a belief in God is needed for someone to act morally. No, I'm not divorcing morality from intention, actually. All I'm saying is that if Xtian God exists, then he created us in his image and likeness which necessarily means we have the ability to recognize a moral realm. Whether you believe in his existence or not, you will be able to recognize this realm in virtue of how you were created. That's really all what I'm saying. So yes, you're right that " this implies that even if God existed, an atheist will not be missing out on anything when it comes to morality. Given your assertion, a person therefore does not need to believe that God is the ultimate source of morality in order for her to follow God's morality"
I want to hear your own reply to my questions to XIII above, as we can make it a basis for the continuation of our previous discussion on the relationship between morality and evolution.
There's nothing actually to reply to. You're right; If God exists, people don't need to believe in him to be moral. You are probably more moral than I am, despite that I believe in God and you don't. But that doesn't change the fact that the flipside will hold true: if God doesn't exist, then objective moral values do not exist. So if God doesn't exist, we would still be acting morally, insofar as it is based on our opinion of how one must act morally, but that's all it would be; an opinion.
Sure, like I said before, it's an opinion that could be based on some calculus like utilitarianism and so forth. But an assumption has to be made that that particular calculus for gauging morality holds true. In the end, something will firstly have to be assumed to be true without any objective reason for doing so. That's just because of the unbridgable is-ought gap.
The inevitable follow-up question to that observation would be: which version of the moral code?
Myriad societies with myriad moral codes would lead one to suppose that there would also be myriad gods each injecting their own moral standards into the very essence of their pet human tribes. Innermind's last article had a chart illustrating how different religions have opposing views on the morality of some controversial issues.
It would also lead one to suspect that the OT god was a different deity altogether from the NT god since there was a *major* overhaul of the moral code.
[DCT, however, maintains much more than that our oughts are constituted by God's directives towards moral conduct in that He also manifested these directives into our very nature…The question of why we ought to follow God's commands is no more substantive than the question of why we ought to be good. The only question is if the good really is constituted by God's directives for moral behavior which you do not dispute, not implying, of course, that you accept them.]
The problem with this argument is that I can replace the word 'God' with 'Nature' without diminishing its force. That means that the argument will work just as well if we replace DCT by NPT (Natural Predisposition Theory). Notice that Jong's contention regarding the serial killers will also work for the NPT, and that any argument that you might use to defend the DCT against the said attack can be used with equal effectiveness in defending the NPT.
Another thing to note, by the way, is that the word "God" in your argument does not need to be interpreted as the personal, theistic God. Notice that I can interpret it as a metaphor, an anthropomorphism perhaps, for "the moral basis of the universe," without contradicting the other things you said (or that other things you might say).
@jong It seems to me, that you put value in finding out how man can be a moral being in this and some of your previous articles. I suggest you read Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics. It explains, what is moral is how man seeks what gives himself happiness and others happiness too. Aristotle will also reveal the authentic virtues that man can have, the cardinal virtues. The virtue of justice, the virtue of fortitude, the virtue of prudence, and the virtue of temperance. Aristotle's version excludes the catholic theological virtues of faith, hope and charity. This shows you how the Philosophers of Ancient Greece knew what they were talking about. I hope this helps.
Thanks, JungleBoy. I'll read up on that. 🙂
Jong, I suggest "The Essential Aristotle". It's almost an all-in-one book!
Aristotle's ethics is (still) very helpful in discussions regrading the is-ought gap. In fact, many of what you wrote in your splendid article resonates with his ideas regarding the proper foundation of a rational ethic.
I'm glad to see many of your ideas resonate with mine, Jong.
There are some more recent writings than Aristotle 😉 about morality beside Kant's categorical imperative of course going already way beyond Aristotle.
Sam Harris 'The Moral landscape' and Patricia Churchland 'Braintrust: what science tells us about morality'. There are so utterly basic fundamental needs of Homo sapiens like : food, shelter, love, avoidance of bodily harm …. etc… that we don’t need some allegedly divine given moral absolutes, especially not from some primitive evil scripture trampling on those basic human needs with their barbarity.