If Catholics Worshipped Satan, Would They Know?

Let me put it this way:

Evil = absence of good
God = omnipresent
God = good
Therefore: Good = omnipresent
Therefore: Evil = cannot exist anywhere

You wrote (in response to Garrick): "Murder, your example, can be seen as an absence of good, as it is a failure to give the victim his due. "

If God is omnipresent, then His goodness should also be present in the would-be murderer's conscience, so even if he has free will, he would freely choose to do good and give the would-be victim his due.

So if God is omnipresent, he'll also be present in the would-be murderers mind, and that presence, you're saying, should have somewhat of an influencing effect?

Honestly, Innerminds, I don't see how God = good + God = omnipresent would make good = omnipresent.

By the definition of omnipresent you're using, then nothing can exist anywhere since God will be occupying every single atom of space.

"God = omnipresent" is a premise, not a conclusion, just as God = omnibenevolent. The conclusion arrived from both premises is that goodness is therefore omnipresent.

Another premise would be that God is incorporeal, hence, He can be present in the person's conscience without physically occupying a single atom of his brain.

If he can be omnipresent and incorporeal and thus causally effete over someone's brain processes –presumably, he could be the opposite should he wish to– then what's left of your point about his omnipresence requiring the omnipresence of good as a corollary? (*good* here being something that should have an influencing effect on material things, making them good or whatever it is you previously meant)

And yet another premise is that God is omnipotent, hence, being incorporeal doesn't make Him effete over anyone's brain processes.

Which I was keen to point out if you read what I said.

This is what you said:

"…incorporeal and thus causally effete over someone's brain processes…"

So I just pointed out that being incorporeal doesn't make God effete.

Miguel, why are we having this conversation? We both already know these things. It's either you're pulling my leg or you're trying to say something that I don't get because it's buried somewhere in those highly philosophical arguments of yours. If it's the latter, may I suggest that you explain it in a more simple language? I'm not a philosophy student. 🙂

Innerminds,

Actually, if you noticed, I'm trying to avoid your line of questioning because I know where it will lead to; it will lead to me saying "free-will".

I know that God, despite being incorporeal, is not causally effete over the material world. Which is why I said "presumably, he could be the opposite should he wish to". He can be causally effete, and..well.. not causally effete. He's omnipotent, like you said.

But his incorporeality means he can be omnipresent without disturbing our brain stuff. You said so yourself. Then he can also be present while murderers do their murdering. Then he can also be present when there's evil, despite himself being all-good.

So you've just answered your own question, actually.

You implied:

God = all-good and God = omnipresent, therefore good = omnipresent. And then you say evil = shouldn't exist anywhere.

Solution? Read above.

"Well why doesn't he stop the evil since he's all-good" I anticipate Innerminds saying. Egads.."free-will?" Miguel says.

[But his incorporeality means he can be omnipresent without disturbing our brain stuff. You said so yourself. Then he can also be present while murderers do their murdering. Then he can also be present when there's evil, despite himself being all-good.]

I did not say "without disturbing our brain stuff" in the sense that God cannot influence our thought process. What I said is that God can be present in the person's conscience without physically occupying a single atom of his brain. Hence, God's incorporeality simply means that He doesn't occupy our physical brain but it does not necessarily follow that He cannot influence our conscience or thought process.

As for free will, if God and therefore goodness is omnipresent, then evil should be "omni-absent" regardless of free will. If goodness is omnipresent it simply means that there is no place for evil, but not necessarily that there is no place for free will. A person can still freely choose, but because there would be no such thing as evil, he will only be able to choose between different kinds of good deeds.

Your first paragraph is not an objective reaction to anything I said. To make it easier for both of us, I will overlook it for now.

Before I answer, I think this "omnipresent" thing is as a characteristic of God is always taken too literally. ("he's omnipresent? You mean he's also inside my anus?" one guy mockingly asked of me once)

It doesn't follow that evil should be omni-absent if God is omni-present, just because God is good. Good and evil aren't material things that can't occupy the same space.

[Your first paragraph is not an objective reaction to anything I said. To make it easier for both of us, I will overlook it for now.]

Why don't you tell me why it's not objective instead of talking in riddles? It seems we have a communication problem here.

As for omnipresence, it simply means that God's omnibenevolence and omnipotence are supposed to pervade all creation.

[It doesn't follow that evil should be omni-absent if God is omni-present, just because God is good. Good and evil aren't material things that can't occupy the same space.]

Are you saying that it is possible for an act to be maximally good and maximally evil at the same time?

" Why don't you tell me why it's not objective instead of talking in riddles? "

The last thing I would want to do is talk in riddles, actually. It's not an objective reaction to anything I said because I wasn't disputing –never tried to dispute, in fact–the fact that God's immateriality doesn't mean he can't influence us materially. I'm a Christian theist, and this fact should have been obvious by now. Now before you quote me as saying something of that kind, let me stop you right there and obviate any such by saying you are misquoting.

"As for omnipresence, it simply means that God's omnibenevolence and omnipotence are supposed to pervade all creation. "

Yes, and this is supposed to mean that evil cannot exist because it's been squeezed out of its place by God's all-pervading "omnibenevolence and omnipotence", right? How does that follow unless evil and all those "omis" have the quality of material things, in that they cannot occupy the same space or place?

"Are you saying that it is possible for an act to be maximally good and maximally evil at the same time?"

No, I said nothing of this kind. I don't even know how this follows from anything that I said. But you'll say I'm engaging in riddles again, right? What I'm saying is that evil can occur, or exist, within God's presence.

Granting that good and evil, being non-material things, can co-exist at the same time, they can only manifest themselves in moral acts, which are either good or evil but not both (or at least most acts anyway). Now if goodness has an omnipotent source, shouldn't it be able to defeat (not "squeeze out" since they are non-material things) evil in every man's heart (not the physical heart but I don't need to explain this to you) every time?

No because it's not God's desire to "defeat evil in every man's heart" if that evil is of that man's own choosing. Presumably it's something he can do if he wanted to –being omnipotent and all. But the very conception of God for Christians is that control of this sort is not in his divine plan. Of course there are reasons for this that I don't have to get into for the purposes of this discussion.

If it's not God's desire to defeat evil in every man's heart, how can you say that he is omnibenevolent?

It's the Christian worldview. He wants people to be holy and moral. Holiness is a choice. You need to exercise your free-will to get there. That's why we don't call a tree holy and moral for providing us its fruit because it's not like it could do otherwise. We are moral agents, unlike the tree.

Sounds more like "omni-moral" or "omni-holy" than omnibenevolent to me because from what you're saying, God would rather give a potential killer the chance to exercise his free will to do the moral thing in spite of the high probability that he will do otherwise (and God knows when the potential killer will do otherwise by virtue of God's omniscience) than save the would-be victim from harm.

EDIT/CORRECTION:

Not "omni-moral" or "omni-holy" but "ultra-obsessed with morality and holiness," or more specifically, ultra-obsessed that people observe His morality and live holy lives, whatever that means.

I'm afraid the contradiction only exists if, like you, I hold good and evil to be akin to physical things or substances, or other some such.

The privation view of evil from the classical theist's perspective, of which I've been mentioning, holds that evil is a privation of good –or evil is the absence of good, if you prefer (but the former is more accurate). Evil and good aren't like particles or a vacuum in the Aristotelian-Thomistic sense, even if they would be in the atomistic sense –the more contemporary view of reality.

A more fitting analogy (but still a crude one, perhaps) would be a 3-legged dog. Dogs, by their nature should have 4 legs; in their *normal* state they will have four legs. Some dogs however, because of an accident, or a genetic defect, could be born with three. Picture the normal state of a dog as good, and the 3-legged state of the dog as evil –where evil is the privation of some good. In the Aristotelian-Thomistic sense, good is always where things *should be*. There's inherent teleology, if you will, towards the good, and a departure from it is evil.

Now, I'm not going to explain Aristotelian-Thomism here for you. The point is that, the "evil God challenge" –or whatever iteration of it you can come up with– will be effete against classical theism because it begs the question right off the bat. You cannot say to a Catholic theologian, for instance, that his God might be evil. His very conception of God, given the privation view that in turn flows from his metaphysics, is of an all-good one. You may say this is poppycock, and present your own arguments against it, but it's those arguments, and not the "evil God challenge" –or some other iteration of this– that WILL BE DOING THE WORK.

And that's essentially my point.

On another note, you may be interested to know that William Craig is not a classical theist. So you won't hear him bandying about these kinds of arguments. But Catholics, for whom the post was directed, are classical theists.

I'm afraid you misunderstood. You can ignore the scientific content of any of the individual statements and focus instead that each pair of claims contradict each other. Let me reformulate so you won't be distracted.

You said:

"All evil can ultimately be defined as a lack of good."

AND

"Without active evil, the default state of all things is good."

This is a contradiction. Here is why.

Let us replace evil with nothing, the absence of anything.

So, let

evil = nothing
good = anything

You effectively said:

"All nothing can ultimately be defined as a lack of anything."

"Without active nothing, the default state of all things is anything."

Both cannot be true.

Let's try it the other way around.

Evil = anything
Good = nothing

This is now how it would look:

"All anything can ultimately be defined as the lack of nothing."

"Without active anything, the default state of all things is nothing."

Still a contradiction.

Garrick, is this the contradiction you're trying to point out?

"All evil can ultimately be defined as a lack of good."

– Meaning evil is the default state and there has to be an active presence of good to defeat or counter evil. Which contradicts with:

"Without active evil, the default state of all things is good."

– Meaning it takes active evil to upset this good default state.

Not in so many words, but, yes.

I could replace evil and good with any nonsense word and the contradiction would remain.

Garrick, when I said that all evil can ultimately be defined as a lack of good, I was using the words in how we commonly use them. Notice that I reminded you from the beginning of that post that that's to miss the point do since we're not dealing with definitions of words but their metaphysical status.

Your defining them and use of analogies is really missing the point.

Again, on classical theism, evil is a privation of good –or an absence of good– (and my usage of the word "lack" confused this, I'm sorry.) because good is the natural state of things.

[If you change the word "lack" to 'privation', then there is no contradiction.]

But this is all to miss the whole point, which is that the "evil god challenge" or any other such iteration of this cannot be used against the classical theist as an attack on his conception of God as being all-good because it begs the question from the get-go.

Now, ofcourse, you can raise arguments against the classical theist's privation view, but it will be those arguments that will be doing the work for you, and not the "evil god challenge".

I think you are still trying to review the content of the statements instead of acknowledging the formal contradiction that you made. I am not using anything, nothing, vacuum, and particles as physical analogues to good and evil. Like I told innerminds, I could replace them with nonsense words and you would still have made a contradiction.

You said:

"All evil can ultimately be defined as a lack of good."

AND

"Without active evil, the default state of all things is good."

This is a contradiction. Here is why.

Let us replace evil with A, the absence of B.

So, let

evil = A
good = B

You effectively said:

"All A can ultimately be defined as a lack of B."

"Without active A, the default state of all things is B."

Both cannot be true.

Let's try it the other way around.

Evil = B
Good = A

This is now how it would look:

"All B can ultimately be defined as the lack of A."

"Without active B, the default state of all things is A."

Still a contradiction.

I wonder how to make this clearer so that you will understand –no disrespect, of course.

I know that using the word "lack" confused the issue. You can forget I used it. I know that there's a contradiction in the statements:

"All evil can ultimately be defined as a lack of good"

and

"Without active evil, the default state of all things is good"

But, like I said, when I said the first statement, I was giving into using the words in how they are conventionally used — a rut I knew you would fall into which is why I tried obviating it at the beginning of the same post.

What matters is that I've already clarified this by giving you a proper analogy, and placing us back in line with the "privation view" by insisting we use the more proper words, i.e, "privation" (or "absence" –but clarified "privation" was more accurate) In fact, I said if you replace "lack" with "privation" in the statements you say contradict, the contradiction disappears.

This is all to miss the main point, however about the "evil God challenge" being completely effete in it's ability to do what Law (or the author of this post) purports it can do, viz. cast doubt on the classical conception of God as being all-good.

Now that you've acknowledged the contradiction within your initial claims, could you explain how the "lack" of something is different from its "absence" or how either are different from "privation"?

Though, you'll find that the contradiction lives on regardless of the injection of the "privation" revision.

You said:

"All evil can ultimately be defined the [privation] of good."

AND

"Without active evil, the default state of all things is good."

This is a contradiction. Here is why.

Let us replace evil with A, the [privation] of B.

So, let

evil = A
good = B

You effectively said:

"All A can ultimately be defined as the [privation] of B."

"Without active A, the default state of all things is B."

Both cannot be true.

Let's try it the other way around.

Evil = B
Good = A

This is now how it would look:

"All B can ultimately be defined as the [privation] of A."

"Without active B, the default state of all things is A."

Still a contradiction.

If "evil is the privation of good", how does this contradict the statement "without evil, the default state of all things is good" given that privation is the taking away from something that which naturally belongs to it?

[Did you even consider the analogy I gave? Because at this point, it seems you're only bent on scoring rhetorical points than actually comprehending. No matter.]

Let me re-phrase it for you:

Statement 1. "Evil can ultimately be defined as a privation of good" means "Evil can be defined as a taking away of good (good –as I've pointed out earlier– being the *natural state of things*)

Statement 2. "Without evil, the default state of things is good"

Where is the contradiction? You do realize that saying "Oh look there's a contradiction!" doesn't actually make it true, right? Because you put the two statements together and simply assert there's a contradiction. We've yet to see any demonstration on where exactly the contradiction lies.

But, yet again, this is to miss the main point entirely, which you have yet to even acknowledge yourself, which is: the "evil god challenge" as an argument just begs the question.

We can get to your dog analogy after we get through this error, because you reiterate it later and it is fundamental to your theodicy. You must acknowledge that I am not picking on your use of lack, absence, or privation. It is a formal error on your part. It is not for rhetorical points, as if someone is counting them.

"Again, on classical theism, evil is a privation of good –or an absence of good– (and my usage of the word "lack" confused this, I'm sorry.) because good is the natural state of things. "

"Evil can ultimately be defined as a privation of good"

You clarify this as evil being the "taking away" of good. Taking away from what? What is left when it is taken away?

This contradicts with:

"Without evil, the default state of things is good."
If good is the default state of things, how can it be taken away?

—

Let us reformulate as I want to be as charitable as possible to your claim, which I still contend is contradictory.

Let
Evil = A
Good = B

You effectively said:

"All A can ultimately be defined as [the taking away] of B."

"Without active A, the default state of all things is B."

Both cannot be true.

You are still seeing the two concepts in terms of "particles" and substances –I took great lengths to clarify to you why this would be an error if you are to understand how the concepts are used in classical theism– in that by taking away, we are left with a shortage of. (you say "What is left when it is taken away?")

Like I said, good, on classical theism, is the natural state of things. Privation of good (or taking away of good) would only simply mean that the natural state of something, or its final cause, had been hindered. Or it could be that something was taken away, which resulted in the final cause being something other than what it would have normally been. The good was thus taken away, insofar as it's final cause is now something other than what it would have been under normal circumstances (because, like I said, the natural state is the good –a dog with 4 legs is good, insofar as it's in its natural state.)

Taking away of good is not akin to taking away of particles of X which thusly leaves us with a shortage of particles of X, and so forth.

Seen in this new light, there is no contradiction.

"All evil can be ultimately defined as a privation of good" (evil can be defined as taking away of good)

[Because if you really must "take away" anything, then presumably that which will be taken away should be there to begin with, else, no "taking away" can take place.]

"Without evil, the default state of things is good"

[Evil is the privation of good. If no privation takes place, then the default state is good]

There's no contradiction. I hope this is OBVIOUS now.

Now, shall we go on to the meat of the issue? (evil god challenge = effete) Or is this something you don't actually dispute?

I think I now get what you mean. It is an essentialist argument of ideals.

Okay, I see how I misconstrued the contradiction. But, you must understand that you are bound to come across these things because you (and your intellectual forebears) misuse words.

If you had used hindrance of an essence from the start, I would have understood your position from the get go. You may have even used hydraulics and fluid compression instead of "taking away" from sets.

There is no contradiction, as long as you use better words. You must get now where my misunderstanding comes from. Of course I would be lead to believe that taking things away would leave an empty state.

If whatever God is (and what he does) is the definition of good, then the evil God hypothesis would indeed fall flat.

I have always been of the belief that if God exists then his well-being would be the supreme sink of all actions. Therefore, any theist must dedicate their life in total service to his well-being. Anything we might construe as immoral (the denial of rights of homosexuals, ignorance of animal rights, etc.) but fine by the lights of God, should be regarded as moral illusions.

Good thing I don't think the Judeo-Christian God exists.

You're right, classical theists –of which I don't consider myself a member (yet)– are bound, at first, to be misunderstood. But it's not because of their misuse of words, but rather their often misunderstood and caricatured metaphysics that under-girds their conclusions.

Ask any non-classical theist who's not familiar with Aristotelian-Thomism to have a go with Aquinas's 5-ways, and you'll get an utterly incompetent objection from them. That's because people see things mechanistically; atomism is the more modern and prevalent view of reality. 2 people espousing different metaphysics can talk about the same concepts and use the same words but mean completely different things. This is why I was careful to clarify what I meant and highlight the ruts we should avoid. I'm sorry if I wasn't clear enough.

And, just to clarify, the "privation view" which renders the "evil god challenge effete" does not argue that "whatever God is (and what he does) is the definition of good". That would still be begging the question, but this time the other way around. That's certainly the conclusion of the view, but it's not a premise.

Thanks for this exchange.

If you don't mind humoring me (and I don't intend to argue against it) would you kindly explain the premises and arguments that lead to "God is the definition of good"?

Actually, it would be very difficult to summarize it in this combox in a way that would not leave more questions than one started with. But, here, let me try:

The classical theist derives his privation view from Aristotelian-Thomistic Metaphysics. This is the metaphysics that underlies the philosophies of people like Aquinas, Aristotle, Augustine, Anselm, Maimonides, Roman Catholic theology and traditional Christian theology.

Since on classical theism evil is the privation of good, then evil is ontologically posterior to good. Thus, any demonstration of God's existence would be ipso facto a demonstration of a being that's necessarily anti-thetical to evil, i.e., one that's all-good.

An argument that purports to cast doubt on the moral character of God –the evil god challenge– is thus ipso facto an argument that assumes the privation view, or AT metaphysics, is false. It thusly begs the question right off the bat. It's like arguing evolution is false because Darwin was wrong.

So, taking privation as axiomatic, it would necessarily mean that the essence of God can only be goodness itself. Since evil is only an illusion and no other moral category exists in the world save for goodness and the privation of it by the free will of man.

Am I getting this right?

No, taking AT metaphysics "as axiomatic" would necessarily mean that the privation view is true. Which would in turn mean that God, if He exists, is necessarily devoid of evil.

That doesn't mean "evil is only an illusion" or that "no other moral category exists in the world save for goodness". If evil is the the privation of good, that doesn't make evil an "illusion".

Okay, not by definition, but I already agree that "God is evil" is not possible under Thomism. I now assert that God is stupid under AT. This stupid God might as well be Satan.

Nope, you're moving the goalposts. That's not what this sounds like:

"What if the deity you’re praying to is the Devil?"

In any case, if you're "satan hypothesis" was simply a challenge for catholics to "prove" that "the current state of the world" was brought about by God, then it's a much weaker iteration of an already weak argument. I don't think they believe that "the current state of the world" was brought about by God. Unless you don't mean for us to take that statement literally.

Stop trying to dodge the problem and stick to the Satan hypotheses. How can you falsify the propositions? If a supernatural being is the driving force behind the Catholic Church, how can a Catholic be sure that it's your ideal God and not hypothetical Satan?

The question was stated simple enough in the original post, and I think you're just trying to complicate things because you think it's easier to dodge the problem when brought to more abstract levels (not to mention copy Craig's or whoever's answer to Stephen Law) than just providing a simple answer to a simple question.

So, to repeat: If a supernatural being is the driving force behind the Catholic Church, how can a Catholic be sure that it's your ideal God and not hypothetical Satan?

I don't think you understood what I said.

A Catholic can never be sure who's running the church. If Satan is pretending to be the pope, of course no one will be able to know. But such an idea is a bit too gratuitous for anyone to take seriously. (that's one answer)

Just because you can't understand the problem "when brought to more abstract levels" doesn't mean it's an attempt by your opponent to dodge anything. Also, Craig would give a different answer because he's not a classical theist. Catholics, for whom you dedicated this post, are classical theists.

[So, to repeat: If a supernatural being is the driving force behind the Catholic Church, how can a Catholic be sure that it's your ideal God and not hypothetical Satan?]

Nobody can ever know, obviously. But classical theists have a concept of God. They base their philosophy on that concept, and that concept cannot be evil. It cannot be evil not because it's been defined as good, but because it follows from the metaphysics. So your "satan hypothesis" doesn't work because it already assumes the underlying metaphysics is false –it begs the question from the get go. If the metaphysics is false, you don't just cast doubt on the deity's moral character, but on his very existence as understood by classical theism!

Of course you can argue against the metaphysics, and thus cast doubt on the moral character of God. But it will be those arguments, and not your "satan hypothesis" that will be doing the work.

I'm afraid you will again run your mouth and say I'm dodging something. Try reading the above again and again until you get it. No disrespect of course, but that's objectively what it;s starting to seem.

Yup, dodging. Actually, the theist I'm addressing the challenge understands perfectly what I mean when I make it, precisely because they have more concrete conceptions of God and Satan than you give them credit for. To them, the Satan hypothesis can easily be translated into reality as the Swindler hypothesis. How would you know whether someone can really be trusted or is just taking advantage?

Consider the following. A deals with B with the assumption that B is a friend. If B turns out to be a swindler, then B is not a friend. But it doesn't change the fact that A first assumed that B was a friend and made a mistake for assuming this. My question for A is: Can you tell if B is a swindler (when in fact he is) when you first assumed he was your friend?

As simple as that. Try explaining it in those terms. Again, no dodging.

Yup. You don't understand, and probably never will, it's beginning to seem. Actually the theist you are addressing probably knows NOTHING about Catholic theology at all –just like, oh maybe, 90% of Catholics.

["Can you tell if B is a swindler (when in fact he is) when you first assumed he was your friend?

As simple as that. Try explaining it in those terms. Again, no dodging."]

Well, wow what a great argument! NO, you won't be able to tell because you've already granted " 1. Satan exists and he is extremely evil and extremely powerful."

So, no, you won't be able to tell if he's disguised as your toilet and is caressing your butt.

Since we have to grant "Satan" exists, which would mean we have to grant "God exists" which means, for the sake of argument we have to grant classical theism is true –since it's what YOU are attempting to argue against– then God would have morally sufficient reasons for allowing it –WHATEVER he's doing.

Ah! But you already said:

"Another objection to the Satan hypotheses would be a similar theistic response to the Problem of Evil: God allows evil so that good can be done. Although some good certainly came out of these — people learning lessons, helping others, etc. — Satan’s goal is not to prevent all good but to lead others to commit a lot of evil. And seen from the perspective of the Satan hypotheses, such an objection is the kind of justification consistent with Satan’s deception. What would be a more devious way of promoting evil than convincing people that Evil is good for Good?"

So, you already want people to assume that the Catholics conception of "good" and "evil" and "God" and "Satan" ARE ALREADY FALSE by what I quoted from you above.

So you want Catholics to first agree that their whole worldview is already FALSE, so you can run the satan hypothesis which would make it…umm… FALSER?

Whoaa…. trippy argument…dude….

More dodging. Actually, it seems that you have already admitted what I'm trying to say, but just don't want to say it outright: the only way you can tell the difference is by faith.

You also seem to be arguing that any Catholic who accepts Catholicism has to be the kind of theist that you are. At the same time, you are saying that 90% of Catholics don't understand this kind of theism. No true theist?

There are many theisms, and most people subscribe to a version particular to them — far from the limited CT and AT that you subscribe to. If SH (and EGC) cause the 90% of Catholics to doubt theism and such theistic arguments from faith and Pascal's wager (which SH thoroughly refutes) then it will have done its job.

As far as your version of theism goes — which you assign too much complexity to, by the way — I think it's just an inflated version of theisms basic circular argument, and you would allow no kind of challenge, no matter how rational, to even cast doubt on your preconceived conclusion.

I don't see how I've admitted anything. You CAN'T TELL THE DIFFERENCE because you said Satan was "extremely powerful". Presumably he has shape shifting powers, is extremely intelligent, and so forth. Obviously he can fool anyone. He could be you or your boxers and nobody will know it.

It must be just "Faith" then that these other FF guys believe you are you and not Satan. Or your boxers is really just what it is and is not Satan caressing your, you know what. You don't see how ridiculous what your attempting to do here is? No, nobody will know.

You're talking to catholics and questioning their theology. Read your own post. You seem, however, to be suggesting that all catholics know catholicism down to every bit of theology before they can call themselves true catholics. Wrong. Does anyone have to know everything about evolution to accept it as a fact? No. But that's what Catholicism is based on –its theology. We can't expect every catholic to know and understand the metaphysics from which their concept of God was derived. And for your information, you can call me a catholic because I was born one, but I don't subscribe to AT metaphysics, the privation view of evil and so forth (at least not yet). I'm probably more of an open theist, like Craig.

Your last paragraph is just more of you saying "I don't understand what you said, therefore it doesn't make sense".

It is actually you who seem to be suggesting that a true Catholic would actually subscribe to CT. I actually believe that if someone truly understood the premises of Catholicism (together with its history and current practices) they would probably leave it. Does an attack or criticism of common theism not count unless it considers that CT or AT is what it eventually leads to? I don't think so. A partial understanding of evolution when pursued through proper science results in more or less the scientific consensus regarding the topic.

On the other hand, a thorough pursuit of common theism using theistic methods (classical philosophy is just one) could lead to anything — a non-Christian theism, polytheism, pantheism, and even atheism. Classical theism is not the logical conclusion of common theism. It is enough to argue against common theism, and this is what I did with SH.

No, what I was suggesting was that true catholics don't have to know –not subscribe, because that would imply they know– anything about AT or the privation view in order to call themselves catholics. But Catholicism's view on evil, good, and God, are based on AT and the privation view.

They may not subscribe, even if they know. That wouldn't necessarily make them non-catholics (I think). But it would nevertheless be a view that's NOT BASED on catholicism.

So your argument is for the catholic (because you address them) beliefs that aren't based on catholicism. O.K. I get it.

You raised an interesting point that might motivate me to write about AT or CT after all: If most Catholics "hold beliefs that aren't based on Catholicism," how should we respond?

Should they be called differently? Should they call themselves another term? In any case, I wonder to what degree most theologians would agree with you when you say common Catholicism is not based on Catholicism. Anyway, thanks for the comments 🙂

Also, although Satan is extremely powerful, he is not omnipotent. He is merely a very smart swindler. I never implied anything is supernatural as mind control as a means of convincing ancient Christians. All I said was that they were very easy to convince.

Also, there is nothing wrong with asking Catholics to consider the possibility that they are wrong about good and evil, God and Satan. All learning is based on some assumption of ignorance (or error), and much improvement and innovation happens when you question even your most basic premises.

But I see how someone so used to circular reasoning could find the questioning of basic premises peculiar.

I didn't say there was anything wrong in "asking Catholics to consider the possibility they are wrong". But your argument is asking them to first consider they are wrong, so you can run an argument that will show they are WRONGER.

You think it's "circular reasoning" but I'm sorry that only demonstrates the limitations of your intellectual capacity. I've already explained to you numerous times now why the "evil god challenge" or your "satan hypothesis" begs the question from the onset. You still don't understand, so you accuse your opponents of "dodging" and being "circular". Pffft.

Nope. If SH is true, then the Catholic would only be wrong once. Testing the hypothesis would not make them any "wronger."

I can argue with you on the merits of CT or AT, but like I said in my other reply, that's not what this post is about, however much you'd like to force it to be. I wrote SH to address the theism of the common Catholic who couldn't care less about CT or AT.

Let's call it Common Theism. Common theism, when justified by faith, fails because of the possibility of SH. (SH, by the way, is not entirely implausible under Common Theism.)

I could write another article refuting CT or AT, but I have no such inclination, and I'd be severely limiting my audience. In case you haven't noticed, I prefer writing for a wider audience, the common Filipino Catholic. Who, I'm sure you'd agree, caring little about CT or AT, still practices a version of theism that to them is equally valid and to me is equally false.

Like I said, your argument is against particular beliefs of *catholics* that's not based on catholicism.

O.K. Perfect.

Sorry for assuming that Catholics subscribe to Catholicism 😉

I realized I acted like an ass on some posts. I'm sorry, sir. But you invited people to try to refute your argument, so I obliged.

I guess we should wrap this up. Thanks, really, for this exchange. I think we are –or at least I am– starting to annoy the readers of this site.

No worries 🙂 We (or at least I) actually appreciate your comments. And if these exchanges are annoying to some readers, they wouldn't have read this far down the comments section to be annoyed 🙂

you're way better than dboncan for sure. if harder to comprehend. and not at all insulting.

Thanks man 🙂

I couldn't resist:

You "never implied anything as supernatural as mind control" yet you just said that Satan could be influencing our conception of "good" and "evil", completely ignorant of what I've been explaining ad nauseum about those concepts being derived from the metaphysics which would mean they follow with logical necessity.

So, Satan makes us think something is logical, but is not doing mind control? What gives?

Even the most intelligent people were convinced of the logic and ethics behind slavery. Also, as I've been trying to say over and over, I'm not trying to refer to Catholics who would tell a con artist, "Hey, you can't possibly be a conman by logical necessity!"

Again, it is possible to be a Catholic without basing your beliefs on the metaphysics you subscribe to. A Catholic could be convinced naturally (as opposed to supernaturally) of ideas that are wrong.

Is it that hard to imagine that given the supernatural exists, that a supernatural entity could have influenced Catholics to have ideas that are wrong? Isn't this the basis of common theists idea of temptation?

So, your argument is essentially for the Catholic whose catholicism is false. Your argument then would cast doubt on what the catholic believes yet is not based on catholicism.

No, I get it. It's a fantastic argument.

Thank you. 🙂

Also note that in the Satan hypothesis, Satan has influenced even the Catholic's conception of what "good" is and what "God" is. In the same way that swindlers influence victims' perceptions, albeit to a smaller degree. Satan in SH has performed the longest con. 😉

I already answered this. By disassociating your "hypothesis" with the EGC, you've now made it irrelevant to anything, and to anyone.

No, nobody will know if Satan is actually the pope. Nobody will know if you're Satan running FF. Nobody will know if Satan was Brad Pitt and Angelina Jolie both at the same time. Nobody will know.

By making THIS your argument, it becomes fantastically much weaker than it already was.

Hey FF people, what if the RH Bill was actually *Bad* and Satan just influenced you people to think it's *good*! The only answer is that that would be so gratuitous a hypothesis that nobody should waste brain cells on.

In case it's not clear by now, the Satan hypotheses (SH) is NOT the EGC. I do not care about the symmetry of good and evil, and neither does the SH make any mention of it. In SH, Satan merely wants a lot of bad things to be done by people who have free will. He used the Catholic Church as a means to this end. There can still be a lot of good (or even more good on the whole) but to Satan it doesn't matter. The evil caused by the CC is already more than enough to keep him happy, but the fact that he is worshipped and obeyed as God (blasphemy) is icing on the cake.

My point is simply that only by faith (and circular logic) can you prove that this is not the case. That is, only by making "SH is false" an assumption can you disprove it. Here of course, when I say proof I mean the same kind of proof that a Catholic would use to prove to himself that the God behind the CC is good (and not Satan).

I know your "satan hypothesis" is not the EGC, but it certainly is another iteration of it.
(you say: "What if the deity you’re praying to is the Devil?") You say you don't care about the "[a]symmetry of good and evil", but I think this is because you don't understand its importance in how classical theists conceptualize their God –and that makes ALL the difference.

You say you don't care about the "[a]symmetry of good and evil" which is highly amusing because your Satan hypothesis REQUIRES there to be SYMMETRY, and you don't even realize it because you don't understand the classical theistic conception of God, Satan, good or evil. Your "satan hypothesis" already assumes from the onset that the classical theistic conceptions of these are false.

Please realize that that's the God they pray and worship. This satan may pretend to be God, but "God" is not a name –it's a concept. And if classical theists pray to their concept of God, then even if satan calls himself God and is disguised as the pope, grew beard and hung himself on the cross, that doesn't make him the recipient of those prayers and worship –because he's not God.

In any case, to answer your question: No. Nobody will know if Satan is disguised as the pope and running the church in much the same way nobody can know if you are satan disguised as Red Tani.

To put it more simply. You've already won the debate before you can even run your "satan hypothesis" because running it would require that classical theism is already false.

I'm curious. What is even the nature of Satan under AT in light of privation?

Also, does AT metaphysics necessarily imply that the Roman Catholic Church is the vessel of truth, the incorruptible keeper of faith and morals?

Garrick, I'm sorry, but Satan questions don't follow from AT.

God is not like the personalistic kind of God that Craig believes in because of AT. That's what I can say. And I don't think AT implies that the Roman Catholic Church is a vessel of truth.

Okay. But, I think what Red is saying, and what you've already acknowledged, is that you can't possibly know that Satan is running the Roman Catholic Church (or any other institution, as you've pointed out). There might still be the Thomist or the Craigian God running some other church (or no church) and believed in by the religious, but since the value for evidence and skepticism is not instilled in the Church's teachings, there are no checks and balances against this consequence.

The specific Catholic dogmas (that Catholics, in practicing them, believe glorify God) that do not follow from Thomism may in fact have been created by this hypothetical Satan. The Thomist God doesn't need to be evil (which I agree is impossible in AT), but he doesn't need to be the Holy Spirit behind the Roman Catholic Church either. The Satan hypothesis does not need to reject AT metaphysics in order to survive. It does not beg the question.

The criticism that the post is putting forward is that this unfalsifiable assertion of the Satan hypothesis is aggravated by the lack of skepticism in Catholicism.

Well thank you for this well-thought out response. But at this point, any response I make would just be the same to what I've already said.

It still begs the question because God will have morally sufficient reasons for allowing Satan to do anything –and that's because he is all-good, which is from the privation view that comes from AT.

But this is a response the author obviated in his post by dressing his "satan hypothesis" like the "evil god challenge" and saying Satan, himself, has evily sufficient reasons for letting us think there are morally sufficient reasons. Which completely does away with the concept of God, good, and evil ON the privation view that's based ON AT.

So Red will have to ask us to assume AT and the privation view is false, before he can run his "Satan hypothesis". If that's not begging the question, then it isn't. But it certainly is some sort of fallacy.

I don't think the article proposed that all Thomists are following the dictates of an evil God. Red wrote that the Catholics, because they follow dogma dogmatically, could be following the specific practices desired by Satan.

So, Catholics (a subset of Thomists) might be wrong in their belief in specific Catholic dogmas, but Thomism isn't necessarily wrong. (As in your Darwin analogy, Darwin [a specific evolutionary biologist] could be wrong but evolution is not.) Thus, Thomist metaphysics survives despite this one subset of Thomists employing faith to justify beliefs that do not follow from Thomism (Satan's dogma).

The Satan hypothesis does not need to be conflated with a nonsensical evil Thomist God challenge. The Thomist God is still the definition of good, it is just that a subset of believers (Catholics) have been led to believe by their institution, through its dogma, that some acts of privation are moral. This is the result of their lack of skepticism for any of their institution's claims.

Therefore, even for Thomists, it is always best to entertain doubts to avoid falling prey to an institution that has been subverted.

Like I said to Red, then his argument is against specific catholic beliefs that aren't based on catholicism. If that's what it is, then it doesn't beg the question. But, if that's what it is, then my opinion is that it's irrelevant because catholics, at least ostensibly, always refer back these questions to their theologians –who must be Thomists (in one way or another)– and that would bring us to square one.

In other words, Red is attacking catholics for a view that isn't based on catholicism. Such a route to take may have its merits, it's just not obvious to me.

I think that's still a limited interpretation of the actual consequences of this piece. It would definitely be trivial if this were the thing the piece wanted to say.

It's saying that this particular group that espouses a Thomist God (the definition of goodness) also espouses faith-based views that do not follow necessarily from Thomism (since Catholicism ≠ Thomism). And since this institution also denounces skepticism in their leadership and heirarchy, their flock is bound to follow them wherever, without question. And since they are unquestioning, it is easy for a hypothetical Satan to subvert this institution for his own ends by promulgating dogma that advocates the privation of good nature.

Here, all the consequences are consistent with Thomist metaphysics, but it impugns the Roman Catholic Church and not just specific Catholics.

Like I said, if that were the case –Satan is now running the catholic church– then yes, he may be fooling people for his ends, and so forth. But the bigger picture is that, following from the privation view (Thomism, etc.), God would have morally sufficient reasons for allowing satan to do so. From the privation view, there can be no gratuitous evil. But the author obviated this kind of response from the catholic theist as I mentioned to you a few posts ago, which is why I said he asks us to assume Thomism is false from the onset.

But yes, I agree the piece can successfully "impugn the Roman Catholic Church".

Garrick, yes that's accurate, I think.

This is the same for Craig's theistic personalism, yes, but as far as I know –and I could be wrong– he derives the same conclusion from different premises. Classical theism and theistic personalism are pretty much the same –there are differences of course– but the conclusions are derived from slightly different premises.

Percier,

No, I don't subscribe to Aristotelian-Thomism. At least not yet. I don't know enough about it to believe it completely. And, as far as what I know, the premises are a bit shaky. Re Anselm CA: it's the other way around; Anselm adopted the metaphysics of Aristotle, and thus his cosmological argument, which tries to prove the existence of God, may have taken the same route.

I know arguing Darwin was wrong doesn't beg the question about evolution. Darwin could have been wrong on something about evolution which isn't integral to the whole theory, and so forth. Obviously what I meant was that arguing evolution is false because Darwin was wrong about evolution, insofar as what evolution fundamentally is –random mutations, natural selection, etc. That would be begging the question.

And, no, the EGC is NOT a challenge to the privation view of evil or Aristotelian-Thomistic Metaphysics. It's a challenge against a view of God wherein the metaphysical status of good and evil are symmetrical. On AT, they aren't symmetrical. You cannot therefore run the EGC on AT since you cannot flip good and evil. Evil, remember is seen as ontologically posterior to good. Once again; they are not symmetrical.

Now to challenge the privation view, and thus challenge classical theist's certainty of the moral character of God, you must challenge Aristotelian-Thomistic metaphysics, OR show that the privation view doesn't actually follow from AT.

To run the EGC is to assume from the onset that AT, and thus the privation view of evil, is false. If AT is false, then classical theism will crumble. You won't just be showing them their God may be evil, you'll essentially be showing that their whole conception of God is FALSE.

[Now to challenge the privation view…]

Agreed.

[If AT is false, then classical theism will crumble.]

This I can't bring myself to agree with. Kindly show me how the falsehood of AT implies the falsehood of classical theism. While we're at it, let me ask: does the falsehood of AT also imply the falsehood of orthodox Christian theology?

[You won't just be showing them their God may be evil, you'll essentially be showing that their whole conception of God is FALSE.]

I wouldn't use the word false. Rather, I would say that to run the EGC is to challenge the foundations of Thomism which, to me, does not imply the falsification of classical and religious theism. Even if Thomism were wrong, religious theism and Christian theology will survive to bear the brunt of the EGC.

Classical theism has a specific conception of God that's based on AT. I would have to explain AT to you to show this. That would be hard. Since I can't do that here, please just agree that if AT is false, and since classical theism's conception of God is based on that, then it too will be false (at least the conception). Of course, the classical theists can just be theistic personalists instead, and hold a *different* conception of God.

I don't know what you mean by "orthodox christian theology". If I were to take a literal reading of that, that is 'classical theism'. But the falsehood of AT doesn't imply the falsehood of other kinds of theisms. William lane Craig, for instance, is not a classical theist. He's more a theistic personalist.

[I would say that to run the EGC is to challenge the foundations of Thomism]

No. This is false. The EGC requires good and evil to be symmetrical. AT is such that good and evil ARE NOT symmetrical. So to run EGC, you have to assume AT is false.

The EGC doesn't try to falsify AT. It already assumes AT is false from the onset.

[Even if Thomism were wrong, religious theism and Christian theology will survive to bear the brunt of the EGC.]

Yes. Theistic personalists, for instance, have their own answer to the EGC which is different from the classical theist's answer. Theistic personalists and classical theists confer different metaphysical statuses to the concepts of good and evil. Most theistic personalists –like Craig– think good and evil ARE in fact symmetrical. So the EGC can be run against theistic personalists, but not against classical theists. On classical theism, it would be begging the question.

Of course, that's not to say that theistic personalists don't have a sufficient answer to the EGC. They have. William Craig keeps using it.