The closest thing to objective moral values

[There you go with your narrow mindedness again, See comments above.]

Hehe, a reply out of mere wounded vanity. A mere assertion and not even an argument.

[It does. Because the creator wants us to be holy and moral.]

And if someone does not follow this creator's morality you call him immoral? If that satisfies you, then O.K.

[No, I would say that the pencil isn't being used for what it was created for –to write.]

So if a person does something that the creator did not create him for, then you call him "a person who does not live in harmony with his creator's will" and that answers the *ought* in "Why *ought* I live harmoniously with my creator?" ALRIGHT.

Many characters in the Bible, characters who obviously believed in the existence of Yaweh, and who sometimes even heard his voice with their own ears, still go against his will. In short, many people don't want to live in harmony with the creator's purpose for them, you don't know this? So why *ought* they live harmoniously according to what their creator designed them for? (Oops, it's that is-ought gap again.)

[Ofcourse it did. Only the creator can give it's creation purpose. That's clearly the ontology of morality in a theistic worldview. Odd you didn't get it.]

So one *ought* to follow the law that *is* established by the creator, else you call him "immoral", end of the story? Mere question begging and repetition of unjustified assertion, but if it satisfies you logically, then O.K.

1. They're not my theories per se (my pet moral theory is Divine Command Theory), but there are a lot of other moral theories that are compatible (or even presuppose) moral realism. In a sense, in disproving my theory, you're only disproving my theory. It may well be the case that moral objectivity is still true, just not the way I construed it to be. Remember, absence of evidence is not evidence of absence. Merely disproving all existing evidence is insufficient to show the non-existence of some object x, a positive case is also necessary.

You know this. 🙂

2. I'm saying that it's necessary to presuppose moral objectivity (i.e. moral facts exist) to make moral statements. After all, if nothing is moral, how are you supposed to make moral condemnations?

1. Then in that case you might as well say that since the existence of fairies has not been disproved, it may well be the case that fairies exist, just not the way the fairytale books portray them to be.

2. I disagree, that is, if we're using Craig's definition of moral objectivity (existing even if all humans are exterminated or brainwashed). Let me quote the words of Michael Shermer, not as authority, but as a concise expression of what I have in mind:

"The moral sense, (the psychological feeling of doing "good" in the form of positive emotions such as righteousness and pride) evolved out of behaviors that were selected for because they were good either for the individual or for the group; an immoral sense (the psychological feeling of doing "bad" in the form of negative emotions such as guilt and shame) evolved out of behaviors that were selected for because they were bad either for the individual or group. While cultures may differ on what behaviors are defined as good or bad, the moral sense of feeling good or feeling bad about behavior X (whatever X may be) is an evolved human universal."

1. The reason no one (seriously) believes in fairies is because a positive case can be erected against the existence of fairies. For example, were fairies to exist, we would expect to find (blank), but we do not find (blank), therefore we may be warranted in thinking that fairies do not exist. Substitute (blank) for:

a. little fairy clothes
b. reports of fairy sightings
c. fairy habitats
d. etc, etc

2. I've moved on from Craig, to be frank. He's far from the best when it comes to defending Divine Command Theory though when it comes to the Cosmological Argument (Kalam), there's none better. In any case, for Michael Shermer's definition (and yours), I need a positive case for why you think moral beliefs are reducible to psychological and sociological impulses with no extramental correlate in the real world.

Now, if asked for a positive case for my own moral realism, I'd be happy to oblige should you wish it.

1. Really? What if I told you that fairies are spiritual beings (hence, no need for (a) little fairy clothes and (c) fairy habitats) but can choose to show themselves to certain people at certain times (hence, the lack of (b) reports of fairy sightings does not allow for the conclusions that fairies don't exist)?

2. You forgot to mention impulses formed by hundreds of thousands of years of evolution. A positive case was already made by Shermer, which I quoted in my previous comment..

[Now, if asked for a positive case for my own moral realism, I'd be happy to oblige should you wish it.]

Be my guest. I suggest post it on the forum where you'll have enough space. 🙂

1. I will then ask for what properties do these fairies, in fact, have. Do they fly, eat, drink, speak, etc, etc. I need to know why he thinks fairies are incorporeal (spiritual was the wrong word) and what are his reasons for thinking that they only show themselves within certain contexts (and what these contexts are).

Based on his answers, you can hit him again with (blanks).

2. No, no positive case was erected. Basically, what Shermer gives us is an alternative explanation for what morals are (i.e. merely psychological and sociological impulses hardwired by evolution) but he doesn't give us any reasons why we should think that this is the case.

P.S. About DCT, later when I get home.

1. What if someone says that one moment he saw a little person, about an inch tall, with wings. He says he tried to touch it but his finger just went through the image as if it was a hologram, then the next moment it was gone. Can you prove that what he saw was a mere product of his wild imagination?

2. Actually, Shermer gives us a lot of reasons to think that this is the case, but unfortunately he wrote them in an entire book, The Science of Good and Evil. Tell you what, give me some time – a lot of time – to finish reading the book and I will try to summarize the key points in one short article. Fair enough? 🙂

1. That makes it easier actually. From what I can gleam, it's a single incident with a single witness. That gives me plenty to work with for a hallucination case.

Follow-up questions would probably be: was he intoxicated? Medicated? Depressed? Where did the incident occur? Was there anything about the area that might be apt to produce a hallucination (say a desert)? Were there animals in the area that plausibly resembled what he saw?

Still though, if he actually saw it, he may well already be justified (i.e. warranted) in believing that fairies exist.

2. Fair enough. 🙂

Innerminds, sorry for butting-in in your discussion with XIII, but you do realize that what you've just quoted from Shermer only proves my point about morality being an illusion on naturalism, right?

Ponder on Hick's thought experiment of an ant endowed with knowledge of socio-biological pressures. The pressure it feels towards self-immolation for the sake of the colony is a trick fashioned by evolution to give the colony better odds for survival. To put it in another way: you agree morality comes from nature, while agreeing nature is amoral. What gives?

[you agree morality comes from nature, while agreeing nature is amoral.]

A naturalist also believes that life emerged out of non-life, so it's really no surprise that a naturalist believes that while nature may be amoral, it shaped our morality – even if it's just a trick fashioned by natural selection for our survival. Let me quote some more of Shermer:

"whether there is a God or not is irrelevant to the theory [of moral naturalism] because in science our approach is a naturalistic one – all effects have natural causes subject to scientific analysis. Since I am a nontheist, my assumption is that the moral sense in humans and moral principles in human cultures are the result of laws of nature, forces of culture, and the unique pathways of history; theists who embrace the findings of science may assume that God created and utilized the laws of nature and forces of culture to generate within humans a moral sense and within human cultures moral principles."

As a theist, do you agree with Shermer that God worked through the laws of nature, which he created, to generate our moral sense, or are you thinking more along the lines of God directly implanting to our psyche – our souls – this moral sense through telepathy or some divine/supernatural means?

Yes, naturalists believe all that while denying morality is an illusion. So thanks for conceding it's a 'trick' 😀

No, I don't agree with Shermer that "God worked through the laws". It's likely that some parts of morality come from nature, in that they have adaptive quality. Natural aversions, like the one we have for incestual relationships, I think would be an example. So I'll take the second route.

[edited my typo]

If you believe that some parts of morality come from nature, like our aversion for incestual relationships, are you saying that these parts are just illusions of morality too, since nature is amoral?

[So I'll take the second route. ]

Do you mean to say that God directly implanted morality into our psyche/souls through telepathy or some divine/supernatural means?

Not telepathy. That's pseudo-sceince. God coded conscience in human DNA and passed from parent to offspring. There are mutations in the sequence of DNA resulting in variations. From time to time, there are conscience DNAs that are perfect and if these embryos develop into viable human beings, they eventually join the Catholic clergy. This is technically called Follow The Calling hypothesis. Further, we call the perfect conscience DNA as Morally Uprightness. These morally upright individuals are more likely favored by Natural Selection to acquire SUVs in morally upright means, of course.

Yes they would be illusions in that there is only pressure towards them for their adaptive quality. The age of consent for women in Britian during the 1500's (might be wrong about the time) was 10. We would think this to be immoral when projecting our 21st century morality, but it actually wasn't considering women back then were lucky if able to reach 40 years old. I've no doubt that a lot of our morality has been shaped by our biology and –in the last example– culture.

On your second question, since I'm a dualist of some sort, then yes that's what I believe. How He did it, whether implanted "through telepathy" or what have you, I don't know.

Remember, that I defined objective as being mind-independent, that is to say, it's truth or falsity is independent of anybody's opinion. Being that the wind is neither sentient nor conscious, mentioning it wasn't really relevant to our discussion.

I'm confused. We both agree that objective means mind-independent, and we both agree that the wind does not have a mind. I have shown that the objective reality of the tree is applicable to the mindless wind, which has to blow around the tree standing on its way even if the wind cannot perceive the existence of the tree. How is this not relevant to our discussion?

Because it was a distinction without a difference. Of course, we agree that the reality of the tree bears out it's reality in a way that can affect the mindless wind. That was never the issue given that the mindless wind (by virtue of it's being mindless) isn't pondering the metaphysical question of whether or not the things that it perceives are real or merely illusory. (Whoa, what a mouthful.)

Perhaps, were the wind actually sentient (ala The Alchemist), the distinction could have had some purchase. But as things stand, it merely detracts from the issue.

Why are we even talking about whether or not the wind is "pondering the metaphysical question of whether or not the things that it perceives are real or merely illusory" here? The point is, the physical reality of the tree affects the movement of the mindless wind. If that's not objective, I don't know what is.

The wind wasn't relevant at all because it's neither sentient nor conscious. The pertinent question, it seems to me, was whether or not the world we perceive is, in fact, real and not illusory. (Remember, we asked whether moral values and duties were facts about reality or illusions foisted by the evolutionary process.)

How exactly would the wind be relevant to that?

Ah, I think I see your point. Well, the point of my article is that while we cannot rule out the possibility that we're just living in the Matrix, such possibilities come cheap and to doubt the existence of objective reality entails a brain-in-a-vat level of skepticism. However, such skepticism is not needed at all to doubt the existence of objective moral values. Like I said in the article, "the key difference between moral values and the physical world lies not in the perception but in the applicability…Moral values apply only to the acts of those who are able to perceive moral values in the first place. Non-human animals do not commit murder when they kill other sentient beings, and even young children and mentally disabled adults are often excused from certain moral duties. It is only the mentally-fit humans who perceive moral values, and it is only the mentally-fit humans to whom these values apply, making moral values doubly dependent on perception. How then, can we call such values objective with the same confidence that we say that the physical world is objective?"

[From a naturalist's perspective, It is an illusion in the sense that we find some acts to be good not because they are in fact good –there is no objective value to any act– but because, on average, such acts conduce to our specie's having evolutionary advantage.]

Sorry, but I can't resist. Remember when I assumed that your moral system is oppressive? This is the reason why. A moral system that is divorced from our biological nature and our evolutionary history cannot be humane. And I cannot see the link between a morality's dependence on our evolutionary history and its being relativist. Your premise and your conclusion are simply unconnected. (Just because you used the word 'relative' as in "relative to our evolution" doesn't mean you can extend it to 'relative' as in "your moral system is relative". That line of reasoning is plain nutty.)

[A moral system that is divorced from our biological nature and our evolutionary history cannot be humane.]

— Of course. But you're talking about epistemology not ontology. I'm saying your system lacks ontology.

[And I cannot see the link between a morality's dependence on our evolutionary history and its being relativist. Your premise and your conclusion are simply unconnected.]

— So say you, without any argument it seems. All that chest beating and foot stomping in no way invalidates what I said, and what should seem intuitively obvious, that it is *relative* to how we've evolved and how we're going to evolve. You're saying it's objective, well objective to what? To how we've already evolved? And by what calculus? Evolution, you agree, can go so many different ways, right? It seems to me, without violating the principle of charity here, describing it as relative would be more apt.

[So say you, without any argument it seems. All that chest beating and foot stomping in no way invalidates what I said, and what should seem intuitively obvious, that it is *relative* to how we've evolved and how we're going to evolve.]

Your logical leaps and gymnastics impress me.

But for your sake I have to point out how stupid this word game you are playing. The sense of the word relative in the phrase "our morality is relative to our evolutionary history" is different from its sense "not objective". The fact that you are using the same word does not prove your point. Two words can have completely different senses, and sense, as you would know, is more than half of meaning.

Let me give you a good example: Our biped nature is "relative" to our evolutionary history. But is the fact of our bipedalism a relative fact? In short, is our bipedalism not objective?

See how nutty your argument is? If one extends your absurd argument to my example, human bipedalism is thus "relative" in the sense of not being objective. But is it? See, I just demolished your point right there.

I don't think you demolished anything.

I already obviated this kind of response, if you cared to look, by saying the only way you can argue for objectivity is by saying it is objective to how we've already evolved. The problem is, evolution, on naturalism, is for the most part random. I don't know how many times I would have to say this for you to understand, but it's worth another shot: evolution can go so many different ways. We can have thought experiments about aliens having evolved differently hence could hold completely different moral systems. Therefore, there is no objective moral value in any act, it is dependent on how the actors have evolved therefore it is relative to who's acting or what his circumstance is.

The fact of bipedalism only has value to those who need to be bipedal. Those who need to walk on fours would not (at least ostensibly) value bipedalism, making the value of bipedalism relative to whoever is opining.

Perhaps my mistake was that I hadn't stressed on the word 'value' at all. Craig's argument is and has always been "without God, there are no objective moral values".

A moral decision is a value choice. The actor is choosing to do that which has value. The objective fact of the choice doesn't make the moral value of the act, itself, objective, since value will always be subjective to the value giver.

You really ought to get it by now.

[You really ought to get it by now.]

Yes, I should get it by know because, at long last, you decided to quit your word-juggling and have actually started making sense.

[I don't know how many times I would have to say this for you to understand, but it's worth another shot: evolution can go so many different ways.]

Duh. Did I ever disagree with this? See my comments downstairs (several stories down). I have already addressed this issue there.

You are actually the one guilty of chest beating and foot stomping: your argument is plain silly and yet you think for all the world that it is completely reasonable, and then you deride me for seeing it for what it is — an empty argument, a fallacious line of reasoning. (See bipedalism refutation above.)

Yes, my morality is "relative" to our evolutionary history, but it does not make it non-objective. That's my point, plain and simple. Let me build on my bipedalism analogy. We could have evolved other wise, sure. We could have been sea dwellers and could have owned fins instead of legs, but that does not make our owning four limbs and our walking on two legs standing upright non-objective. In the same way, a humane morality is dependent on our evolutionary history, but that does not make it non-objective.

Ok, let me challenge you this way: try refuting my point using the word "non-objective" instead of "relative". Then you'll see how hollow your argument was right from the start. It was mere word juggling on your part, to be completely honest. I never thought you would become so desperate.

Geez. You're saying morality is objective insofar as it actually exists; insofar as there are actual moral acts going on.

Then you accuse me of wordplay. Nice.

Let me unpack your nonsense for you.

'killing babies for fun' is bad, why? Why is it bad?
(I'm not trying to be facetious, this will illuminate you on why you are wrong)

I have already addressed this elsewhere. See comments below.

Also, see comment immediately below.

An accidental fact is still a fact. A fact's being non-necessary does not imply its being non-objective.

So there, I summed up where we disagree. (At last, we're free from your "relative" word-juggling nonsense!) You think morality should be necessary, so that even if we evolved otherwise the same morality would apply to us. That is why I believe your morality is inferior: it's like setting the rules without regard to who the players will be. Such rules are bound to be cruel and inconsiderate to the players.

Now I, on the other hand, think that some important facts of our morality is accidental to our evolution, while at the same time believing that there will be commonalities between all conscious beings everywhere in the universe that will be the basis of an all-encompassing morality. That in no way implies the non-objectivity of my moral system.

You may call my moral system inferior to yours. But that's just your opinion. However, when you call my moral system non-objective, then you are asserting something that is plainly false.

[An accidental fact is still a fact. A fact's being non-necessary does not imply its being non-objective. ]

— "Necessary" here will mean it's value content. Yes, it's value would be non-objective, as I explained above. The fact of it's existing, or actually taking place and producing a measurable effect, HAS NOTHING TO DO WITH IT'S VALUE.

[So there, I summed up where we disagree. (At last, we're free from your "relative" word-juggling nonsense!)]

— There was no word-juggling, just narrow mindedness on your part. You really ought to have been familiar with the argument. My mistake was in over-estimating your knowledge.

[That is why I believe your morality is inferior: it's like setting the rules without regard to who the players will be. Such rules are bound to be cruel and inconsiderate to the players. ]

— No. In my worldview, God has set the rules. Who are you to say that God (you have to assume he exists for the sake of argument, ofcourse) wouldn't have any regard for who the players would be?

[Such rules are bound to be cruel and inconsiderate to the players]

— "cruel" and "inconsiderate" are value judgements that have no ontological base on your worldview. Hello, is-ought gap, hello? For our hypothetical aliens, who could have evolved differently, they may not be so "cruel and inconsiderate".

[while at the same time believing that there will be commonalities between all conscious beings everywhere in the universe that will be the basis of an all-encompassing morality.]

— So you keep saying. I have yet to hear valid reasons for believing this. I believe we can get wild with thought experiments and quash this notion of yours (example would be what I said above).

[You may call my moral system inferior to yours. But that's just your opinion. However, when you call my moral system non-objective, then you are asserting something that is plainly false.]

— No, your "moral system" is not inferior to mine. We probably believe in the same things with respect to morality. We probably both believe that torturing babies would be bad, and so forth. We probably have the same moral system. The difference is, mine has an ontological base. Yours, not so much.

[However, when you call my moral system non-objective, then you are asserting something that is plainly false.]

— Objective moral values don't exist in your worldview. If, despite this fact, you still believe you are correct in describing your naturalistic morality as objective, then that's up to you.

You may also find my other replies to your weeks-old comments interesting, although I will try to resist the urge to reply back. To be honest, this discussion is starting to get stale. Perhaps its interestingness can be revived some other time, but that time is not now.

[Obviously there won't be any evidence that these kids "committed any sort of wrong", because they died before they were able to. ]

In short, they were killed based on a suspicion, sans any hard evidence of any wrongdoing. I'm just glad you're not in law enforcement, though you'll a lovely place in Dubya's Pentagon staff.

[Their way of life; their society was conducive for them to be eventually committing all sorts of wrong.]

I could argue the same of the Israelis – they condoned slavery, and yet I don't see god giving them any flak for that, or their treatment of rape victims.

Deuteronomy 22:28-29
"If a man find a damsel [that is] a virgin, which is not betrothed, and lay hold on her, and lie with her, and they be found; Then the man that lay with her shall give unto the damsel's father fifty [shekels] of silver, and she shall be his wife; because he hath humbled her, he may not put her away all his days."

[This is why Craig argues (not only in what you gave a link for, but also in his other writings) that they were better off dying before having reached that point. If you have an issue with his argument, then take it up with him; all I'm saying is that they weren't killed solely in virtue of their being Canaanites. ]

What a wonderful bit of reasoning you have Miguel. So let's put that apply it, shall we? Instead of putting kids who were taken away by social services from violent families into foster homes, why don't we just save everybody the trouble, and off them.

Their exposure to such a violent culture will possibly corrupt the spiritual well-being of the new family after all.

That, in a nutshell, is basically what Craig claims about justifying the slaughter of Canaanite children. Murder veiled under the guise of righteousness is still murder.

Imams who condone the killing of non-Muslims who've never hurt them are no different. Bigots who kill people because they think homosexuality is an abomination, and despite the victim having done no wrong, are no different from the god presented here.

Except that at least they did the killing with their own hands. God – for all his powers of creation and destruction – leaves the dirty work to his chosen people.

[And, geez, Godwin's law? I was debating innerminds sometime ago, and I said that very same thing. He responded something akin to "what the hell does Godwin's law have to do with anything?". So allow me to retort in the same way: Twin, what the frigging hell does that have to do with anything? ]

My bad then. Since we are talking about genocide, references to Nazism would probably be valid. Of course, that doesn't change the fact that you made the baseless claim that a kid will possibly become that guard, without presenting every possible factor in his life that will have a direct influencein him taking that life course.

You're not a fucking precog.

Notice that I said I'm not setting myself out to defend Craig's argument.

But what the heck, since the hole in your logic can easily be pointed out, I might as well indulge:

If you are going to say that Craig's God is immoral, then you will have to grant, for the sake of argument, that it exists. The corollary is that you'll also have to grant his Omniscience and all those other "omis". Given that, if Craig's God said that they will be turning into, like our example, Dahmer's and Hitlers, and thus are better off being dead before getting to that point, then my analogy stands.

The reason why we can say that people are immoral for using this same reason in murdering others is that we know they are NOT omniscient.

That was put as tersely as possible because it's getting tight here in this comment section.

Craig's own reasoning shoots itself in the foot with one of his further lines:

//God had morally sufficient reasons for His judgement upon Canaan, and Israel was merely the instrument of His justice, just as centuries later God would use the pagan nations of Assyria and Babylon to judge Israel//

Craig is referring to the Assyrian destruction of Israel in 722 B.C.

Assuming that this god exists, and that he is "pmni", the problem lies then that in he is clearly biased.

You yourself have stated that he could already predict the outcome of the Canaanites children, and that they would become a wicked people, and that their death would only be a prevention of their predetermined future.

My question to you is this: If this God could, as Craig says, predict that his own chosen people could become wicked, and would eventually judge them, why didn't he do so before they started committing these acts of genocide, or before it got out of hand?

Again, as brief as possible (intense debate sucks, why the heck does it get tighter and tighter on the way down.).

I don't know what Craig would argue, but in my reading of other apologists, one answer could be: God was merciful to the Israelites for some reason, maybe he had a plan. To judge God because of his having been merciful on others is to be envious of the mercy he has shown. God is just and merciful, and can be just or merciful as he sees fit. Lucky for the Israelites, he judged them mercifully.

[To judge God because of his having been merciful on others is to be envious of the mercy he has shown. ]

No, that would be envy, that would be pointing out a clear bias. If god was truly merciful and omniscient, he would have found so many alternatives to handling the Canaanites, none of which would have involved bloodshed. Instead, we end up with a sad tale in a Jewish tome that somehow manages to explain to people that what the early Irsaelites committed was okay because God gave them the thumbs up. How bloody convenient.

What I meant on the 'mercy' thing was that the Canaanites would have been wrong if they said God was being biased in judging the israelites mercifully because they got their justice and its upto God if he chooses to dispense mercy on others.

[If god was truly merciful and omniscient, he would have found so many alternatives to handling the Canaanites]

— Ah, but he's not only merciful and omniscient, he's also *just*.

It's not justice, dumbfuck. It's 1st-degree murder.

So to you killing Osama Bin Laden is first degree murder. O.K. And I will ask you nicely to refrain from cussing me.

[And I will ask you nicely to refrain from cussing me. ] And you will get no such courtesy, dickwad. We are talking about innocent children being murdered here, not a terrorist who has been found guilty of killing over 5,000 people. Learn to tell the difference.

I wasn't expecting any. And my hitler-dahmer analogy already dealt with your point about the children. I was talking about the adult Canaanites.

[I was talking about the adult Canaanites. ] Now you are sidestepping.

You said it yourself earlier:
[[Obviously there won't be any evidence that these kids "committed any sort of wrong", because they died before they were able to.] Our discussion up until this point was regarding the justification that god had them killed because he could predict what they would become. You do not get to shift topics again like you did regarding our morality argument, you slippery little dipshit.

Actually, no. Read up, and you'll find that the discussion has devolved into you asking this: "My question to you is this: If this God could, as Craig says, predict that his own chosen people could become wicked, and would eventually judge them, why didn't he do so before they started committing these acts of genocide, or before it got out of hand?

Who committed the acts of genocide? The children israelites? No, the adult israelites! So who should we necessarily be comparing them to? The adult Canaanites.

You're so stupid.

What!? Did you read what you just responded to? Here I was saying that you refurbished your original statement for more sense making. Now what the hell does this thing you just said have to do with anything? You're lost.

Notice that none of what you said has anything to do with what you've originally responded to, which is this statement:

"[with respect to morality] you assume it "improves itself over time". "

Showing improvements in morality doesn't show that morality itself will always be trending for the better. You follow up on your own tangents too much.

[Showing improvements in morality doesn't show that morality itself will always be trending for the better. ]

Can you cite a reliable source that can make this prediction with accurate data then? You made the claim, hence you should be ready to substantiate it.

Look at history and see that it's more saw-toothed than upward sloping.

It's an upward, saw-toothed slope then.

Twin, when I said there was no reason to believe that "morality improves itself overtime", I meant human morality as a whole, I didn't mean that there's no reason to believe that improvements can be had. We can improve on many areas –which you've cited– but that doesn't mean that everything will be tending to move forward for the better.

The reason why I slapped your examples down is because it only shows that there are improvements, it doesn't show that we're always moving towards improvement –which is what mr. Decierdo was implying when he said : "I do not see anything bleak with a morality that improves itself over time".

//I meant human morality as a whole, I didn't mean that there's no reason to believe that improvements can be had. We can improve on many areas –which you've cited– but that doesn't mean that everything will be tending to move forward for the better.//

And as a whole, you can easily see how far it has gotten over the past few centuries. Slavery for example has been progressively been devalued, to the point that it is now criminal.

Women's rights have also progressed over the years. Where a woman back then was only a property meant for political marriages, she now has the ability to vote, with several laws in place to guarantee her equal treatment at work.

Racism has also been progressively become less justifiable, as is discrimination against people due to their sexual orientation. Read a fucking history book.

[The reason why I slapped your examples down is because it only shows that there are improvements, it doesn't show that we're always moving towards improvement –which is what mr. Decierdo was implying when he said : "I do not see anything bleak with a morality that improves itself over time". ]

Now you're trying to weasel out of your own wording.

When you said //morality improves itself overtime//, that doesn't necessarily mean it has to be a perfect progression. Indeed it is sawtoothed as you claim it is, but overall, history teaches us that we are human morality overall improves. Not "always," but it is getting there.

As compared to you second statement, which added "always" after I cited examples that show there is reason to believe that morality is steadily progressing.

You attempted to shift goal posts.

I said: "But you assume it "improves itself over time". "There's no reason to think this would be the case." –I did not mean that it won't improve under any circumstance. The fact that you want to make it seem like that is what I meant is because you have no argument whatsoever, and are attempting to strawman my statement.

Nobody is moving any "goal posts". You tried to respond by giving examples of morality improving, but that's irrelevant to my point that there's no reason to believe that we can be assured of its continuous improvement.

[The fact that you want to make it seem like that is what I meant is because you have no argument whatsoever, and are attempting to strawman my statement. ]

Not a strawman. More of calling you out for attempting to shift your argument when presented with reasons to believe the contrary.

[but that's irrelevant to my point that there's no reason to believe that we can be assured of its continuous improvement. ]

And there you go again, phrasing it as //there's no reason to believe that we can be assured of its continuous improvement. //

Whereas earlier, when presented with evidence, you switched to the phrase:

//Showing improvements in morality doesn't show that morality itself will ALWAYS be trending for the better.//

You're a puss-nutted, limp-dicked liar who has been caught in the open Miguel. Now kindly stop being a shit-brained git, and admit to your fuckup.

I told you what I meant. I would never say that, under any circumstance, morality does not improve. That would be very ridiculous. There's not one morality. Some aspects obviously have improved, but that doesn't mean that we can rest assured that the trend is always towards improvement.

You are straw-manning what I said to be able to attack it better.

Any mid-wit would have gotten this by now.

[ I would never say that, under any circumstance, morality does not improve. That would be very ridiculous.]

No, you didn't say that. What you said was:

//there's no reason to believe that we can be assured of its continuous improvement.//

And when I presented several landmark cases in human society as a whole that that reasons to believe that it does improve, you quietly rephrased it to:

//Showing improvements in morality doesn't show that morality itself will ALWAYS be trending for the better.//

Do understand that the meaning between both statements is very different. The former can the be tackled by one simply pointing out that while morality has had its bumps, its overall progress is still upward.

The latter shuts that out by demanding 100 percent proof, when you know no such thing exists in reality.

They're two very different arguments.

So which is it, really? What you have committed is a fallacy of shifting goalposts.

Read your first paragraph –which you quoted from me, and then your response to it. And then look at yourself and laugh.

Then compare the next two things that you quoted from me:

1. /there's no reason to believe that we can be assured of its continuous improvement (which is what you say I said)

and

2 Showing improvements in morality doesn't show that morality itself will ALWAYS be trending for the better.
(which is what you say I changed it to)

then notice that they mean exactly the same thing;which is what I've been saying all along; I've rightly downplayed your examples because it doesn't touch my point that there's no reason to believe morality is trending for the better.

"The former can the be tackled by one simply pointing out that while morality has had its bumps, its overall progress is still upward. "

— No, it can be tackled by *proving*, not just citing examples, that its overall progress would be upward, notwithstanding the bumps.

"The latter shuts that out by demanding 100 percent proof, when you know no such thing exists in reality."

–No, it can be tackled by *proving*, not just citing examples, that its overall progress would be upward, notwithstanding the bumps.

I will, under no circumstance, be "demanding 100 percent proof" that morality always improves –that's stupid. And that's obviously a weak argument. You want to interpret what I said into that, because it's easier for you to attack, and you can only attack WEAK things.

notice that, despite I used the word "always", I also used the word "trend"

'the general course or prevailing tendency; drift'

So when you say they mean 2 completely different things, you actually mean "I'm dumb".

[So when you say they mean 2 completely different things, you actually mean "I'm dumb". ]

No. Dishonest.

You might want to quote me in context. Ofcourse something that's objective isn't by definition absolute. And if you read what I said, I've already obviated your response by saying we don't have to philosophize that far off, and further said that in order for anyone to be absolutely certain about something, he would have to know absolutely everything about it –which is arguably impossible for propositions that are not reducible to a mathematical certainty. But in the context of the discussion, we would want something objectively true to be absolutely true –provided all influencing variables remain static. The problem with what you're doing is that anyone can philosophize similarly to the point of absurdity — since, apart from mathematical propositions, nobody can show anything to be absolute, which will render all discussions useless. You can show someone all the evidence in the world, but will find yourself dumbstruck in trying to remove him from his hardcore brain-in-a-vat skepticism.

Your second paragraph is nothing short of ridiculous. Whether you like it or not, and no matter how you try to hammer the nails that don't need hammering, truth can NEVER be provisional, and scientific truth is no exception. If a proposition's value is true, yet is subject to change, then it couldn't have been true; either there was a mistake somewhere, or some variable itself changed and thus changed it's truth value. If it's true that Napoleon won the battle at waterloo, then he won the battle at waterloo. The truth that Napoleon won that battle CANNOT be provisional. If we find evidence that he in fact lost, then that means HE NEVER WON. Something that is true cannot be false unless a variable or a premise, from which it's 'truth' value is dependent on, somehow changes. Try going to scienceblogs and assert there that the truths of science are provisional; unless people misconstrue what you say to mean that science can get a lot of things wrong, you'll be derided like you really ought to be for making statements like that.

Your subsequent paragraphs merely harp on your assertion that truth is provisional –which is ridiculous. You then say: "Another point that should be noted about scientific truths is that they are mere approximations." They necessarily should be because if they weren't, then that means we know absolutely everything there is to know about that which was previously being approximated. NONE of this shows that "truths are provisional", all it shows is that we have incomplete information. Again, you are welcome to this kind of brain-in-a-vat skepticism, but you really ought to know that this will render all discussion useless in that you are already accepting from the onset that, apart from mathematical propositions, nobody can be absolutely certain about anything, then there is no nourishment to be had.

Yes, and I am in fact saying what you think I'm saying, i.e, in a naturalists worldview, moral value judgements have no ontological base. I don't want to sound elitist, but are you really that philosophically illiterate? Because, if not, then you really ought to know that what you've just said renders all those voluminous debates on moral epistemology and ontology rather trivial. This is exactly the point of contention in the Harris-Craig debate –which was what this post was about– and it's exactly why Harris lost the debate. There is an is-ought gap that is un-bridgable on naturalism.

[ But in the context of the discussion, we would want something objectively true to be absolutely true –provided all influencing variables remain static.]

What an utterly useless statement. Will it ever happen that all influencing variables will remain static? If no, what's the point of your argument? What's the point of arguing from an ideal that will never occur in the real world?

[The problem with what you're doing is that anyone can philosophize similarly to the point of absurdity — since, apart from mathematical propositions, nobody can show anything to be absolute, which will render all discussions useless.]

How will that render every discussion useless? Follow the argument below:
1. Are scientific discussions useless? No.
2. Do scientific statements have the absolute certainty of mathematical statements. Again, no.
3. Your claim is therefore false. QED.

The problem with your thinking is that you don't seem to have any working knowledge of the pragmatic nature of scientific reasoning.

[If we find evidence that he in fact lost, then that means HE NEVER WON.]

On the metaphysical level, yes. But before we we find evidence that he in fact lost, if our best evidence suggests that he in fact won, then we are warranted to say that he won. We may be wrong metaphysically, but we are nonetheless warranted to make the mistake given the fact the gap in our knowledge. Ever heard of pragmatism a la Quine? Well, science is pragmatic: as long as a statement is consistent with all the other accepted statements believed to be true, a statement should be accepted as true. But since we know that the entire body of present evidence is incomplete and not final, the truth value that we must assign to our statements should be provisional.

Ok, let me get this straight. What exactly is your definition of 'absolutely true' apart from the definition I was using all along?

[I don't want to sound elitist, but are you really that philosophically illiterate?]

I am not philosophically illiterate — it's your philosophy that is fractured.

Notice that you did not answer my challenge: Is Newtonian mechanics true or false? What truth value will you assign to a statement in Newtonian mechanics statement such as "Force is equal to the product of mass and the derivative of the velocity"?

[There is an is-ought gap that is un-bridgable on naturalism.]

That is a very prevalent absurdity, and I should say I'm surprised you're parroting it too. Using the same stupid reasoning that lead to that absurdity, one could just as well argue that there exist a similar is-ought gap in ALL moral systems. In the context of theistic morality, the argument goes as follows:

1. Morality comes from God, the creator of the universe. (IS)
2. Why should I follow what God commands me to do? (OUGHT)
3. Because God is the creator of the universe. (This is an argument from authority: "might makes right".)

However, you might argue that if your god exist, then I would be stupid not to follow the commands of that omniscient god. That argument is in fact valid, and it bridges the supposed is-ought gap. In the same way, I can argue, with equal validity, that only a very irrational person will not follow a moral system that is based on a scientifically-sound understanding of human nature. See what I did there? Your "un-bridgable is-out gap" bridged within the context of naturalism. And note that I did not use any of the absurd-armchair-philosopher-type argument you seem to be so fond of.

[What an utterly useless statement. Will it ever happen that all influencing variables will remain static? If no, what's the point of your argument? What's the point of arguing from an ideal that will never occur in the real world?]

–It only seems "useless" because you misunderstood it, or you thought I said static to mean 'everything's completely unchanging'. When we do experiments we can only be sure of our conclusions if we are able to replicate the results without changing the variables.

[How will that render every discussion useless? Follow the argument below:
1. Are scientific discussions useless? No.
2. Do scientific statements have the absolute certainty of mathematical statements. Again, no.
3. Your claim is therefore false. QED. ]

— Lol. I never said or claimed anything you are listing down here. I said a brain-in-a-vat type of skepticism will render any discussion useless. I don't even know where you got this list.

[The problem with your thinking is that you don't seem to have any working knowledge of the pragmatic nature of scientific reasoning.]

— So you keep asserting, while also asserting that scientific truth is provisional. The problem with you is that you keep hammering the nails that don't need hammering to show whatever imaginary hard-won education I presume.

[But since we know that the entire body of present evidence is incomplete and not final, the truth value that we must assign to our statements should be provisional.]

— More hammering. No truth is provisional. If you're going to say that its truth value is provisional, that's just a fancy way of saying that we're not sure. If all the evidence points to the conclusion that Napoleon did in fact win, then whether we want to go for the most probable conclusion of Napoleon winning is irrelevant to the truth of whether he did in fact win or not. Saying that Napoleon won because the evidence makes it more probable than its negation is different from saying that the truth of Napoelon winning because of said evidence is provisional. A proposition has a truth value –whether we are able to absolutely ascertain what it is or not– and that truth value IS NOT PROVISIONAL. You' make more sense if you said our 'knowledge' is provisional, but no, you say "scientific truth' is provisional. You're ridiculous.

[Ok, let me get this straight. What exactly is your definition of 'absolutely true' apart from the definition I was using all along? ]

— We both know what the right definition is. We both know that we cannot be absolutely certain about anything that's not reducible to mathematical certainty. We can both safely say that it is absolutely true that Jose Rizal was an actual man that lived. Although we cannot prove his existence absolutely –since it isn't reducible to mathematical certainty– we are both warranted in saying that anyone who disbelieves in his existence, despite having been shown the evidence, is a moron. The problem is that this moron can always be a skeptic to the point of absurdity. If this moron asks us that his disbelief in Rizal is warranted in virtue of our complete inability to prove 5 minutes ago did not exist –which makes him right– then it renders all discussion useless; because the fact is that we are just limited in what we can prove.

[Notice that you did not answer my challenge: Is Newtonian mechanics true or false? ]

— I didn't answer that because I don't think it's relevant. That's just like asking if it's true or false whether a rock dropped from a building will fall towards the ground –it depends on where in the universe the building and the ground are. Newtonian mechanics is true, the reason why it doesn't work on cosmic scales or at the quantum level is not because it's false, but because the influencing variables on those levels are different.

[one could just as well argue that there exist a similar is-ought gap in ALL moral systems. In the context of theistic morality, the argument goes as follows:
1. Morality comes from God, the creator of the universe. (IS)
2. Why should I follow what God commands me to do? (OUGHT)
3. Because God is the creator of the universe. (This is an argument from authority: "might makes right".) ]

— This is the most insane thing ever. I won't even try to correct it, but I'll take what you said: If you say (1) morality comes from God, then if one wants to be moral, then (2) we ought to follow God not because he is the creator of the universe, but because you've already given that (1) morality comes from God.

See what I did there? Your "un-bridgable is-out gap" bridged within the context of naturalism.]

— This isn't meant to be condescending, but, me thinks you don't know what the is-ought problem is.

[Because, if not, then you really ought to know that what you've just said renders all those voluminous debates on moral epistemology and ontology rather trivial.]

Much of those voluminous debates are indeed trivial, not to mention useless. There is no "un-bridgeable is-ought" gap. Such a thing is a pathetic, Kantian excuse to pull God out of nowhere.

[Much of those voluminous debates are indeed trivial, not to mention useless. There is no "un-bridgeable is-ought" gap. Such a thing is a pathetic, Kantian excuse to pull God out of nowhere.]

— Riiight. And you bridged it by saying it's irrational not to follow "a moral system that is based on a scientifically-sound understanding of human nature."

Why does *ought* this irrational person follow your moral system? Because you will deride him as irrational if he doesn't? O.K.

[And that is why we must always actively pursue the improvement of our moral system. An improving morality is not for the lazy, although I guess absolutist moralities would be just their cup of tea. ],

— You think that "improving our moral system" is something a moral absolutist would be against? O.K.

[So tell me, how can we improve an absolutist moral system? Absolutist morals systems don't leave for improvement since they are obliged to claim that they are perfect.]

— You think that for an absolutist, there is no new knowledge to be had in this world? Since that's the only way for anyone to justify absolute perfection of anything. O.K.

For my part, I will not have any problems with an improving moral system, since I hold that morality is not absolute (never final) but is only provisional (there is always room for improvement). The problem would be yours only, since it is only you who claim that morality should be absolute, like "1+1=2".]

— I won't be having any problems about that either, since I know that we do not know everything there is to know; and as our knowledge grows, there will always be room for improvement. If morality were a game, we are both in the dark about the rules to follow. The difference is, I believe there are rules, and you believe the rules are illusory. In fact, you don't even have a leg to stand on; there's no justifying, from your perspective, why the game has to be played in the first place.

[If morality were a game, we are both in the dark about the rules to follow.]

No, you'd still be bitching about not being able to read the rulebook.

[You think that for an absolutist, there is no new knowledge to be had in this world? Since that's the only way for anyone to justify absolute perfection of anything. O.K. ]

Wait, is your second statement even a sentence? As for your first, my answer is yes. How else could it call itself absolutist if it will not make a claim to being perfect? In the context of theistic morality, why would an omniscient god provide a moral code that is incomplete and imperfect? Did the God of the Bible hand down his moral system so that we humans can improve it as our self-knowledge expands? I don't think so. If you think otherwise, that's fine, just support it.

[The difference is, I believe there are rules, and you believe the rules are illusory.]

Whoa! Where is this coming from? Not from me, surely. The rules are illusory? Did I ever say that? Did you not catch my drift, after countless comments, that I believe in an objective, non-absolute morality? Did I ever suggest that I was a moral relativist? Hell no!

[ In fact, you don't even have a leg to stand on; there's no justifying, from your perspective, why the game has to be played in the first place.]

And then he continues with it, ladies and gentlemen. Please give a big round of applause to the magician who pulls bunnies out of his nostrils!

BTW, notice that you completely avoided my question: how will your absolutist morality accommodate our ever-expanding self-knowledge? My objective morality will have no problems with accommodating the said expansion. How about yours? Just show me how its done, and I will honestly call you my brother and I would say that whatever our philosophical differences are we are still in agreement when it comes to the essentials. Because for me, there is nothing in ethics more essential that an improving, scientifically-informed and constantly updated moral system. If you agree with that, then we're good, just show me how you can accommodate such in a theistic, absolutist moral perspective, because as of now, I think such a feat is not doable.

[Wait, is your second statement even a sentence? As for your first, my answer is yes. How else could it call itself absolutist if it will not make a claim to being perfect? In the context of theistic morality,….blahblahblah ]

— Someone who believes in an objective moral domain doesn't necessarily believe that the morality he holds, every aspect of it, is objective/absolute. Granted that there are some aspects about his morality that he will think is absolute, like, say, killing babies for fun is absolutely wrong, it doesn't mean that he holds an absolute moral view with respect to everything else.

[Whoa! Where is this coming from? Not from me, surely. The rules are illusory? Did I ever say that? Did you not catch my drift, after countless comments, that I believe in an objective, non-absolute morality? Did I ever suggest that I was a moral relativist? Hell no! ]

— I was talking about the is-ought problem here. And no, I didn't say that you said the rules are illusory, but if your a naturalist then you really ought to know that the rules are in fact illusory.

And then he continues with it, ladies and gentlemen. Please give a big round of applause to the magician who pulls bunnies out of his nostrils! ]

— Again, this was in reference to the is-ought problem, which you probably didn't understand — but that's not saying anything against you, I presumed, maybe wrongfully, you knew about Sam Harris's chess analogy.

[BTW, notice that you completely avoided my question: how will your absolutist morality accommodate our ever-expanding self-knowledge? My objective morality will have no problems with accommodating the said expansion.]

— Your "objective morality" that's actually relative to an "ever-expanding self-knowledge"? People would call that moral relativity, you know. And I've already said that as our knowledge grows, we get closer to truth, thus are more able to find out whether our moral decisions were in fact objective to begin with. Our ever-expanding self-knowledge does not mean truth is provisional, it only means our information is growing, and are thus getting closer to the actual truth. You ask the question already presupposing that truth values are temporary.

[Just show me how its done, and I will honestly call you my brother and I would say that whatever our philosophical differences are we are still in agreement when it comes to the essentials. Because for me, there is nothing in ethics more essential that an improving, scientifically-informed and constantly updated moral system. If you agree with that, then we're good]

— Well you can start calling me "brother" now since I don't have a problem with a "scientifically-informed and constantly updated moral system".

Look, and this explains my 'game' analogy, I believe that an objective moral domain is out there. I'm not claiming that we've already found it. We are both continuously revising our morality. The difference being: for me it's because I want to get closer to truth, and for you it's because the times have changed.

[The difference being: for me it's because I want to get closer to truth, and for you it's because the times have changed.]

Oh no, you have completely misunderstood my viewpoint. I think moral systems improve because we have an improving self-knowledge. In short, we are getting closer to what one might call "perfect moral knowledge". Of course I believe we will never reach it; what's important to me is that we are approaching it.

After all, we will never gain perfect knowledge of the physical universe too, but that's not bleak or disconcerting to me at all; what's important is that our physical theories are getting better all the time so that they could always accommodate newer scientific data.

Note also that I do not merely believe that there is an objective moral truth out there, I also think that we have already started getting to know the lay of the land. Many of our modern, scientifically-informed moral values are already part of this objective moral truth that you speak of. Of course I also believe that our moral landscape must change as we evolve as a species; you cannot have a morality that is divorced from the biological nature and evolutionary history of the moral agent. But, and this is where we disagree, I don't think that that makes my moral system relativist, while you think it does. In the future I hope to convince you that it does not. A moral system based on our biological nature and evolutionary history is not relativist and its rules are not in any way illusory.

I guess I will first have to read your article then. I think I already know the route you will take, but it would be better to hear how you actually lay it out.

[I'll just assert, kinda like you did, that there was.]

Let's clear that up by directly quoting the source:

"By setting such strong, harsh dichotomies God taught Israel that any assimilation to pagan idolatry is intolerable. It was His way of preserving Israel’s spiritual health and posterity. God knew that if these Canaanite children were allowed to live, they would spell the undoing of Israel. The killing of the Canaanite children not only served to prevent assimilation to Canaanite identity but also served as a shattering, tangible illustration of Israel’s being set exclusively apart for God.

Moreover, if we believe, as I do, that God’s grace is extended to those who die in infancy or as small children, the death of these children was actually their salvation. We are so wedded to an earthly, naturalistic perspective that we forget that those who die are happy to quit this earth for heaven’s incomparable joy. Therefore, God does these children no wrong in taking their lives."

Miguel, would it kill you to read the link before you make another assumption?

Try reading what you just quoted. It's hardly fairly encapsulated by your statement "[it's all well and fine] since God commanded it, and that the Canaanites were wicked, the deserved it. That includes killing their women, children, and infants "

[Try reading what you just quoted. ]

I did. Have you? Don't blame me for your lack of reading comprehension.

Firstly, I'm not a biblical inerrantist, but I'll be defending what Craig said from your summation of it.

you said: "since God commanded it, and that the Canaanites were wicked, the deserved it. That includes killing their women, children, and infants"

Now notice that your "summation" scarcely makes any reference to the first paragraph you quoted which says that God was concerned about the Israelites, and barely touches on the second paragraph that you quote which says that God does the children no wrong in taking their lives. This is even just based on what you quoted that is even arguably lacking because of your being so generous to yourself.

Now you notice that you erred, and so do a little sleighty-sleighty by saying:

"Basically, because God promises them heaven, it's okay to kill kids, and tells the Israelites to do it. If I commited an error, it is that I made Craig sound more sane then he actually is"

which actually has nothing to do with what you originally said. Read them side by side. But I understand why you would want to refurbish what you've originally said for more sense-making.

And I lack reading comprehension skills, he says.

The bottom line is still that Craig has justified murdering an entire race because God ordered his people to, regardless his concern for the Israelites. And seriously, an ethnic cleansing to "protect" the spiritual health of his chosen people?

And to justify killing women and children, Craig further surmised that because of their Canaanite heritage, these children had to be executed as well, but attempts (and fails to) rationalize that this God would still bring them into heaven, somehow making it okay.

As I said earlier, given you seem to be ignoring it, kindly read the fucking link before you blather on again. You can't expect us to hold your hand all the time.

No, actually the bottom line is that you oversimplified what he said to make him sound more ridiculous, which makes you disingenuous. Even how you re-explained what you said right now –above this post– would make what you *originally* said seem like an oversimplification.

[Craig further surmised that because of their Canaanite heritage, these children had to be executed as well]

— I think Craig's point was that they were executed for their own good, not solely because of their Canaanite heritage. (This may sound ridiculous, ofcourse, since we are only able to crudely show a small part of the logic behind the rationalization he gave)

[As I said earlier, given you seem to be ignoring it, kindly read the fucking link before you blather on again. You can't expect us to hold your hand all the time.]

— I've read the link, and have accurately called you out on your oversimplification. I've also been able to show you what you left out in what you yourself quoted from Craig. No need to hold my hand, buddy boy.

[– I think Craig's point was that they were executed for their own good, not solely because of their Canaanite heritage.

Bullshit. For somebody who claims to read the link, you're not doing a very good job remembering it. Allow me to refresh your memory:

//But why take the lives of innocent children? The terrible totality of the destruction was undoubtedly related to the prohibition of assimilation to pagan nations on Israel’s part. In commanding complete destruction of the Canaanites, the Lord says, “You shall not intermarry with them, giving your daughters to their sons, or taking their daughters for your sons, for they would turn away your sons from following me, to serve other gods” (Deut 7.3-4). This command is part and parcel of the whole fabric of complex Jewish ritual law distinguishing clean and unclean practices. To the contemporary Western mind many of the regulations in Old Testament law seem absolutely bizarre and pointless: not to mix linen with wool, not to use the same vessels for meat and for milk products, etc. The overriding thrust of these regulations is to prohibit various kinds of mixing. Clear lines of distinction are being drawn: this and not that. These serve as daily, tangible reminders that Israel is a special people set apart for God Himself.//

For their own good?

Prohibiting "mixing" of races to ensure purity as a premise for genocide.

If you said that under most circumstances, you would get called a Klansman or worse. In fact, we have a wealth of history showing this sort of thinly veiled atrocity being conducted on other communities that were put under the sword. The salem witch trials, the crusades, and the holocaust are just among more common examples.

The only one here who sounds fucking ridiculous is you, for attempting to rationalize what happened to the Canaanites as if it's alright just because God says it is, or because some bronze age law dictates that it is fine.