The closest thing to objective moral values

[Continued from Do objective moral values exist?]

The Christian apologist William Lane Craig says that certain actions like rape and torture are not just socially unacceptable behavior but moral abominations. He also argues that the Holocaust would still be wrong even if the Nazis had won World War II and succeeded in exterminating or brainwashing everybody who disagreed with them. And I agree with him on both counts. However, the term “moral abomination” does not necessarily mean objectively wrong since we have no way of finding out if our list of moral abominations would still be the same had we evolved in a different way, and I would also argue that we’re only able to make such judgment on the Holocaust precisely because we haven’t been exterminated or brainwashed by the Nazis and, more importantly, because evolution has “taught” us that genocide is not a very good way of perpetuating our species. The moral values that evolution has conditioned into our minds may not be objective since they cannot exist independently of our minds, but they are definitely more than just moral fads.

Not surprisingly, Craig expresses skepticism with evolution-based morality:

[T]here’s no good evidence that our perception of moral and aesthetic values has been programmed by evolution. Darwinists are extremely imaginative and creative in coming up with what are called “just so” stories in order to explain things via evolution for which there is no empirical evidence. Indeed, these stories are almost endlessly adaptable, so that they become almost irrefutable and, hence, unfalsifiable.

I admit that Craig has a good point, and I admire his skepticism. Unfortunately he doesn’t seem to apply the same skepticism when it comes to the existence of objective moral values:

Why should I think that objective moral values exist rather than that evolution has made me believe in the illusion that there are objective moral values? Because I clearly apprehend objective moral values and have no good reason to deny what I clearly perceive.

This is the same answer we give to the sceptic who says, “How do you know you’re not just a body lying in the Matrix and that all that you see and experience is an illusory, virtual reality?” We have no way to get outside our five senses and prove that they’re veridical. Rather I clearly apprehend a world of people and trees and houses about me, and I have no good reason to doubt what I clearly perceive. Sure, it’s possible that I’m a body in the Matrix. But possibilities come cheap. The mere possibility provides no warrant for denying what I clearly grasp.

I think the key difference between moral values and the physical world lies not in the perception but in the applicability. The physical world applies to everyone and everything regardless of their sense capabilities and even whether they are sentient or not. For example, a blind horse and a deaf bat will both hit a tree standing in their paths, and even the unconscious wind will have to blow around that tree. Lack of perception does not exempt anyone or anything from the reality of the physical world.

Moral values, however, apply only to the acts of those who are able to perceive moral values in the first place. Non-human animals do not commit murder when they kill other sentient beings, and even young children and mentally disabled adults are often excused from certain moral duties. It is only the mentally-fit humans who can perceive moral values, and it is only the mentally-fit humans to whom these values apply, making moral values doubly dependent on perception. How then, can we call such values objective with the same confidence that we say that the physical world is objective?

Now without objective moral values, what are we left with? It seems that no matter how we try to get some purchase for our morality, there is an is-ought gap we just can’t quite cross. Just what is it in life, or the flourishing of life, that makes us ought to act in certain ways?

Others are more qualified to answer that, so I’ll just try to approach it from the semantics angle, particularly with the word objective again, which happens to have another definition: undistorted by emotion or personal bias. In this context, objective moral values could mean something like the kind of morality Richard Dawkins says he wants: “thought-out, reasoned, argued, discussed, and based upon – you could almost say – intelligent design.” And I believe we have what is arguably the closest thing to objective moral values, and that is the objective reasoning of an evolved brain.

142 comments

  1. @Pecier Decierdo

    As I don't want to interrupt your conversation with Miguel, I'll ask my question here. How do you propose to solve the is-ought problem (of deriving an ought from an is) on your model of morality?

    Cheers!

  2. [Hehe, a reply out of mere wounded vanity. A mere assertion and not even an argument. ]

    — Apologies then. Heat of the moment kind of thing.

    [And if someone does not follow this creator's morality you call him immoral? If that satisfies you, then O.K. ]

    — If he is in fact the creator (which you have to assume for the sake of argument) then, yes, of course! The "someone [who] does not follow" what the creator has purposed us to follow, would be immoral. Remember, the purpose of the creator is that people become holy and moral.

    [So if a person does something that the creator did not create him for, then you call him "a person who does not live in harmony with his creator's will" and that answers the *ought* in "Why *ought* I live harmoniously with my creator?" ALRIGHT.]

    — Well that's just a more ridiculous way of putting what I actually said. The ontology of moral values on a theistic worldview has never been in dispute, since it quite OBVIOUSLY bridges the is-ought gap. So your indignation at the thought is just ridiculous, actually.

    [Many characters in the Bible, characters who obviously believed in the existence of Yaweh, and who sometimes even heard his voice with their own ears, still go against his will. In short, many people don't want to live in harmony with the creator's purpose for them, you don't know this? So why *ought* they live harmoniously according to what their creator designed them for? (Oops, it's that is-ought gap again.) ]

    — God.. give me strength.. You're arguing that because many people don't agree with God, there can be no bridging the is-ought gap, on account of that. Just wow.

    Again, they ought to live morally, because that was what they were made to do, to be holy and moral. Only the creator can give its creation purpose. If they don't live morally, then they are being immoral. If you create something for purpose X, and that something does the opposite of purpose X, then it is doing not-X.

    [So one *ought* to follow the law that *is* established by the creator, else you call him "immoral", end of the story? Mere question begging and repetition of unjustified assertion, but if it satisfies you logically, then O.K.]

    — Because one of the laws that has been established by the creator is to be moral. I don't have to call him "immoral". He is being objectively "immoral" on account of his not being *moral*.

  3. [moral values that are relative to how we've evolved, or how we are going to evolve are not objective, they are relative.]

    Whenever you say this my reaction is "What?! Where are these statements coming from?!" Of course a moral system must be DEPENDENT on our evolutionary history. If it's not, then it cannot be valid to us humans, but that doesn't make the moral system RELATIVE.

    [You, like the pencil, have a purpose for your creation. Only the creator can give its creation 'purpose'. ]

    A very bad analogy, since pencils don't have free will while moral agents do.

    Now, here's my analogy (and I hope I don't need to explain how it supports my case). A fish is adapted to live in fresh water only. Will it benefit the fish to force its way into the sea? No, it would be doing something that is contrary to its biological nature.

    [ Many people don't want to live harmoniously. You don't know this?]

    I believe the main purpose of education is to improve the moral sensibilities of people. What good is a high intelligence quotient if it is not used to bolster one's moral reasoning? So to answer your question, most of the people you speak of are simply the victims of lack of good liberal education. The rest, the sociopaths and psychopaths (the people Gideon chase down in 'Criminal Minds'), are to be treated as forces of nature. You catch them and put them in jails or mental asylums, but you do not treat them as normal moral agents.

    Here's a simple test: Does the Golden Rule (or what my fellow freethinkers call the Platinum Rule) make sense for you? If it doesn't, then you have a psychological problem and you need to seek professional attention.

    • [Whenever you say this my reaction is "What?! Where are these statements coming from?!" Of course a moral system must be DEPENDENT on our evolutionary history. If it's not, then it cannot be valid to us humans]

      — If it is "dependent on our evolutionary history" then it is *relative* to how we've evolved, and so is relative. Sentient Aliens could have evolved in a certain way where harvesting humans for food would have been quite a moral thing to do. They may have evolved differently. Their morality is relative to how they've evolved, and is different from ours. So where is the objectivity there? No where.

      [A very bad analogy, since pencils don't have free will while moral agents do]

      — If you go back to your question, you were asking why we should follow the creator, and my answer was that because only the creator can give purpose to it's creation. Seeing as we cannot give an analogy where someone was able to create something that was a free-willed agent, then the pencil analogy should do.

      [Now, here's my analogy (and I hope I don't need to explain how it supports my case). A fish is adapted to live in fresh water only. Will it benefit the fish to force its way into the sea? No, it would be doing something that is contrary to its biological nature. ]

      — And how does that answer or refute your question to which I gave the pencil analogy for? Seems to me it has nothing to do with it. You're completely talking about something else.

      [most of the people you speak of are simply the victims of lack of good liberal education. The rest, the sociopaths and psychopaths]

      — What is morally wrong about being sociopathic on naturalism? It's your opinion that they are wrong. Sociopaths will opine that you are wrong. The only difference is that more people share your opinion. But that's all it would be, an opinion. Sure, you can use a calculus and show your opinion to have more utility, but that begs the question: why should utility be assumed to be good? You still don't get it. You cannot get an ought from an is, no matter what you do. You seriously believe that a high intelligence quotient would automatically conduce to a bolstering of moral reasoning? O.K.

      [Here's a simple test: Does the Golden Rule (or what my fellow freethinkers call the Platinum Rule) make sense for you? If it doesn't, then you have a psychological problem and you need to seek professional attention.]

      — It does make sense to me. Why is this relevant?

      • [If it is "dependent on our evolutionary history" then it is *relative* to how we've evolved, and so is relative.]

        There you go with your word juggling again. See comments above.

        [If you go back to your question, you were asking why we should follow the creator, and my answer was that because only the creator can give purpose to it's creation… then the pencil analogy should do.]

        That still does not answered my question. Why *ought* anyone follow the moral law that *is* prescribed by a universal creator? Because if someone doesn't follow your imagined morality then you call him "immoral"? O.K. Because if a pencil is not used for writing then you call it a "misused pencil"? O.K. I still don't see how you can bridge the is-ought gap you created for yourself. Notice how your pencil analogy did nothing to bridge it for you.

        • [There you go with your word juggling again. See comments above]

          — There you go with your narrow mindedness again, See comments above.

          [That is does not answered my question. Why *ought* anyone follow the moral law that *is* prescribed by a universal creator?]

          — It does. Because the creator wants us to be holy and moral.

          [Because if someone doesn't follow your imagined morality then you call him "immoral"? O.K.]

          — I don't have a right to. But, ostensibly, if someone doesn't follow the moral standard –God– then yes, he is slightly being immoral.

          [O.K. Because if a pencil is not used for writing then you call it a "misused pencil"? O.K.]

          — No, I would say that the pencil isn't being used for what it was created for –to write.

          [O.K. I still don't see how you can bridge the is-ought gap you created for yourself. Notice how your pencil analogy did nothing to bridge it for you.]

          — Ofcourse it did. Only the creator can give it's creation purpose. That's clearly the ontology of morality in a theistic worldview. Odd you didn't get it.

          • [There you go with your narrow mindedness again, See comments above.]

            Hehe, a reply out of mere wounded vanity. A mere assertion and not even an argument.

            [It does. Because the creator wants us to be holy and moral.]

            And if someone does not follow this creator's morality you call him immoral? If that satisfies you, then O.K.

            [No, I would say that the pencil isn't being used for what it was created for –to write.]

            So if a person does something that the creator did not create him for, then you call him "a person who does not live in harmony with his creator's will" and that answers the *ought* in "Why *ought* I live harmoniously with my creator?" ALRIGHT.

            Many characters in the Bible, characters who obviously believed in the existence of Yaweh, and who sometimes even heard his voice with their own ears, still go against his will. In short, many people don't want to live in harmony with the creator's purpose for them, you don't know this? So why *ought* they live harmoniously according to what their creator designed them for? (Oops, it's that is-ought gap again.)

            [Ofcourse it did. Only the creator can give it's creation purpose. That's clearly the ontology of morality in a theistic worldview. Odd you didn't get it.]

            So one *ought* to follow the law that *is* established by the creator, else you call him "immoral", end of the story? Mere question begging and repetition of unjustified assertion, but if it satisfies you logically, then O.K.

      • [Sentient Aliens could have evolved in a certain way where harvesting humans for food would have been quite a moral thing to do.]

        If these hypothetical aliens of yours are conscious beings as well, then their harvesting humans for food is immoral. Would you eat a pig if it starts to ponder the mystery of its own existence? (I'm assuming you're not vegan.) No matter how divergent our evolutionary history may be, all conscious beings in the universe can share a universal morality (one that obviously consists of resisting the urge to have each other for breakfast).

        [So where is the objectivity there? No where.]

        By virtue of the fact that your hypothetical aliens and us humans have evolved consciousness, there will be psychological and moral homologues between us and them. And we can always seek a moral middle ground based on those homologues. In fact, we are already starting at our own backyard, and we do this by starting to discover the broad outlines of a morality that will encompass all living organisms on Earth, whether conscious, sentient, sensate or otherwise. After all, all living forms will have common preconditions for existence despite the divergence of their evolutionary history. Based on this foundation, a planetary morality is starting to uncover itself. No logical leap is required in extending this planetary morality to a galactic one.

        • [If these hypothetical aliens of yours are conscious beings as well, then their harvesting humans for food is immoral. Would you eat a pig if it starts to ponder the mystery of its own existence?]

          — I wouldn't, because on naturalism, I've evolved in a certain that would make me feel it would be immoral to torture animals. But we can have thought experiments and imagine how others could have evolved in different ways. This wouldn't be so hard. Imagine an alien race who reproduced itself by implanting it's eggs on other creatures. It would likely enjoy killing creatures because such a disposition would conduce to their flourishing –much like how humans enjoy sex. Crude example , maybe, but the point is that you're wrong in assuming that all sentient and intelligent creatures are bound to evolve similarly to humans. There is no reason to think this. Dawkins himself said something to this effect. ( I'll try to find the quote.)

          You're second paragraph is false. There is no reason to believe this. And, no, we aren't "starting to discover the broad outlines of morality that will encompass all living creatures" –far from it! Chimps will eat the faces of their enemies, a praying mantis will devour it's mate after sex, lions will kill the cubs of the lionesses belonging to just-conquered territory, and so forth. These, as you really must know, are sentient creatures as well. There's no reason to assume what you just said. In fact it's more probable that it's the exact opposite. Different conditions in other planets will require different ways of flourishing.

  4. It seems that Miguel already has most of the issues covered so I'm only going to add to what he said. Let's start by posting something controversial: naturalism, as a system, is a framework that is incapable making moral statements because their world-view just can't ground objective moral values and duties (either epistemologically or ontologically).

    The very best that naturalism has on offer (basically moral relativism) basically precludes from being capable of condemning the RCC on the basis of, well, anything. And yet why do I keep seeing erstwhile naturalists so vehement in their moral condemnation of the Church?

    • [naturalism, as a system, is a framework that is incapable making moral statements because their world-view just can't ground objective moral values and duties (either epistemologically or ontologically).]

      Before I answer that, let me challenge you first to show us how theism provides objective moral values and duties. I have argued in another article that objective moral values don't exist:
      https://filipinofreethinkers.org/2011/04/08/do-obj

      • No, you did not (argue that objective moral values and duties do not exist). What you gave was a negative case that aimed merely to disprove the evidence that I gave for the existence of objective moral values and duties being grounded on God via Euthypro's Dilemma. You gave neither a negative case nor a positive case either for or against moral objectivity.

        Besides, even if I can't give a plausible case for moral objectivity, it's not exactly relevant, is it? I'm asking why erstwhile and self-professed moral relativists are so vehement in their moral condemnations despite their disbelief in moral objectivity.

        • By making a negative case aimed at disproving the evidence you gave for the existence of objective moral values, am I not making a case against moral objectivity? Or do you have other evidences for the existence of objective moral values which I haven't yet disproved?

          [I'm asking why erstwhile and self-professed moral relativists are so vehement in their moral condemnations despite their disbelief in moral objectivity.]

          Are you saying that Craig's moral objectivity, which is based on the moral dictates of a deity, is the only thing that can allow people to make vehement moral condemnations?

          • 1. They're not my theories per se (my pet moral theory is Divine Command Theory), but there are a lot of other moral theories that are compatible (or even presuppose) moral realism. In a sense, in disproving my theory, you're only disproving my theory. It may well be the case that moral objectivity is still true, just not the way I construed it to be. Remember, absence of evidence is not evidence of absence. Merely disproving all existing evidence is insufficient to show the non-existence of some object x, a positive case is also necessary.

            You know this. 🙂

            2. I'm saying that it's necessary to presuppose moral objectivity (i.e. moral facts exist) to make moral statements. After all, if nothing is moral, how are you supposed to make moral condemnations?

          • 1. Then in that case you might as well say that since the existence of fairies has not been disproved, it may well be the case that fairies exist, just not the way the fairytale books portray them to be.

            2. I disagree, that is, if we're using Craig's definition of moral objectivity (existing even if all humans are exterminated or brainwashed). Let me quote the words of Michael Shermer, not as authority, but as a concise expression of what I have in mind:

            "The moral sense, (the psychological feeling of doing "good" in the form of positive emotions such as righteousness and pride) evolved out of behaviors that were selected for because they were good either for the individual or for the group; an immoral sense (the psychological feeling of doing "bad" in the form of negative emotions such as guilt and shame) evolved out of behaviors that were selected for because they were bad either for the individual or group. While cultures may differ on what behaviors are defined as good or bad, the moral sense of feeling good or feeling bad about behavior X (whatever X may be) is an evolved human universal."

          • 1. The reason no one (seriously) believes in fairies is because a positive case can be erected against the existence of fairies. For example, were fairies to exist, we would expect to find (blank), but we do not find (blank), therefore we may be warranted in thinking that fairies do not exist. Substitute (blank) for:

            a. little fairy clothes
            b. reports of fairy sightings
            c. fairy habitats
            d. etc, etc

            2. I've moved on from Craig, to be frank. He's far from the best when it comes to defending Divine Command Theory though when it comes to the Cosmological Argument (Kalam), there's none better. In any case, for Michael Shermer's definition (and yours), I need a positive case for why you think moral beliefs are reducible to psychological and sociological impulses with no extramental correlate in the real world.

            Now, if asked for a positive case for my own moral realism, I'd be happy to oblige should you wish it.

          • 1. Really? What if I told you that fairies are spiritual beings (hence, no need for (a) little fairy clothes and (c) fairy habitats) but can choose to show themselves to certain people at certain times (hence, the lack of (b) reports of fairy sightings does not allow for the conclusions that fairies don't exist)?

            2. You forgot to mention impulses formed by hundreds of thousands of years of evolution. A positive case was already made by Shermer, which I quoted in my previous comment..

            [Now, if asked for a positive case for my own moral realism, I'd be happy to oblige should you wish it.]

            Be my guest. I suggest post it on the forum where you'll have enough space. 🙂

          • 1. I will then ask for what properties do these fairies, in fact, have. Do they fly, eat, drink, speak, etc, etc. I need to know why he thinks fairies are incorporeal (spiritual was the wrong word) and what are his reasons for thinking that they only show themselves within certain contexts (and what these contexts are).

            Based on his answers, you can hit him again with (blanks).

            2. No, no positive case was erected. Basically, what Shermer gives us is an alternative explanation for what morals are (i.e. merely psychological and sociological impulses hardwired by evolution) but he doesn't give us any reasons why we should think that this is the case.

            P.S. About DCT, later when I get home.

          • 1. What if someone says that one moment he saw a little person, about an inch tall, with wings. He says he tried to touch it but his finger just went through the image as if it was a hologram, then the next moment it was gone. Can you prove that what he saw was a mere product of his wild imagination?

            2. Actually, Shermer gives us a lot of reasons to think that this is the case, but unfortunately he wrote them in an entire book, The Science of Good and Evil. Tell you what, give me some time – a lot of time – to finish reading the book and I will try to summarize the key points in one short article. Fair enough? 🙂

          • 1. That makes it easier actually. From what I can gleam, it's a single incident with a single witness. That gives me plenty to work with for a hallucination case.

            Follow-up questions would probably be: was he intoxicated? Medicated? Depressed? Where did the incident occur? Was there anything about the area that might be apt to produce a hallucination (say a desert)? Were there animals in the area that plausibly resembled what he saw?

            Still though, if he actually saw it, he may well already be justified (i.e. warranted) in believing that fairies exist.

            2. Fair enough. 🙂

          • Innerminds, sorry for butting-in in your discussion with XIII, but you do realize that what you've just quoted from Shermer only proves my point about morality being an illusion on naturalism, right?

            Ponder on Hick's thought experiment of an ant endowed with knowledge of socio-biological pressures. The pressure it feels towards self-immolation for the sake of the colony is a trick fashioned by evolution to give the colony better odds for survival. To put it in another way: you agree morality comes from nature, while agreeing nature is amoral. What gives?

          • [you agree morality comes from nature, while agreeing nature is amoral.]

            A naturalist also believes that life emerged out of non-life, so it's really no surprise that a naturalist believes that while nature may be amoral, it shaped our morality – even if it's just a trick fashioned by natural selection for our survival. Let me quote some more of Shermer:

            "whether there is a God or not is irrelevant to the theory [of moral naturalism] because in science our approach is a naturalistic one – all effects have natural causes subject to scientific analysis. Since I am a nontheist, my assumption is that the moral sense in humans and moral principles in human cultures are the result of laws of nature, forces of culture, and the unique pathways of history; theists who embrace the findings of science may assume that God created and utilized the laws of nature and forces of culture to generate within humans a moral sense and within human cultures moral principles."

            As a theist, do you agree with Shermer that God worked through the laws of nature, which he created, to generate our moral sense, or are you thinking more along the lines of God directly implanting to our psyche – our souls – this moral sense through telepathy or some divine/supernatural means?

          • Yes, naturalists believe all that while denying morality is an illusion. So thanks for conceding it's a 'trick' 😀

            No, I don't agree with Shermer that "God worked through the laws". It's likely that some parts of morality come from nature, in that they have adaptive quality. Natural aversions, like the one we have for incestual relationships, I think would be an example. So I'll take the second route.

            [edited my typo]

          • If you believe that some parts of morality come from nature, like our aversion for incestual relationships, are you saying that these parts are just illusions of morality too, since nature is amoral?

            [So I'll take the second route. ]

            Do you mean to say that God directly implanted morality into our psyche/souls through telepathy or some divine/supernatural means?

          • Not telepathy. That's pseudo-sceince. God coded conscience in human DNA and passed from parent to offspring. There are mutations in the sequence of DNA resulting in variations. From time to time, there are conscience DNAs that are perfect and if these embryos develop into viable human beings, they eventually join the Catholic clergy. This is technically called Follow The Calling hypothesis. Further, we call the perfect conscience DNA as Morally Uprightness. These morally upright individuals are more likely favored by Natural Selection to acquire SUVs in morally upright means, of course.

          • Yes they would be illusions in that there is only pressure towards them for their adaptive quality. The age of consent for women in Britian during the 1500's (might be wrong about the time) was 10. We would think this to be immoral when projecting our 21st century morality, but it actually wasn't considering women back then were lucky if able to reach 40 years old. I've no doubt that a lot of our morality has been shaped by our biology and –in the last example– culture.

            On your second question, since I'm a dualist of some sort, then yes that's what I believe. How He did it, whether implanted "through telepathy" or what have you, I don't know.

  5. The contention is, of course, your definition of 'objective' which most philosophers take to mean 'mind-independent'. A fact is objective if it's truth or falsity is independent of anybody's opinions. For example, it is an objective fact that the earth revolves around the sun (heliocentric) even if the predominant opinion on Earth was that it was the sun that revolved around the earth (geocentrism).

    You, yourself, innerminds, give credence to this definition by your very wording:

    "The physical world applies to everyone and everything regardless of their sense capabilities and even whether they are sentient or not. For example, a blind zebra and a deaf bat will both hit a tree standing in their paths, and even the unconscious wind will have to blow around that tree. Lack of perception does not exempt anyone or anything from the reality of the physical world."

    With just one added correction. The lack of the perception of touch would preclude you from apprehending the existence of the tree by bumping on it. Thus, your epistemology still does not furnish us with an objective moral basis for the affirmation of our moral systems.

    • [With just one added correction. The lack of the perception of touch would preclude you from apprehending the existence of the tree by bumping on it.]

      Does the wind have a perception of touch – or any perception or even sentience for that matter? Still, the wind's lack of perception and sentience does not exempt it from the existence of the tree.
      Hey, the forum is up again. You might want to try it. I miss debating with you. 🙂

      [Thus, your epistemology still does not furnish us with an objective moral basis for the affirmation of our moral systems.]

      If you read the title again, it says, "The closest thing to objective moral values."

      Hey, have you read the article "Do objective moral values exist?" I mentioned your name in it. 🙂 https://filipinofreethinkers.org/2011/04/08/do-obj

      • Well, the wind doesn't have an opinion, you see. 😀

        The forum is up again? Cheers! That's very good news. I'll go read that other article now.

          • Remember, that I defined objective as being mind-independent, that is to say, it's truth or falsity is independent of anybody's opinion. Being that the wind is neither sentient nor conscious, mentioning it wasn't really relevant to our discussion.

          • I'm confused. We both agree that objective means mind-independent, and we both agree that the wind does not have a mind. I have shown that the objective reality of the tree is applicable to the mindless wind, which has to blow around the tree standing on its way even if the wind cannot perceive the existence of the tree. How is this not relevant to our discussion?

          • Because it was a distinction without a difference. Of course, we agree that the reality of the tree bears out it's reality in a way that can affect the mindless wind. That was never the issue given that the mindless wind (by virtue of it's being mindless) isn't pondering the metaphysical question of whether or not the things that it perceives are real or merely illusory. (Whoa, what a mouthful.)

            Perhaps, were the wind actually sentient (ala The Alchemist), the distinction could have had some purchase. But as things stand, it merely detracts from the issue.

          • Why are we even talking about whether or not the wind is "pondering the metaphysical question of whether or not the things that it perceives are real or merely illusory" here? The point is, the physical reality of the tree affects the movement of the mindless wind. If that's not objective, I don't know what is.

          • The wind wasn't relevant at all because it's neither sentient nor conscious. The pertinent question, it seems to me, was whether or not the world we perceive is, in fact, real and not illusory. (Remember, we asked whether moral values and duties were facts about reality or illusions foisted by the evolutionary process.)

            How exactly would the wind be relevant to that?

          • Ah, I think I see your point. Well, the point of my article is that while we cannot rule out the possibility that we're just living in the Matrix, such possibilities come cheap and to doubt the existence of objective reality entails a brain-in-a-vat level of skepticism. However, such skepticism is not needed at all to doubt the existence of objective moral values. Like I said in the article, "the key difference between moral values and the physical world lies not in the perception but in the applicability…Moral values apply only to the acts of those who are able to perceive moral values in the first place. Non-human animals do not commit murder when they kill other sentient beings, and even young children and mentally disabled adults are often excused from certain moral duties. It is only the mentally-fit humans who perceive moral values, and it is only the mentally-fit humans to whom these values apply, making moral values doubly dependent on perception. How then, can we call such values objective with the same confidence that we say that the physical world is objective?"

  6. [The point was that we both don't have the rule book. But I believe the rules exist, and you don't.]

    What a Kafkaesque universe you live in, my friend. There's a rule book, although you do not completely know what it says, and yet you and all of your fellow humans are to be judged according to this rule book? What kind of referee does this universe have? (This reminds me so much of Kafka's "The Castle" and "The Great Wall of China".) If no one has the rule book except God himself, then why should he judge us according to its rules? Should he not first allow us to evolve better brains so that we will perfectly understand his will before he expects us to follow it?

    And notice that all that, you still have the guts to call our moral beliefs absurd. What self-contradiction!

    • Buddy, if I may, can we limit our discussion to one comment block? I noticed that you answer one comment of mine with answers spread out in different blocks. Just so it will be easier, as you know it can get quite tedious here. Hopefully we could continue this in the forum once it's up.

      • [Buddy, if I may, can we limit our discussion to one comment block?]

        I wholeheartedly agree. Reading our comments here is starting to tire me. (Notice my sudden silence.)

        I guess we could continue this very interesting discussion some other time, using a more convenient medium, of course.

        And also, I have started a short essay that I think would interest you. I'll try to finish it next weekend. It's about a scientifically-informed morality. In that essay I will argue that a morality founded on scientific knowledge is not, as you so often argue (and to my irritation), relativist, but is in fact objective. In other words, in a moral system that is built using the knowledge gleaned from science, the rules are not illusory (unless you would want to argue that scientific facts are illusory).

        • I'll read your article, kindly point it out to me once it's done.

          No, I'm not arguing scientific facts are illusory. Neither am I saying there isn't a calculus that can be followed to gauge the morality of certain acts. One can be a utilitarian, calculate the utility of each act, and say with some precision whether one act could be considered more moral than another –ofcourse some utilitarian philosophy has to be assumed first. That's not what I'm saying.

          I'm saying that a morality *relative* to how we've evolved, and are going to evolve would be exactly that — relative. It is non-objective. We could have thought experiments on how evolution could have moved in another direction and so forth. So the morality that I think you're claiming to be objective, is in fact objective only to how we've already evolved –Harris's argument. From a naturalist's perspective, It is an illusion in the sense that we find some acts to be good not because they are in fact good –there is no objective value to any act– but because, on average, such acts conduce to our specie's having evolutionary advantage.

          • [From a naturalist's perspective, It is an illusion in the sense that we find some acts to be good not because they are in fact good –there is no objective value to any act– but because, on average, such acts conduce to our specie's having evolutionary advantage.]

            Sorry, but I can't resist. Remember when I assumed that your moral system is oppressive? This is the reason why. A moral system that is divorced from our biological nature and our evolutionary history cannot be humane. And I cannot see the link between a morality's dependence on our evolutionary history and its being relativist. Your premise and your conclusion are simply unconnected. (Just because you used the word 'relative' as in "relative to our evolution" doesn't mean you can extend it to 'relative' as in "your moral system is relative". That line of reasoning is plain nutty.)

          • [A moral system that is divorced from our biological nature and our evolutionary history cannot be humane.]

            — Of course. But you're talking about epistemology not ontology. I'm saying your system lacks ontology.

            [And I cannot see the link between a morality's dependence on our evolutionary history and its being relativist. Your premise and your conclusion are simply unconnected.]

            — So say you, without any argument it seems. All that chest beating and foot stomping in no way invalidates what I said, and what should seem intuitively obvious, that it is *relative* to how we've evolved and how we're going to evolve. You're saying it's objective, well objective to what? To how we've already evolved? And by what calculus? Evolution, you agree, can go so many different ways, right? It seems to me, without violating the principle of charity here, describing it as relative would be more apt.

          • [So say you, without any argument it seems. All that chest beating and foot stomping in no way invalidates what I said, and what should seem intuitively obvious, that it is *relative* to how we've evolved and how we're going to evolve.]

            Your logical leaps and gymnastics impress me.

            But for your sake I have to point out how stupid this word game you are playing. The sense of the word relative in the phrase "our morality is relative to our evolutionary history" is different from its sense "not objective". The fact that you are using the same word does not prove your point. Two words can have completely different senses, and sense, as you would know, is more than half of meaning.

            Let me give you a good example: Our biped nature is "relative" to our evolutionary history. But is the fact of our bipedalism a relative fact? In short, is our bipedalism not objective?

            See how nutty your argument is? If one extends your absurd argument to my example, human bipedalism is thus "relative" in the sense of not being objective. But is it? See, I just demolished your point right there.

          • I don't think you demolished anything.

            I already obviated this kind of response, if you cared to look, by saying the only way you can argue for objectivity is by saying it is objective to how we've already evolved. The problem is, evolution, on naturalism, is for the most part random. I don't know how many times I would have to say this for you to understand, but it's worth another shot: evolution can go so many different ways. We can have thought experiments about aliens having evolved differently hence could hold completely different moral systems. Therefore, there is no objective moral value in any act, it is dependent on how the actors have evolved therefore it is relative to who's acting or what his circumstance is.

            The fact of bipedalism only has value to those who need to be bipedal. Those who need to walk on fours would not (at least ostensibly) value bipedalism, making the value of bipedalism relative to whoever is opining.

            Perhaps my mistake was that I hadn't stressed on the word 'value' at all. Craig's argument is and has always been "without God, there are no objective moral values".

            A moral decision is a value choice. The actor is choosing to do that which has value. The objective fact of the choice doesn't make the moral value of the act, itself, objective, since value will always be subjective to the value giver.

            You really ought to get it by now.

          • [You really ought to get it by now.]

            Yes, I should get it by know because, at long last, you decided to quit your word-juggling and have actually started making sense.

            [I don't know how many times I would have to say this for you to understand, but it's worth another shot: evolution can go so many different ways.]

            Duh. Did I ever disagree with this? See my comments downstairs (several stories down). I have already addressed this issue there.

          • You are actually the one guilty of chest beating and foot stomping: your argument is plain silly and yet you think for all the world that it is completely reasonable, and then you deride me for seeing it for what it is — an empty argument, a fallacious line of reasoning. (See bipedalism refutation above.)

            Yes, my morality is "relative" to our evolutionary history, but it does not make it non-objective. That's my point, plain and simple. Let me build on my bipedalism analogy. We could have evolved other wise, sure. We could have been sea dwellers and could have owned fins instead of legs, but that does not make our owning four limbs and our walking on two legs standing upright non-objective. In the same way, a humane morality is dependent on our evolutionary history, but that does not make it non-objective.

            Ok, let me challenge you this way: try refuting my point using the word "non-objective" instead of "relative". Then you'll see how hollow your argument was right from the start. It was mere word juggling on your part, to be completely honest. I never thought you would become so desperate.

          • Geez. You're saying morality is objective insofar as it actually exists; insofar as there are actual moral acts going on.

            Then you accuse me of wordplay. Nice.

            Let me unpack your nonsense for you.

            'killing babies for fun' is bad, why? Why is it bad?
            (I'm not trying to be facetious, this will illuminate you on why you are wrong)

          • I have already addressed this elsewhere. See comments below.

            Also, see comment immediately below.

          • An accidental fact is still a fact. A fact's being non-necessary does not imply its being non-objective.

            So there, I summed up where we disagree. (At last, we're free from your "relative" word-juggling nonsense!) You think morality should be necessary, so that even if we evolved otherwise the same morality would apply to us. That is why I believe your morality is inferior: it's like setting the rules without regard to who the players will be. Such rules are bound to be cruel and inconsiderate to the players.

            Now I, on the other hand, think that some important facts of our morality is accidental to our evolution, while at the same time believing that there will be commonalities between all conscious beings everywhere in the universe that will be the basis of an all-encompassing morality. That in no way implies the non-objectivity of my moral system.

            You may call my moral system inferior to yours. But that's just your opinion. However, when you call my moral system non-objective, then you are asserting something that is plainly false.

          • [An accidental fact is still a fact. A fact's being non-necessary does not imply its being non-objective. ]

            — "Necessary" here will mean it's value content. Yes, it's value would be non-objective, as I explained above. The fact of it's existing, or actually taking place and producing a measurable effect, HAS NOTHING TO DO WITH IT'S VALUE.

            [So there, I summed up where we disagree. (At last, we're free from your "relative" word-juggling nonsense!)]

            — There was no word-juggling, just narrow mindedness on your part. You really ought to have been familiar with the argument. My mistake was in over-estimating your knowledge.

            [That is why I believe your morality is inferior: it's like setting the rules without regard to who the players will be. Such rules are bound to be cruel and inconsiderate to the players. ]

            — No. In my worldview, God has set the rules. Who are you to say that God (you have to assume he exists for the sake of argument, ofcourse) wouldn't have any regard for who the players would be?

            [Such rules are bound to be cruel and inconsiderate to the players]

            — "cruel" and "inconsiderate" are value judgements that have no ontological base on your worldview. Hello, is-ought gap, hello? For our hypothetical aliens, who could have evolved differently, they may not be so "cruel and inconsiderate".

            [while at the same time believing that there will be commonalities between all conscious beings everywhere in the universe that will be the basis of an all-encompassing morality.]

            — So you keep saying. I have yet to hear valid reasons for believing this. I believe we can get wild with thought experiments and quash this notion of yours (example would be what I said above).

            [You may call my moral system inferior to yours. But that's just your opinion. However, when you call my moral system non-objective, then you are asserting something that is plainly false.]

            — No, your "moral system" is not inferior to mine. We probably believe in the same things with respect to morality. We probably both believe that torturing babies would be bad, and so forth. We probably have the same moral system. The difference is, mine has an ontological base. Yours, not so much.

            [However, when you call my moral system non-objective, then you are asserting something that is plainly false.]

            — Objective moral values don't exist in your worldview. If, despite this fact, you still believe you are correct in describing your naturalistic morality as objective, then that's up to you.

          • You may also find my other replies to your weeks-old comments interesting, although I will try to resist the urge to reply back. To be honest, this discussion is starting to get stale. Perhaps its interestingness can be revived some other time, but that time is not now.

  7. [The point was that we both don't have the rule book. But I believe the rules exist, and you don't.]

    And since you don't have the rulebook, you decide to make it up as you go along, it seems.

  8. This is the morality have I been outlining in my previous comments. Do I need to connect the dots for you? If so, here it goes: A scientific morality is one that recognizes the intimate link between our scientific understanding of human nature (which is always incomplete) and the validity of a moral system. A scientific morality is an objective moral system, so that statements like "Slavery is immoral" or "Plagiarism is unethical" are objectively true. However, moral statements in this system are not absolutely true; that is, they are not supposed to hold the same logical status as "The square root of 2 cannot be written as the quotient of two integers" or "(if p then q) and (p) therefore q" [modus ponens]. Rather, their philosophical standing is the same as that of scientific statements or inductive generalizations like "For an ideal gas, pressure and volume are inversely proportional" or "The sun will rise in the east tomorrow". In this moral system, there is therefore a room for perpetual improvement.

    • You are describing a 'science of morality' not a 'scientific morality'.

      A scientific morality is an objective moral system, so that statements like "Slavery is immoral" or "Plagiarism is unethical" are objectively true. However, moral statements in this system are not absolutely true; that is, they are not supposed to hold the same logical status as "The square root of 2 cannot be written as the quotient of two integers"]

      — The only difference between the two is that the latter can be reduced to a mathematical certainty. The only difference between the statement '1 1 = 2' and 'Socrates was a man that lived' is that the we can have mathematical certainty for the former; but if they are both true, then they are both absolutely true (assuming we can be absolutely true about the existence of Socrates which is arguably impossible).

      Now the problem with a 'Science of Morality' is the is-ought divide. You can say living harmoniously is good, and we should all strive to live harmoniously, but you cannot say people *ought* to live harmoniously. Science can tell us how to live harmoniously, in just the same way it can tell us how to maximize the flourishing of our plants, but it cannot say why we *ought* to live harmoniously. That's the problem, and that's why Harris lost the debate. There is no bridging that divide.

      [edited my typo]

      As for 'scientific morality', I believe there is no such thing.

      • [The only difference between the two is that the latter can be reduced to a mathematical certainty. The only difference between the statement '1 1 = 2' and 'Socrates was a man that lived' is that the we can have mathematical certainty for the former; but if they are both true, then they are both absolutely true (assuming we can be absolutely true about the existence of Socrates which is arguably impossible).]

        I agree with everything you said except the one that goes "then they are both absolutely true." What is this absolute truth you speak of? If there's no difference between an objective morality and an absolutist morality, then count me as an absolutist! My only problem is that for me, there is a big difference between the two, and I have argued for this at length. Since I don't believe that moral statement should be ABSOLUTELY certain in order for them to be VALID, and that a moral system does not need to be relativist in order for it to be not absolutist, then no, I am not a moral absolutist. However, I believe in objective moral values, and such objective moral values spring from science.

        In anticipation to your expected reply to this, let's look at a related statement of yours:

        [You can say living harmoniously is good, and we should all strive to live harmoniously, but you cannot say people *ought* to live harmoniously.]

        Oops, you did it again. Since you forced me to do so, let me throw the question back to you: So why should I — or for that matter anyone — *ought* to follow a moral system handed down by the creator of the universe? Even if I believe in the existence of a personal God, I could still challenge his moral system in the same way many characters in the Bible did.

        There is an obvious answer to my question, of course: What kind of stupid person will question that perfection, let alone validity, of a moral system authored by the omniscient, disembodied consciousness many people call God?

        In the same way, there is an obvious answer to the absurdity you so religiously parrot: What kind of stupid person won't want to live harmoniously?

        The so-called is-out gap can be bridged by simple common sense. Only armchair philosophers who insist everything must be absolutely true will find a Ginnungagap where there is none.

  9. [By the time of their destruction, Canaanite culture was, in fact, debauched and cruel, embracing such practices as ritual prostitution and even child sacrifice. ]

    So God wanted them destroyed because they had child sacrifice. The man must really hate competition, doesn't he?

    Genesis 22:1-18
    "Take your son, your only son – yes, Isaac, whom you love so much – and go to the land of Moriah. Sacrifice him there as a burnt offering on one of the mountains, which I will point out to you."

    And while you will probably argue that God didn't intend to actually have Abraham kill his son, Abe didn't know that. He worked under the full premise of killing his own child out of a sense of devotion if it ever came to that.

    And don't even get me started on prostitution:

    Leviticus 25:44-46
    "However, you may purchase male or female slaves from among the foreigners who live among you. You may also purchase the children of such resident foreigners, including those who have been born in your land. You may treat them as your property, passing them on to your children as a permanent inheritance. You may treat your slaves like this, but the people of Israel, your relatives, must never be treated this way. "

    • I'm not about to take you on in another of your tangents. I'm not a biblical inerrantist.

      This is exactly like when I said Berlinski, insofar as what's written about him, is an agnostic, then it ended up with you accusing me of defending ID and "distancing ID from creationism".

      Notice your tangents.

  10. [By the time of their destruction, Canaanite culture was, in fact, debauched and cruel, embracing such practices as ritual prostitution and even child sacrifice.

    Or this:

    God’s grace is extended to those who die in infancy or as small children, the death of these children was actually their salvation.]

    So because these kids grew up in a crapsack society, God decided that killing them was a better idea than, I dunno, raising them in a loving home?

    Miguel, stop being a fucking moron. To cite an example, when a kid is found in an abusive home that raises him improperly, he doesn't get executed. He gets raised by a foster family.

    And if you've noticed, the quotes you cite only drive home my original point earlier – God condoned genocide of a people, down to their kids and infants.

    • What on earth are you talking about? Wouldn't you think that a guard at Auschwitz, who was able to make lampshades out of human skin, would have been better off dying before getting to that point? You don't think that it would have been better if Dahmer had been killed before he devolved into being the serial killer he was? That's the point.

      And don't make the mistake of projecting your 21st century morality to the people of that time. There were no foster homes back then. A thief back then had to be punished severely because that was the best way to disincentivize stealing. Now things are different; locking up someone for a couple of years would work. If ancient people locked up their thieves and murderers with a roof and a bed and gave them 3 square meals a day, everyone would commit crime. The point is that the times were different.

      [And if you've noticed, the quotes you cite only drive home my original point earlier – God condoned genocide of a people, down to their kids and infants.]

      I've never tried to dispute this, insofar as what the text says. What the contention is about are the reasons for it.

      • And what evidence do you have that these kids committed any sort of wrong?

        That they were thieves, murderers, and rapists, or that they were going to become their generation's next batch of cutthroats?

        None.

        The only crime they have been accused of at this point is being part of what the Israelites accused of being a "corrupt" culture, and because of their bloodline, they were put to the sword much like their parents.

        And btw, since you mentioned Auschwitz, can I assume you're throwing in the towel, by virtue of Godwin's Law?

        • Obviously there won't be any evidence that these kids "committed any sort of wrong", because they died before they were able to. Their way of life; their society was conducive for them to be eventually committing all sorts of wrong. This is why Craig argues (not only in what you gave a link for, but also in his other writings) that they were better off dying before having reached that point. If you have an issue with his argument, then take it up with him; all I'm saying is that they weren't killed solely in virtue of their being Canaanites.

          And, geez, Godwin's law? I was debating innerminds sometime ago, and I said that very same thing. He responded something akin to "what the hell does Godwin's law have to do with anything?". So allow me to retort in the same way: Twin, what the frigging hell does that have to do with anything?

          • [Obviously there won't be any evidence that these kids "committed any sort of wrong", because they died before they were able to. ]

            In short, they were killed based on a suspicion, sans any hard evidence of any wrongdoing. I'm just glad you're not in law enforcement, though you'll a lovely place in Dubya's Pentagon staff.

            [Their way of life; their society was conducive for them to be eventually committing all sorts of wrong.]

            I could argue the same of the Israelis – they condoned slavery, and yet I don't see god giving them any flak for that, or their treatment of rape victims.

            Deuteronomy 22:28-29
            "If a man find a damsel [that is] a virgin, which is not betrothed, and lay hold on her, and lie with her, and they be found; Then the man that lay with her shall give unto the damsel's father fifty [shekels] of silver, and she shall be his wife; because he hath humbled her, he may not put her away all his days."

            [This is why Craig argues (not only in what you gave a link for, but also in his other writings) that they were better off dying before having reached that point. If you have an issue with his argument, then take it up with him; all I'm saying is that they weren't killed solely in virtue of their being Canaanites. ]

            What a wonderful bit of reasoning you have Miguel. So let's put that apply it, shall we? Instead of putting kids who were taken away by social services from violent families into foster homes, why don't we just save everybody the trouble, and off them.

            Their exposure to such a violent culture will possibly corrupt the spiritual well-being of the new family after all.

            That, in a nutshell, is basically what Craig claims about justifying the slaughter of Canaanite children. Murder veiled under the guise of righteousness is still murder.

            Imams who condone the killing of non-Muslims who've never hurt them are no different. Bigots who kill people because they think homosexuality is an abomination, and despite the victim having done no wrong, are no different from the god presented here.

            Except that at least they did the killing with their own hands. God – for all his powers of creation and destruction – leaves the dirty work to his chosen people.

            [And, geez, Godwin's law? I was debating innerminds sometime ago, and I said that very same thing. He responded something akin to "what the hell does Godwin's law have to do with anything?". So allow me to retort in the same way: Twin, what the frigging hell does that have to do with anything? ]

            My bad then. Since we are talking about genocide, references to Nazism would probably be valid. Of course, that doesn't change the fact that you made the baseless claim that a kid will possibly become that guard, without presenting every possible factor in his life that will have a direct influencein him taking that life course.

            You're not a fucking precog.

          • Notice that I said I'm not setting myself out to defend Craig's argument.

            But what the heck, since the hole in your logic can easily be pointed out, I might as well indulge:

            If you are going to say that Craig's God is immoral, then you will have to grant, for the sake of argument, that it exists. The corollary is that you'll also have to grant his Omniscience and all those other "omis". Given that, if Craig's God said that they will be turning into, like our example, Dahmer's and Hitlers, and thus are better off being dead before getting to that point, then my analogy stands.

            The reason why we can say that people are immoral for using this same reason in murdering others is that we know they are NOT omniscient.

            That was put as tersely as possible because it's getting tight here in this comment section.

          • Craig's own reasoning shoots itself in the foot with one of his further lines:

            //God had morally sufficient reasons for His judgement upon Canaan, and Israel was merely the instrument of His justice, just as centuries later God would use the pagan nations of Assyria and Babylon to judge Israel//

            Craig is referring to the Assyrian destruction of Israel in 722 B.C.

            Assuming that this god exists, and that he is "pmni", the problem lies then that in he is clearly biased.

            You yourself have stated that he could already predict the outcome of the Canaanites children, and that they would become a wicked people, and that their death would only be a prevention of their predetermined future.

            My question to you is this: If this God could, as Craig says, predict that his own chosen people could become wicked, and would eventually judge them, why didn't he do so before they started committing these acts of genocide, or before it got out of hand?

          • Again, as brief as possible (intense debate sucks, why the heck does it get tighter and tighter on the way down.).

            I don't know what Craig would argue, but in my reading of other apologists, one answer could be: God was merciful to the Israelites for some reason, maybe he had a plan. To judge God because of his having been merciful on others is to be envious of the mercy he has shown. God is just and merciful, and can be just or merciful as he sees fit. Lucky for the Israelites, he judged them mercifully.

          • [To judge God because of his having been merciful on others is to be envious of the mercy he has shown. ]

            No, that would be envy, that would be pointing out a clear bias. If god was truly merciful and omniscient, he would have found so many alternatives to handling the Canaanites, none of which would have involved bloodshed. Instead, we end up with a sad tale in a Jewish tome that somehow manages to explain to people that what the early Irsaelites committed was okay because God gave them the thumbs up. How bloody convenient.

          • What I meant on the 'mercy' thing was that the Canaanites would have been wrong if they said God was being biased in judging the israelites mercifully because they got their justice and its upto God if he chooses to dispense mercy on others.

            [If god was truly merciful and omniscient, he would have found so many alternatives to handling the Canaanites]

            — Ah, but he's not only merciful and omniscient, he's also *just*.

          • So to you killing Osama Bin Laden is first degree murder. O.K. And I will ask you nicely to refrain from cussing me.

          • [And I will ask you nicely to refrain from cussing me. ] And you will get no such courtesy, dickwad. We are talking about innocent children being murdered here, not a terrorist who has been found guilty of killing over 5,000 people. Learn to tell the difference.

          • I wasn't expecting any. And my hitler-dahmer analogy already dealt with your point about the children. I was talking about the adult Canaanites.

          • [I was talking about the adult Canaanites. ] Now you are sidestepping.

            You said it yourself earlier:
            [[Obviously there won't be any evidence that these kids "committed any sort of wrong", because they died before they were able to.] Our discussion up until this point was regarding the justification that god had them killed because he could predict what they would become. You do not get to shift topics again like you did regarding our morality argument, you slippery little dipshit.

          • Actually, no. Read up, and you'll find that the discussion has devolved into you asking this: "My question to you is this: If this God could, as Craig says, predict that his own chosen people could become wicked, and would eventually judge them, why didn't he do so before they started committing these acts of genocide, or before it got out of hand?

            Who committed the acts of genocide? The children israelites? No, the adult israelites! So who should we necessarily be comparing them to? The adult Canaanites.

            You're so stupid.

  11. [Look man, this is another tangent. I'm not here to defend everything Craig says or does, you can take that up with him. You're forgetting that I was simply accusing you of oversimplifying what he said to make him sound more ridiculous. ]

    And I think you just have a reading comprehension problem. Don't blame that on me, dumkoff.

    • You could at least show me what I've misconstrued. But obviously, I doubt you'd be able to, because it is now being obvious that this is what you always opt to say when you are scarcely able formulate an argument.

      I said you were going off on another weird tangent by arguing I'll be called "a klansman or worse", and that we had a "wealth of history showing this sort of thinly veiled atrocity being conducted on other communities that were put under the sword." when you interpreted what I said to mean that the demarcation of their races by God was "good". The big frigging problem is THAT'S NOT what I said; that's what you *thought* Craig said. And even if Craig did say that, it is irrelevant to the discussion of your oversimplification of Craig's argument.

      I'm not about to follow up on another of your tangents. Any sufficiently intelligent person will be able to see how this thread started; it started by me accusing you of oversimplification. I'm not setting myself out to defend Craig's argument; I'm defending it from your oversimplification. If I am able to show –which I've already been able to– that Craig's original argument isn't fairly encapsulated by what you originally said, then you lose the argument.

      • [And even if Craig did say that, it is irrelevant to the discussion of your oversimplification of Craig's argument. ]

        And as I've also said earlier, I don't think I oversimplified Craig's long drawn-out moral flip-flops on why genocide is justifiable in God's case.

        • So you keep saying. But I have yet to see any refutation of what I've been able to show earlier –your blatant disregard of the very 2 paragraphs that you yourself quoted from Craig. They somehow fail to manifest themselves in that very narrow, simplistic, and populist oversimplified statement of yours

  12. Well thank you, I really was actually humored…by this attempt at refurbishing your original statement for more sense making. My response is above.

    • [by this attempt at refurbishing your original statement for more sense making.] Miguel, I was only quoting my own post, word for word:

      "William Craig justified genocide, explaining that since God commanded it, and that the Canaanites were wicked, the deserved it. That includes killing their women, children, and infants."

      Do remember that anybody can simply look at my previous posts and copy-paste. As compared to you putting words in my mouth by posting this instead:

      "[it's all well and fine] since God commanded it, and that the Canaanites were wicked, the deserved it. That includes killing their women, children, and infants"

      • What kind of red herring is this?

        This is what you said now (above):

        "Basically, because God promises them heaven, it's okay to kill kids, and tells the Israelites to do it. If I commited an error, it is that I made Craig sound more sane then he actually is."

        which is much too different from what you originally said, here:

        William Craig justified genocide, explaining that since God commanded it, and that the Canaanites were wicked, the deserved it. That includes killing their women, children, and infants

        which is exactly the same as what I said you said (my emphasized part is pretty obvious, and any sufficiently intelligent person wouldn't have been confused), here:

        "[it's all well and fine] since God commanded it, and that the Canaanites were wicked, the deserved it. That includes killing their women, children, and infants"

        I'm accusing you of refurbishing what you said to reference the second paragraph you quoted from Craig. Remember what you originally said in no way touches on either of the paragraphs you quoted.

        If you remember, since its quite possible you got lost since this is something that happens rather often with you, I was accusing you of over simplifying what Craig said. Then you quoted him and told me it's the same. Then I showed you that it isn't –as both paragraphs have never been represented in your summation. Why don't you KEEP THIS IN FRAME, so we can avoid another weird tangent –something you seem to be unable to avoid judging from our previous discussions.

        So, what on earth are you talking about.

  13. Huh?! There's no doubt that there is improvement over time, and there could be a lot of areas you can cite which has improved. That doesn't show that we can therefore be comfortable in knowing it will always be an upward slope; that just shows that we can get a lot of things right.

    • [Huh?! There's no doubt that there is improvement over time, and there could be a lot of areas you can cite which has improved.]

      What you fail to notice is that in the examples I cited, one common stumbling block that all of them have is religious opposition. Proposition 8 serves a as a good example of this trend. Our morality regarding these matters improved despite, not because of, religion.

      • Who cares about the examples you cited. They are irrelevant to what I'm saying, which is: there's no reason to believe that morality will always be better than it was a moment ago on account of whatever improvement that's been had. There's no reason to believe that it will always be trending for the better.

        • [Who cares about the examples you cited. ]

          About several hundred thousand gay residents in California, for one thing, a well as several more million members of the LGBT community worldwide that see the removal of Prop 8 as a monumental decision that represents that at least in the case of gay rights, the world is moving in the right direction.

          But I guess you have serious denial issues with evidence against your bullshit, eh?

          Conversely, the only people who seem think that trends like this, alongside feminism, the removal of slavery, and RH rights are evil, are woman-hating imams, homophobic pastors, and conservative priests.

          • Notice that none of what you said has anything to do with what you've originally responded to, which is this statement:

            "[with respect to morality] you assume it "improves itself over time". "

            Showing improvements in morality doesn't show that morality itself will always be trending for the better. You follow up on your own tangents too much.

          • [Showing improvements in morality doesn't show that morality itself will always be trending for the better. ]

            Can you cite a reliable source that can make this prediction with accurate data then? You made the claim, hence you should be ready to substantiate it.

        • Let's review your previous statements, Miguel. Earlier, you said this:

          //But you assume it [morality] "improves itself over time". There's no reason to think this would be the case. Absolutely none.//

          When I posted my examples as a reason to believe that morality does have a tendency improve over time, you slapped them down, and rephrased your statement to this (caps for emphasis)

          //there's no reason to believe that morality will ALWAYS be better than it was a moment ago on account of whatever improvement that's been had.//

          It is funny that you accuse me of being off-tangent when you don't feel like addressing my points, and yet here we have caught you red-handed with an attempt at moving the goalposts.
          http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Moving_the_goalposts

          • Twin, when I said there was no reason to believe that "morality improves itself overtime", I meant human morality as a whole, I didn't mean that there's no reason to believe that improvements can be had. We can improve on many areas –which you've cited– but that doesn't mean that everything will be tending to move forward for the better.

            The reason why I slapped your examples down is because it only shows that there are improvements, it doesn't show that we're always moving towards improvement –which is what mr. Decierdo was implying when he said : "I do not see anything bleak with a morality that improves itself over time".

          • //I meant human morality as a whole, I didn't mean that there's no reason to believe that improvements can be had. We can improve on many areas –which you've cited– but that doesn't mean that everything will be tending to move forward for the better.//

            And as a whole, you can easily see how far it has gotten over the past few centuries. Slavery for example has been progressively been devalued, to the point that it is now criminal.

            Women's rights have also progressed over the years. Where a woman back then was only a property meant for political marriages, she now has the ability to vote, with several laws in place to guarantee her equal treatment at work.

            Racism has also been progressively become less justifiable, as is discrimination against people due to their sexual orientation. Read a fucking history book.

            [The reason why I slapped your examples down is because it only shows that there are improvements, it doesn't show that we're always moving towards improvement –which is what mr. Decierdo was implying when he said : "I do not see anything bleak with a morality that improves itself over time". ]

            Now you're trying to weasel out of your own wording.

            When you said //morality improves itself overtime//, that doesn't necessarily mean it has to be a perfect progression. Indeed it is sawtoothed as you claim it is, but overall, history teaches us that we are human morality overall improves. Not "always," but it is getting there.

            As compared to you second statement, which added "always" after I cited examples that show there is reason to believe that morality is steadily progressing.

            You attempted to shift goal posts.

          • I said: "But you assume it "improves itself over time". "There's no reason to think this would be the case." –I did not mean that it won't improve under any circumstance. The fact that you want to make it seem like that is what I meant is because you have no argument whatsoever, and are attempting to strawman my statement.

            Nobody is moving any "goal posts". You tried to respond by giving examples of morality improving, but that's irrelevant to my point that there's no reason to believe that we can be assured of its continuous improvement.

          • [The fact that you want to make it seem like that is what I meant is because you have no argument whatsoever, and are attempting to strawman my statement. ]

            Not a strawman. More of calling you out for attempting to shift your argument when presented with reasons to believe the contrary.

            [but that's irrelevant to my point that there's no reason to believe that we can be assured of its continuous improvement. ]

            And there you go again, phrasing it as //there's no reason to believe that we can be assured of its continuous improvement. //

            Whereas earlier, when presented with evidence, you switched to the phrase:

            //Showing improvements in morality doesn't show that morality itself will ALWAYS be trending for the better.//

            You're a puss-nutted, limp-dicked liar who has been caught in the open Miguel. Now kindly stop being a shit-brained git, and admit to your fuckup.

          • I told you what I meant. I would never say that, under any circumstance, morality does not improve. That would be very ridiculous. There's not one morality. Some aspects obviously have improved, but that doesn't mean that we can rest assured that the trend is always towards improvement.

            You are straw-manning what I said to be able to attack it better.

            Any mid-wit would have gotten this by now.

          • [ I would never say that, under any circumstance, morality does not improve. That would be very ridiculous.]

            No, you didn't say that. What you said was:

            //there's no reason to believe that we can be assured of its continuous improvement.//

            And when I presented several landmark cases in human society as a whole that that reasons to believe that it does improve, you quietly rephrased it to:

            //Showing improvements in morality doesn't show that morality itself will ALWAYS be trending for the better.//

            Do understand that the meaning between both statements is very different. The former can the be tackled by one simply pointing out that while morality has had its bumps, its overall progress is still upward.

            The latter shuts that out by demanding 100 percent proof, when you know no such thing exists in reality.

            They're two very different arguments.

            So which is it, really? What you have committed is a fallacy of shifting goalposts.

          • Read your first paragraph –which you quoted from me, and then your response to it. And then look at yourself and laugh.

            Then compare the next two things that you quoted from me:

            1. /there's no reason to believe that we can be assured of its continuous improvement (which is what you say I said)

            and

            2 Showing improvements in morality doesn't show that morality itself will ALWAYS be trending for the better.
            (which is what you say I changed it to)

            then notice that they mean exactly the same thing;which is what I've been saying all along; I've rightly downplayed your examples because it doesn't touch my point that there's no reason to believe morality is trending for the better.

            "The former can the be tackled by one simply pointing out that while morality has had its bumps, its overall progress is still upward. "

            — No, it can be tackled by *proving*, not just citing examples, that its overall progress would be upward, notwithstanding the bumps.

            "The latter shuts that out by demanding 100 percent proof, when you know no such thing exists in reality."

            –No, it can be tackled by *proving*, not just citing examples, that its overall progress would be upward, notwithstanding the bumps.

            I will, under no circumstance, be "demanding 100 percent proof" that morality always improves –that's stupid. And that's obviously a weak argument. You want to interpret what I said into that, because it's easier for you to attack, and you can only attack WEAK things.

          • notice that, despite I used the word "always", I also used the word "trend"

            'the general course or prevailing tendency; drift'

            So when you say they mean 2 completely different things, you actually mean "I'm dumb".

          • [So when you say they mean 2 completely different things, you actually mean "I'm dumb". ]

            No. Dishonest.

  14. innerminds,

    you said:

    "And I believe we have what is arguably the closest thing to objective moral values, and that is the objective reasoning of an evolved brain."

    — Then you can never be a moral realist –which is Craig's point — because there is no reason to think that we've stopped evolving. Hence, what we perceive to be morally unacceptable today may change in, say, a hundred years, when we've gone through another evolutionary epoch. In just the same way we can make a persuasive argument that our ancestors, less evolved primates that they are, were completely moral in killing off neighboring tribes for the benefit of their own, there's no reason to think that our sense of morality will not change upon further evolution.

    So, what you call "the closest thing to objective moral values" still seems like a mile away.

    But that's something, I guess, a naturalist would have to accept. And I think you rightly do. My opinion: it sounds very bleak.

    • [Hence, what we perceive to be morally unacceptable today may change in, say, a hundred years, when we've gone through another evolutionary epoch.]

      While that is possible, I think that it would mostly be the other way around: some acts that we perceive to be morally acceptable today may no longer be in the future. For example, today it is still generally acceptable to raise animals in cramped captivity for food. Maybe in a hundred years (or less) it won't be.

      [In just the same way we can make a persuasive argument that our ancestors, less evolved primates that they are, were completely moral in killing off neighboring tribes for the benefit of their own]

      I wouldn't for one moment even try to argue that our less evolved ancestors were completely moral in killing off neighboring tribes for the benefit of their own. The most I would say is that they were, to some degree, amoral, especially our very early ancestors. Besides, I doubt that everyone of them (not just the warriors and the leaders) didn't have qualms about the killings.

      [there's no reason to think that our sense of morality will not change upon further evolution]

      I totally agree. (see my above example on raising animals in captivity)

      [So, what you call "the closest thing to objective moral values" still seems like a mile away.]

      It may be a mile away, but unless there is something else closer than a mile, the objective reasoning of an evolved brain is still the closest thing to objective moral values.

      [But that's something, I guess, a naturalist would have to accept. And I think you rightly do. My opinion: it sounds very bleak.]

      Not as bleak as the entire universe one day ceasing to exist – erasing every record that we once lived. But as a naturalist I have already accepted that. It only makes this life even more precious.

      • innerminds,

        ["I wouldn't for one moment even try to argue that our less evolved ancestors were completely moral in killing off neighboring tribes for the benefit of their own. The most I would say is that they were, to some degree, amoral, especially our very early ancestors. Besides, I doubt that everyone of them (not just the warriors and the leaders) didn't have qualms about the killings."]

        — Well, you may be right. But if we hold Peter Singer's 'expanding circle' explanation of how morality developed, then at some point during our ancestors' lives, there should have been a time when neighboring tribes were seen as beyond their 'circle' and were considered sub-human, or less then whatever they considered themselves to be. We have the same feeling for other animals which we exploit for food source. If morality is whatever maximizes well-being, or helps in flourishing, then our ancestors in their killing off neighboring tribes for just those purposes would have been moral at least from their perspective.

        • [If morality is whatever maximizes well-being, or helps in flourishing]

          I would like to add "of all sentient beings" to that.

          [then our ancestors in their killing off neighboring tribes for just those purposes would have been moral at least from their perspective.]

          Hmmm…interesting point. Let me think about that and get back to you. But for the meantime I have this to say: from our present generation's perspective we are morally justified in exploiting animals in order to provide a reliable food source for the human race. But I doubt if the future, more enlightened generations wouldn't frown at us just as we frown at our murderous ancestors.

    • [Hence, what we perceive to be morally unacceptable today may change in, say, a hundred years, when we've gone through another evolutionary epoch.]

      While that is possible, I think that it would mostly be the other way around: some acts that we perceive to be morally acceptable today may no longer be in the future. For example, today it is still generally acceptable to raise animals in cramped captivity for food. Maybe in a hundred years (or less) it won't be.

      [In just the same way we can make a persuasive argument that our ancestors, less evolved primates that they are, were completely moral in killing off neighboring tribes for the benefit of their own]

      I wouldn't for one moment even try to argue that our less evolved ancestors were completely moral in killing off neighboring tribes for the benefit of their own. The most I would say is that they were, to some degree, amoral, especially our very early ancestors. Besides, I doubt that everyone of them (not just the warriors and the leaders) didn't have qualms about the killings.

      [there's no reason to think that our sense of morality will not change upon further evolution]

      I totally agree. (see my above example on raising animals in captivity)

      [So, what you call "the closest thing to objective moral values" still seems like a mile away.]

      It may be a mile away, but unless there is something else closer than a mile, the objective reasoning of an evolved brain is still the closest thing to objective moral values.

      [But that's something, I guess, a naturalist would have to accept. And I think you rightly do. My opinion: it sounds very bleak.]

      Not as bleak as the entire universe one day ceasing to exist – erasing every record that we once lived. But as a naturalist I have already accepted that. It only makes this life even more precious.

    • [So, what you call "the closest thing to objective moral values" still seems like a mile away. ]

      You are confusing objective moral values with absolute moral values. A truth can be objective without being absolute. The truths of science, for example, are objective without being absolute. And I don't see anything bleak with the fact that the truths of science are provisional. Does the fact that all their theories can be overthrown in the end debilitate scientists? In fact, the provisional nature of scientific facts and theories does not hinder us from judging the scientific truth of a specific claim.

      Science is humanity's best effort to understand the nature of the physical universe it finds itself in. Similarly, for a metaphysical naturalist, morality is humanity's best effort to come up with a system that allows it to exist harmoniously. And as our knowledge of human nature improves, our moral systems will also get better. But this will not morally incapacitate us in the same way that the provisional nature of science does not hamper the scientific enterprise.

      • [You are confusing objective moral values with absolute moral values.]

        — No I'm not. Both words can mean different things, yes, but with respect to moral values, and within the context of the discussion, if something is objectively true than it is absolutely true. Ofcourse before one can know something to be absolutely true, one would has to know absolutely everything about it — which may be impossible, but we don't have to philosophize that far off to understand what is meant by these words in the context they are being used.

        [And I don't see anything bleak with the fact that the truths of science are provisional.]

        — I don't think you know what you're saying here. You say it's O.K. that the truths of science are provisional? They may be incomplete, but they shouldn't be "provisional". A truth is a truth, it cannot be considered true if its truth value is subject to change. Ponder on this statement some more.

        [Does the fact that all their theories can be overthrown in the end debilitate scientists?]

        — If it happens too often, then heuristically, yes. But I'm not one to say that wrong theories renders science useless.

        [ the provisional nature of scientific facts and theories does not hinder us from judging the scientific truth of a specific claim. ]

        — If the scientific fact has a "provisional nature" as you say, then it isn't fact. And if something is a "fact" only for the time being, then yes, that will "hinder us from judging the…specific claim".

        [Science is humanity's best effort to understand the nature of the physical universe it finds itself in. Similarly, for a metaphysical naturalist, morality is humanity's best effort to come up with a system that allows it to exist harmoniously. And as our knowledge of human nature improves, our moral systems will also get better. But this will not morally incapacitate us in the same way that the provisional nature of science does not hamper the scientific enterprise.]

        — A metaphysical naturalist saying we ought to live harmoniously is all well and fine. Problem is, that's a value claim that has no ontological base in a metaphysical naturalist's worldview.

        • […if something is objectively true than it is absolutely true.]

          Obviously false. "All even numbers are divisible by two" is absolutely true and objectively true. However, "The earth is 4.5 billion years old" is objectively true, but not absolutely. To be absolutely true, a statement must be true a priori and in all possible universes. In short, a logical proof is required to show that a statement is absolute true. However, you cannot provide a 'proof' for the latter statement, you can only give evidences for it. And note that a body of evidences merely increases the probability of a statement being true, it does not make it absolutely true. That is the main difference between absolute truth and objective truth. To be absolutely true, it must be CERTAIN. To be objectively true, it must be PROBABLE.

          [You say it's O.K. that the truths of science are provisional? They may be incomplete, but they shouldn't be "provisional". A truth is a truth, it cannot be considered true if its truth value is subject to change. Ponder on this statement some more.]

          I don't want to sound elitist here, but let me ask, are you scientifically trained? Because I find your ignorance of scientific philosophy disturbing. Truth in logic, as established by deductive reasoning through a system of proofs is one thing. Truth in science, as established by scientific induction and a finite body of evidences is another. Do not confuse one with the other.

          So in the context of science, truth is provisional. You cannot just give a statement like "Neanderthals are not ancestors to humans" and say that it is absolutely true and that you are CERTAIN that it will never be proven false. I challenge you to give me a scientific statement (not a mathematical or a logical one) that is not provisionally true. Even the so-called "postulates" of science, ex. conservation of energy, electric field superposition, Heisenberg's uncertainly principle, are provisional.

          Note that to say that the truths of science are provisional is NOT to say that "what is true now is not true later". Rather, it is to always leave room for doubt. This means that scientific statements will NEVER be CERTAIN. However, in an absolutist morality, nearly everything is certain, and that is why it is inferior and that is what differentiates it from an objective, non-absolutist morality.

          Another point that should be noted about scientific truths is that they are mere approximations. For instance, I challenge you to call Newton's mechanics true or false. Obviously, it is neither; the products of inductive reasoning do not follow Aristotle's law of excluded middle. Newton's mechanics is a good approximation of the behavior of the universe in the scale of the everyday, but it fails badly in the microscale (where quantum mechanics rules) and in the macroscale (where general relativity is the best approximation). Call Newtonian mechanics false if you like; engineers will still use it to erect the buildings and to build the bridges we use everyday.

          [A metaphysical naturalist saying we ought to live harmoniously is all well and fine. Problem is, that's a value claim that has no ontological base in a metaphysical naturalist's worldview.]

          You would seriously say this? I mean, you would honestly claim that the goal of harmonious existences has no basis apart from the dictates of a universal, disembodied moral arbiter?

          And your last phrase is false, since it is part of a metaphysical naturalist's worldview that a valid moral system must be based on a scientific understanding of human nature. And in our current understanding of human nature, humans will thrive only in a social system that will provide for them peace, safety and certain amounts of freedom.

          • You might want to quote me in context. Ofcourse something that's objective isn't by definition absolute. And if you read what I said, I've already obviated your response by saying we don't have to philosophize that far off, and further said that in order for anyone to be absolutely certain about something, he would have to know absolutely everything about it –which is arguably impossible for propositions that are not reducible to a mathematical certainty. But in the context of the discussion, we would want something objectively true to be absolutely true –provided all influencing variables remain static. The problem with what you're doing is that anyone can philosophize similarly to the point of absurdity — since, apart from mathematical propositions, nobody can show anything to be absolute, which will render all discussions useless. You can show someone all the evidence in the world, but will find yourself dumbstruck in trying to remove him from his hardcore brain-in-a-vat skepticism.

            Your second paragraph is nothing short of ridiculous. Whether you like it or not, and no matter how you try to hammer the nails that don't need hammering, truth can NEVER be provisional, and scientific truth is no exception. If a proposition's value is true, yet is subject to change, then it couldn't have been true; either there was a mistake somewhere, or some variable itself changed and thus changed it's truth value. If it's true that Napoleon won the battle at waterloo, then he won the battle at waterloo. The truth that Napoleon won that battle CANNOT be provisional. If we find evidence that he in fact lost, then that means HE NEVER WON. Something that is true cannot be false unless a variable or a premise, from which it's 'truth' value is dependent on, somehow changes. Try going to scienceblogs and assert there that the truths of science are provisional; unless people misconstrue what you say to mean that science can get a lot of things wrong, you'll be derided like you really ought to be for making statements like that.

            Your subsequent paragraphs merely harp on your assertion that truth is provisional –which is ridiculous. You then say: "Another point that should be noted about scientific truths is that they are mere approximations." They necessarily should be because if they weren't, then that means we know absolutely everything there is to know about that which was previously being approximated. NONE of this shows that "truths are provisional", all it shows is that we have incomplete information. Again, you are welcome to this kind of brain-in-a-vat skepticism, but you really ought to know that this will render all discussion useless in that you are already accepting from the onset that, apart from mathematical propositions, nobody can be absolutely certain about anything, then there is no nourishment to be had.

            Yes, and I am in fact saying what you think I'm saying, i.e, in a naturalists worldview, moral value judgements have no ontological base. I don't want to sound elitist, but are you really that philosophically illiterate? Because, if not, then you really ought to know that what you've just said renders all those voluminous debates on moral epistemology and ontology rather trivial. This is exactly the point of contention in the Harris-Craig debate –which was what this post was about– and it's exactly why Harris lost the debate. There is an is-ought gap that is un-bridgable on naturalism.

          • [ But in the context of the discussion, we would want something objectively true to be absolutely true –provided all influencing variables remain static.]

            What an utterly useless statement. Will it ever happen that all influencing variables will remain static? If no, what's the point of your argument? What's the point of arguing from an ideal that will never occur in the real world?

            [The problem with what you're doing is that anyone can philosophize similarly to the point of absurdity — since, apart from mathematical propositions, nobody can show anything to be absolute, which will render all discussions useless.]

            How will that render every discussion useless? Follow the argument below:
            1. Are scientific discussions useless? No.
            2. Do scientific statements have the absolute certainty of mathematical statements. Again, no.
            3. Your claim is therefore false. QED.

            The problem with your thinking is that you don't seem to have any working knowledge of the pragmatic nature of scientific reasoning.

            [If we find evidence that he in fact lost, then that means HE NEVER WON.]

            On the metaphysical level, yes. But before we we find evidence that he in fact lost, if our best evidence suggests that he in fact won, then we are warranted to say that he won. We may be wrong metaphysically, but we are nonetheless warranted to make the mistake given the fact the gap in our knowledge. Ever heard of pragmatism a la Quine? Well, science is pragmatic: as long as a statement is consistent with all the other accepted statements believed to be true, a statement should be accepted as true. But since we know that the entire body of present evidence is incomplete and not final, the truth value that we must assign to our statements should be provisional.

            Ok, let me get this straight. What exactly is your definition of 'absolutely true' apart from the definition I was using all along?

            [I don't want to sound elitist, but are you really that philosophically illiterate?]

            I am not philosophically illiterate — it's your philosophy that is fractured.

            Notice that you did not answer my challenge: Is Newtonian mechanics true or false? What truth value will you assign to a statement in Newtonian mechanics statement such as "Force is equal to the product of mass and the derivative of the velocity"?

            [There is an is-ought gap that is un-bridgable on naturalism.]

            That is a very prevalent absurdity, and I should say I'm surprised you're parroting it too. Using the same stupid reasoning that lead to that absurdity, one could just as well argue that there exist a similar is-ought gap in ALL moral systems. In the context of theistic morality, the argument goes as follows:

            1. Morality comes from God, the creator of the universe. (IS)
            2. Why should I follow what God commands me to do? (OUGHT)
            3. Because God is the creator of the universe. (This is an argument from authority: "might makes right".)

            However, you might argue that if your god exist, then I would be stupid not to follow the commands of that omniscient god. That argument is in fact valid, and it bridges the supposed is-ought gap. In the same way, I can argue, with equal validity, that only a very irrational person will not follow a moral system that is based on a scientifically-sound understanding of human nature. See what I did there? Your "un-bridgable is-out gap" bridged within the context of naturalism. And note that I did not use any of the absurd-armchair-philosopher-type argument you seem to be so fond of.

          • [What an utterly useless statement. Will it ever happen that all influencing variables will remain static? If no, what's the point of your argument? What's the point of arguing from an ideal that will never occur in the real world?]

            –It only seems "useless" because you misunderstood it, or you thought I said static to mean 'everything's completely unchanging'. When we do experiments we can only be sure of our conclusions if we are able to replicate the results without changing the variables.

            [How will that render every discussion useless? Follow the argument below:
            1. Are scientific discussions useless? No.
            2. Do scientific statements have the absolute certainty of mathematical statements. Again, no.
            3. Your claim is therefore false. QED. ]

            — Lol. I never said or claimed anything you are listing down here. I said a brain-in-a-vat type of skepticism will render any discussion useless. I don't even know where you got this list.

            [The problem with your thinking is that you don't seem to have any working knowledge of the pragmatic nature of scientific reasoning.]

            — So you keep asserting, while also asserting that scientific truth is provisional. The problem with you is that you keep hammering the nails that don't need hammering to show whatever imaginary hard-won education I presume.

            [But since we know that the entire body of present evidence is incomplete and not final, the truth value that we must assign to our statements should be provisional.]

            — More hammering. No truth is provisional. If you're going to say that its truth value is provisional, that's just a fancy way of saying that we're not sure. If all the evidence points to the conclusion that Napoleon did in fact win, then whether we want to go for the most probable conclusion of Napoleon winning is irrelevant to the truth of whether he did in fact win or not. Saying that Napoleon won because the evidence makes it more probable than its negation is different from saying that the truth of Napoelon winning because of said evidence is provisional. A proposition has a truth value –whether we are able to absolutely ascertain what it is or not– and that truth value IS NOT PROVISIONAL. You' make more sense if you said our 'knowledge' is provisional, but no, you say "scientific truth' is provisional. You're ridiculous.

            [Ok, let me get this straight. What exactly is your definition of 'absolutely true' apart from the definition I was using all along? ]

            — We both know what the right definition is. We both know that we cannot be absolutely certain about anything that's not reducible to mathematical certainty. We can both safely say that it is absolutely true that Jose Rizal was an actual man that lived. Although we cannot prove his existence absolutely –since it isn't reducible to mathematical certainty– we are both warranted in saying that anyone who disbelieves in his existence, despite having been shown the evidence, is a moron. The problem is that this moron can always be a skeptic to the point of absurdity. If this moron asks us that his disbelief in Rizal is warranted in virtue of our complete inability to prove 5 minutes ago did not exist –which makes him right– then it renders all discussion useless; because the fact is that we are just limited in what we can prove.

            [Notice that you did not answer my challenge: Is Newtonian mechanics true or false? ]

            — I didn't answer that because I don't think it's relevant. That's just like asking if it's true or false whether a rock dropped from a building will fall towards the ground –it depends on where in the universe the building and the ground are. Newtonian mechanics is true, the reason why it doesn't work on cosmic scales or at the quantum level is not because it's false, but because the influencing variables on those levels are different.

            [one could just as well argue that there exist a similar is-ought gap in ALL moral systems. In the context of theistic morality, the argument goes as follows:
            1. Morality comes from God, the creator of the universe. (IS)
            2. Why should I follow what God commands me to do? (OUGHT)
            3. Because God is the creator of the universe. (This is an argument from authority: "might makes right".) ]

            — This is the most insane thing ever. I won't even try to correct it, but I'll take what you said: If you say (1) morality comes from God, then if one wants to be moral, then (2) we ought to follow God not because he is the creator of the universe, but because you've already given that (1) morality comes from God.

            See what I did there? Your "un-bridgable is-out gap" bridged within the context of naturalism.]

            — This isn't meant to be condescending, but, me thinks you don't know what the is-ought problem is.

          • [Because, if not, then you really ought to know that what you've just said renders all those voluminous debates on moral epistemology and ontology rather trivial.]

            Much of those voluminous debates are indeed trivial, not to mention useless. There is no "un-bridgeable is-ought" gap. Such a thing is a pathetic, Kantian excuse to pull God out of nowhere.

          • [Much of those voluminous debates are indeed trivial, not to mention useless. There is no "un-bridgeable is-ought" gap. Such a thing is a pathetic, Kantian excuse to pull God out of nowhere.]

            — Riiight. And you bridged it by saying it's irrational not to follow "a moral system that is based on a scientifically-sound understanding of human nature."

            Why does *ought* this irrational person follow your moral system? Because you will deride him as irrational if he doesn't? O.K.

    • I do not see anything bleak with a morality that improves itself over time and that can be adapted to the needs of an evolving species. Would you find it bleak that our country's Constitution is adaptable? What is so inherently superior with a moral system that imprisons our species to a very limited moral dimension? What is so great with a morality that does not improve as our understanding of ourselves gets better?

      If our knowledge of human nature cannot be considered final — and if our very nature as humans is itself not final — then there is no logical way to formulate a final, absolute morality. And if you really insist on your absolute morality since you view a naturalistic morality as "bleak", then prepare to end up espousing a moral system that is inhuman, destructive and incapacitating, very much like the moral systems that have dominated humankind's moral landscape throughout its recorded history.

      • [I do not see anything bleak with a morality that improves itself over time and that can be adapted to the needs of an evolving species.]

        — I don't see anything wrong with that either. But you assume it "improves itself over time". There's no reason to think this would be the case. Absolutely none.

        [What is so inherently superior with a moral system that imprisons our species to a very limited moral dimension?]

        — When you put that way, ofcourse such a moral system would be inferior. Any moral system that "imprisons our species to a very limited…dimension" would obviously be an inferior one; no need to belabor the obvious.

        [What is so great with a morality that does not improve as our understanding of ourselves gets better? ]

        — Absolutely nothing.

        [If our knowledge of human nature cannot be considered final — and if our very nature as humans is itself not final — then there is no logical way to formulate a final, absolute morality. And if you really insist on your absolute morality since you view a naturalistic morality as "bleak", then prepare to end up espousing a moral system that is inhuman, destructive and incapacitating, very much like the moral systems that have dominated humankind's moral landscape throughout its recorded history.]

        — So many presuppositions here about what I believe and its consequences. And no, I find that I don't agree that I would end up espousing "a moral system that is inhuman, destructive and incapacitating" if I believed in an objective moral domain. And in case you didn't know, Sam Harris doesn't either

        • [I don't see anything wrong with that either. But you assume it "improves itself over time". There's no reason to think this would be the case. Absolutely none.]

          And that is why we must always actively pursue the improvement of our moral system. An improving morality is not for the lazy, although I guess absolutist moralities would be just their cup of tea.

          [Absolutely nothing.]

          So tell me, how can we improve an absolutist moral system? Absolutist morals systems don't leave for improvement since they are obliged to claim that they are perfect. However, since objective, non-absolutist moral systems are not obliged to claim perfection and finality, there is always a room for improvement.

          [nd in case you didn't know, Sam Harris doesn't either.]

          I don't see the point of mentioning Sam Harris here, great a thinker he may be. I know my moral theories are very similar to his, but I have arrived at them independently, and therefore there are important differences between his theories and mine.

          Okay, since you and I seem to agree on a very important point — that our moral system must improve over time — tell me how you would logically reconcile this with an absolutist morality.

          For my part, I will not have any problems with an improving moral system, since I hold that morality is not absolute (never final) but is only provisional (there is always room for improvement). The problem would be yours only, since it is only you who claim that morality should be absolute, like "1+1=2".

          • [And that is why we must always actively pursue the improvement of our moral system. An improving morality is not for the lazy, although I guess absolutist moralities would be just their cup of tea. ],

            — You think that "improving our moral system" is something a moral absolutist would be against? O.K.

            [So tell me, how can we improve an absolutist moral system? Absolutist morals systems don't leave for improvement since they are obliged to claim that they are perfect.]

            — You think that for an absolutist, there is no new knowledge to be had in this world? Since that's the only way for anyone to justify absolute perfection of anything. O.K.

            For my part, I will not have any problems with an improving moral system, since I hold that morality is not absolute (never final) but is only provisional (there is always room for improvement). The problem would be yours only, since it is only you who claim that morality should be absolute, like "1+1=2".]

            — I won't be having any problems about that either, since I know that we do not know everything there is to know; and as our knowledge grows, there will always be room for improvement. If morality were a game, we are both in the dark about the rules to follow. The difference is, I believe there are rules, and you believe the rules are illusory. In fact, you don't even have a leg to stand on; there's no justifying, from your perspective, why the game has to be played in the first place.

          • [If morality were a game, we are both in the dark about the rules to follow.]

            No, you'd still be bitching about not being able to read the rulebook.

          • [You think that for an absolutist, there is no new knowledge to be had in this world? Since that's the only way for anyone to justify absolute perfection of anything. O.K. ]

            Wait, is your second statement even a sentence? As for your first, my answer is yes. How else could it call itself absolutist if it will not make a claim to being perfect? In the context of theistic morality, why would an omniscient god provide a moral code that is incomplete and imperfect? Did the God of the Bible hand down his moral system so that we humans can improve it as our self-knowledge expands? I don't think so. If you think otherwise, that's fine, just support it.

            [The difference is, I believe there are rules, and you believe the rules are illusory.]

            Whoa! Where is this coming from? Not from me, surely. The rules are illusory? Did I ever say that? Did you not catch my drift, after countless comments, that I believe in an objective, non-absolute morality? Did I ever suggest that I was a moral relativist? Hell no!

            [ In fact, you don't even have a leg to stand on; there's no justifying, from your perspective, why the game has to be played in the first place.]

            And then he continues with it, ladies and gentlemen. Please give a big round of applause to the magician who pulls bunnies out of his nostrils!

            BTW, notice that you completely avoided my question: how will your absolutist morality accommodate our ever-expanding self-knowledge? My objective morality will have no problems with accommodating the said expansion. How about yours? Just show me how its done, and I will honestly call you my brother and I would say that whatever our philosophical differences are we are still in agreement when it comes to the essentials. Because for me, there is nothing in ethics more essential that an improving, scientifically-informed and constantly updated moral system. If you agree with that, then we're good, just show me how you can accommodate such in a theistic, absolutist moral perspective, because as of now, I think such a feat is not doable.

          • [Wait, is your second statement even a sentence? As for your first, my answer is yes. How else could it call itself absolutist if it will not make a claim to being perfect? In the context of theistic morality,….blahblahblah ]

            — Someone who believes in an objective moral domain doesn't necessarily believe that the morality he holds, every aspect of it, is objective/absolute. Granted that there are some aspects about his morality that he will think is absolute, like, say, killing babies for fun is absolutely wrong, it doesn't mean that he holds an absolute moral view with respect to everything else.

            [Whoa! Where is this coming from? Not from me, surely. The rules are illusory? Did I ever say that? Did you not catch my drift, after countless comments, that I believe in an objective, non-absolute morality? Did I ever suggest that I was a moral relativist? Hell no! ]

            — I was talking about the is-ought problem here. And no, I didn't say that you said the rules are illusory, but if your a naturalist then you really ought to know that the rules are in fact illusory.

            And then he continues with it, ladies and gentlemen. Please give a big round of applause to the magician who pulls bunnies out of his nostrils! ]

            — Again, this was in reference to the is-ought problem, which you probably didn't understand — but that's not saying anything against you, I presumed, maybe wrongfully, you knew about Sam Harris's chess analogy.

            [BTW, notice that you completely avoided my question: how will your absolutist morality accommodate our ever-expanding self-knowledge? My objective morality will have no problems with accommodating the said expansion.]

            — Your "objective morality" that's actually relative to an "ever-expanding self-knowledge"? People would call that moral relativity, you know. And I've already said that as our knowledge grows, we get closer to truth, thus are more able to find out whether our moral decisions were in fact objective to begin with. Our ever-expanding self-knowledge does not mean truth is provisional, it only means our information is growing, and are thus getting closer to the actual truth. You ask the question already presupposing that truth values are temporary.

            [Just show me how its done, and I will honestly call you my brother and I would say that whatever our philosophical differences are we are still in agreement when it comes to the essentials. Because for me, there is nothing in ethics more essential that an improving, scientifically-informed and constantly updated moral system. If you agree with that, then we're good]

            — Well you can start calling me "brother" now since I don't have a problem with a "scientifically-informed and constantly updated moral system".

            Look, and this explains my 'game' analogy, I believe that an objective moral domain is out there. I'm not claiming that we've already found it. We are both continuously revising our morality. The difference being: for me it's because I want to get closer to truth, and for you it's because the times have changed.

          • [The difference being: for me it's because I want to get closer to truth, and for you it's because the times have changed.]

            Oh no, you have completely misunderstood my viewpoint. I think moral systems improve because we have an improving self-knowledge. In short, we are getting closer to what one might call "perfect moral knowledge". Of course I believe we will never reach it; what's important to me is that we are approaching it.

            After all, we will never gain perfect knowledge of the physical universe too, but that's not bleak or disconcerting to me at all; what's important is that our physical theories are getting better all the time so that they could always accommodate newer scientific data.

            Note also that I do not merely believe that there is an objective moral truth out there, I also think that we have already started getting to know the lay of the land. Many of our modern, scientifically-informed moral values are already part of this objective moral truth that you speak of. Of course I also believe that our moral landscape must change as we evolve as a species; you cannot have a morality that is divorced from the biological nature and evolutionary history of the moral agent. But, and this is where we disagree, I don't think that that makes my moral system relativist, while you think it does. In the future I hope to convince you that it does not. A moral system based on our biological nature and evolutionary history is not relativist and its rules are not in any way illusory.

          • I guess I will first have to read your article then. I think I already know the route you will take, but it would be better to hear how you actually lay it out.

    • The countless absolutist moralities have been given tens of thousands of years to improve the human condition and to make life on Earth better for all of its inhabitants, and none of them worked. Now is the time to try a scientific morality.

    • [Remind me again why I should take this asshole seriously?]

      — Well, if you oversimplify what he said in the way that you have, then he really would seem like an "asshole".

      • Twin merely summarized the whole thing; there was no oversimplification involved.

        Modern Christians, on the other hand, are frequently guilty of inserting pseudo-justifications between scriptural lines to make gory Old Testament stories palatable to the modern moral sensibility. (Mind you, if you read the writings of pre-Aquinas theologians, they would have no problem with Old Testament gore. Even a modern Calvinist theologian would see no need in apologizing for God's gruesome actions in the Old Testament. After all, a God who can prepare eternal damnation for anyone who happens to not believe in him and who get away with it can obviously get away with anything.)

        • Yes there was "oversimplification involved". And seeing as you have no argument as to why I should believe that there was "no oversimplification involved", I'll just assert, kinda like you did, that there was.

          • [I'll just assert, kinda like you did, that there was.]

            Let's clear that up by directly quoting the source:

            "By setting such strong, harsh dichotomies God taught Israel that any assimilation to pagan idolatry is intolerable. It was His way of preserving Israel’s spiritual health and posterity. God knew that if these Canaanite children were allowed to live, they would spell the undoing of Israel. The killing of the Canaanite children not only served to prevent assimilation to Canaanite identity but also served as a shattering, tangible illustration of Israel’s being set exclusively apart for God.

            Moreover, if we believe, as I do, that God’s grace is extended to those who die in infancy or as small children, the death of these children was actually their salvation. We are so wedded to an earthly, naturalistic perspective that we forget that those who die are happy to quit this earth for heaven’s incomparable joy. Therefore, God does these children no wrong in taking their lives."

            Miguel, would it kill you to read the link before you make another assumption?

          • Try reading what you just quoted. It's hardly fairly encapsulated by your statement "[it's all well and fine] since God commanded it, and that the Canaanites were wicked, the deserved it. That includes killing their women, children, and infants "

          • [Try reading what you just quoted. ]

            I did. Have you? Don't blame me for your lack of reading comprehension.

          • Firstly, I'm not a biblical inerrantist, but I'll be defending what Craig said from your summation of it.

            you said: "since God commanded it, and that the Canaanites were wicked, the deserved it. That includes killing their women, children, and infants"

            Now notice that your "summation" scarcely makes any reference to the first paragraph you quoted which says that God was concerned about the Israelites, and barely touches on the second paragraph that you quote which says that God does the children no wrong in taking their lives. This is even just based on what you quoted that is even arguably lacking because of your being so generous to yourself.

            Now you notice that you erred, and so do a little sleighty-sleighty by saying:

            "Basically, because God promises them heaven, it's okay to kill kids, and tells the Israelites to do it. If I commited an error, it is that I made Craig sound more sane then he actually is"

            which actually has nothing to do with what you originally said. Read them side by side. But I understand why you would want to refurbish what you've originally said for more sense-making.

            And I lack reading comprehension skills, he says.

          • The bottom line is still that Craig has justified murdering an entire race because God ordered his people to, regardless his concern for the Israelites. And seriously, an ethnic cleansing to "protect" the spiritual health of his chosen people?

            And to justify killing women and children, Craig further surmised that because of their Canaanite heritage, these children had to be executed as well, but attempts (and fails to) rationalize that this God would still bring them into heaven, somehow making it okay.

            As I said earlier, given you seem to be ignoring it, kindly read the fucking link before you blather on again. You can't expect us to hold your hand all the time.

          • No, actually the bottom line is that you oversimplified what he said to make him sound more ridiculous, which makes you disingenuous. Even how you re-explained what you said right now –above this post– would make what you *originally* said seem like an oversimplification.

            [Craig further surmised that because of their Canaanite heritage, these children had to be executed as well]

            — I think Craig's point was that they were executed for their own good, not solely because of their Canaanite heritage. (This may sound ridiculous, ofcourse, since we are only able to crudely show a small part of the logic behind the rationalization he gave)

            [As I said earlier, given you seem to be ignoring it, kindly read the fucking link before you blather on again. You can't expect us to hold your hand all the time.]

            — I've read the link, and have accurately called you out on your oversimplification. I've also been able to show you what you left out in what you yourself quoted from Craig. No need to hold my hand, buddy boy.

          • [– I think Craig's point was that they were executed for their own good, not solely because of their Canaanite heritage.

            Bullshit. For somebody who claims to read the link, you're not doing a very good job remembering it. Allow me to refresh your memory:

            //But why take the lives of innocent children? The terrible totality of the destruction was undoubtedly related to the prohibition of assimilation to pagan nations on Israel’s part. In commanding complete destruction of the Canaanites, the Lord says, “You shall not intermarry with them, giving your daughters to their sons, or taking their daughters for your sons, for they would turn away your sons from following me, to serve other gods” (Deut 7.3-4). This command is part and parcel of the whole fabric of complex Jewish ritual law distinguishing clean and unclean practices. To the contemporary Western mind many of the regulations in Old Testament law seem absolutely bizarre and pointless: not to mix linen with wool, not to use the same vessels for meat and for milk products, etc. The overriding thrust of these regulations is to prohibit various kinds of mixing. Clear lines of distinction are being drawn: this and not that. These serve as daily, tangible reminders that Israel is a special people set apart for God Himself.//

            For their own good?

            Prohibiting "mixing" of races to ensure purity as a premise for genocide.

            If you said that under most circumstances, you would get called a Klansman or worse. In fact, we have a wealth of history showing this sort of thinly veiled atrocity being conducted on other communities that were put under the sword. The salem witch trials, the crusades, and the holocaust are just among more common examples.

            The only one here who sounds fucking ridiculous is you, for attempting to rationalize what happened to the Canaanites as if it's alright just because God says it is, or because some bronze age law dictates that it is fine.

      • More of Craig's wonderful rationalization:

        //According to the version of divine command ethics which I’ve defended, our moral duties are constituted by the commands of a holy and loving God. Since God doesn’t issue commands to Himself, He has no moral duties to fulfill. He is certainly not subject to the same moral obligations and prohibitions that we are. For example, I have no right to take an innocent life. For me to do so would be murder. But God has no such prohibition. He can give and take life as He chooses. We all recognize this when we accuse some authority who presumes to take life as “playing God.” Human authorities arrogate to themselves rights which belong only to God. God is under no obligation whatsoever to extend my life for another second. If He wanted to strike me dead right now, that’s His prerogative.

        What that implies is that God has the right to take the lives of the Canaanites when He sees fit. How long they live and when they die is up to Him. //

  15. Morality that “thought-out, reasoned, argued, discussed, and based upon – you could almost say – intelligent design.”

    Thought out and discussed by who? And what exactly is an "evolved" brain?

    • Thought out and discussed by rational people who stick to the rules of evidence and the laws of logic. An evolved brain is the brain of the homo sapien which is capable of rational thought.

  16. Does Craig's objective moral values include the property of being changeless? Like "Thou shall not kill" has been, is now and shall ever be? If so, then evidence of changing moral values will weaken his claim.

    • Craig is more focused on rattling out words like a machine gun to confuse a listening audience to really discuss his own understanding of what constitutes "objective".

      • Tanod. Read the article. It is not too hard to understand Craig's argument. Than make your objections to his reasoning in a logical way.

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